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On April 30, 2007, Judge James C. Morfitt, without any detailed explanation, granted the
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of statute of limitations. Judge
Morfitt indicated in his Order of that date that "Plaintiffs' claims and causes of action arising
prior to July 21, 2003 are time-barred based upon the applicable statute of limitation for statutory
violations." The issue at that time was whether a three-year statute of limitation pursuant to LC.
§ 5-218 or a five-year statute oflimitation pursuant to LC.§ 5-216 applied.
A Motion for Reconsideration can be brought pursuant to Rule l l(a)(2)(B), which states
in material part: "A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may
be made at any time before the entry of final judgment ...." Rule 54(b) also allows the court to
reconsider and to change a previous ruling. The material part of Rule 54(b) LR.C.P. reads in
material part: "[A]ny order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates
less than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the parties shall not terminate
the actions as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties .... "

In the two and one-half years since Judge Morfitt's Order of April 30, 2007, the parties to
this action have been engaged in further discovery, multiple motion practice, an appeal to the
Supreme Court and now they are now back before this honorable Court. During that period of
time, it has become evident that the parties are proceeding upon a contract cause of action rather
than a statutory action.
The statute in question, i.e., LC.§ 72-915, does not by and of itself control the issue as to
which statute of limitation should be applied in this context. True, LC. § 72-915 was the focus of
the Supreme Court's decision entered in this matter on May 5, 2009. But, as developed below,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO BIFURCATE - 2
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that is not dispositive of the applicability of a five-year statute oflimitation.

Kelso & Irwin, P.A. vs. State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 997 P.2d 591 (2000) has
not been changed or overruled, or limited by any subsequent decisions of the Idaho Supreme
Court. The operative language in Kelso is crystal clear:

It is undisputed that Kelso has a contract for worker's compensation insurance
with the SIF. Any violation of the provisions of that contract would constitute a
breach of contract by the SIF. Additionally, the contract necessarily incorporates
the statutory framework which both created the SIF and governs the actions that
can be taken by the SIF with regard to the SIF's funds ... consequently, any act
taken by the SIF beyond its statutory authority would also be a breach of the SIF's
contract with Kelso.
At 138.

This holding immediately brings into play J.C. § 5-216, the five-year statute governing breach of
contract claims.
Paramount in this case is the fact that the smaller policyholders paying premiums of
$2,500 or less have had their contracts breached by the SIF on multiple occasions. The decision
by the Supreme Court on May 5, 2009 indicating the necessity of a pro rata distribution of a
declared dividend corpus, once one has been established, leaves no doubt that the contracts of the
policyholders within the Class have been breached by virtue of the SIF's statutory violations. 1
After Judge Morfitt's ruling, the Deposition of Randolph E. Farber, one of the individual
Plaintiffs in this case, was taken by the Defendants. In that deposition, the State Insurance Fund
refers to the contract between it and Mr. Farber (Farber Depo., p 18, I. 20; p. 27, I. 25). Th.ere the
word "contract" is used by the SIF itself. Mr. Farber himself refers to his "policy'' which is, of
course, a contract. The SIF does the same:

1

It should be noted that while the term "dividends· has been used frequently in this case, the SIF has
recently acknowledged that the operative statute really describes a rate readjustment. See, I.C. § 72-915.
The readjustment of the cost of buying insurance is, in actuality, a readjustment of the consideration lying
at the heart of the contract.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO BIFURCATE - 3
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Q:
Now, with respect to the insurance that you have with the State Insurance Fund,
you don't even have a contract with the State Insurance Fund, other than your policy; correct?
(emphasis added)
Mr. Farber agrees with that statement. Id., p. 28, 1. 4.

The Deposition of Scott Becker, another lead Plaintiff in this case, was taken on June 28,
2007 by the State Insurance Fund. Again, this was after Judge Morfitt's decision. There, the
policy of Mr. Becker with the SIF for worker's compensation insurance was discussed
repeatedly. See, e.g., Becker Depo., p. 10, 11. 9, 12, 18; 12:7, 14. Mr. Becker purchased his State
Insurance Fund policy because of the dividend distribution which made his contract with the
State Insurance Fund "affordable." Id., p. 29, 11. 16-22; Mr. Becker, a layperson, refers to his
contractual relationship with the SIF as an "insurance policy" Id, p. 32, 11. 13-14. The SIF kept
interrogating Mr. Becker pointing out that his insurance policy with the State Insurance Fund
does not say anything about dividends. See, e.g., Becker Depo., p. 45, 1. 19, p. 46, 1. 9. The SIF
called the policy itself an "agreement" on p. 45.

The SIF, in taking this position, clearly

understands that the statute is incorporated into the contract and it is that contract which allows
Mr. Becker a dividend under applicable circumstances.

Following these two depositions and many pages of briefing, the Supreme Court on
March 5th and May 5th made clear what was, perhaps, unclear to Judge Morfitt. That is to say,
the Supreme Court has made clear that the Plaintiffs and the Class have a direct, contractual
property interest in those dividend monies which were improperly distributed by the SIF.
The conclusion that this is not a statutory cause of action but, rather, is grounded in
contract is compelled by the fact that the Plaintiffs are pursuing the recovery of a property right
which bears directly upon the consideration given for the purchase of insurance.

Idaho

employers do not fall under I.C. § 72-915 simply because they are employers. They must first
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO BIFURCATE-4
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have a contract of worker's compensation insurance with the State Insurance Fund before I.C. §
72-915 comes into play. When the statute is violated, as the Farber Court has said that it has
been repeatedly violated, then that constitutes multiple breaches of contract. 1.C. § 5-216 then
should control and allow a five-year limitation for the Class of policyholders which have brought
this action on the basis of a deprivation of a direct, contractual property interest.
The Plaintiffs in Kelso had made numerous claims regarding the conduct of the SIF, but
were unsuccessful as to the bulk of those claims.

On appeal, most of the district court's

decisions dismissing the causes of action were affirmed. However, two breach of contract claims
were remanded for further proceedings. There was no ruling by the Court as to whether these
claims might be precluded by the statute of limitations but the fact remains that these claims were
recognized by the Supreme Court as contractual, not statutory, claims. This is important because
at least one of the claims which was remanded arose from the allegation that the SIF had
breached its contract in failing to follow the duties imposed on it by I.C. § 72-911 - one of the
statutes creating the SIF in 1917. These claims were regarded by the Supreme Court not as
statutory claims but as contract claims as the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Here, too, the contract claims of the Plaintiffs should be seen as paramount. The statute,
standing alone, could not be utilized by the Plaintiffs unless they first had a contract of insurance
with the SIF. That contract incorporates the statute, not vice versa. The dismissal of all of the
Plaintiffs in the Class for the two-year period prior to the three-year period which Judge Morfitt
accepted (but did not explain) was simply in error.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have requested the Court to revisit this issue under its inherent
authority under Rule 54(b) and/or Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B).
The Defendants will argue that in some fashion Kelso has been changed or conditioned by
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Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, et al., 141 Idaho 388, 111 P.3d 73 (2005).
However, on close examination Hayden Lake will not support a determination that the claims
made in this case are limited by the three-year statute. The facts underlying Hayden Lake are
procedurally and chronologically complex since the complaint of Hayden Lake was filed while

Kelso was still pending before the Supreme Court. However, one of the issues before the district
court was whether a three-year or five-year statute of limitation should be applied against the

Kelso and Hayden Lake claims against the State Insurance Fund arising from claimed violations
of I.e. ff 72-911 and 42-722 (with the exception of an unjust enrichment claim which the district
court held fell under the 4-year statute of limitations). The district court held that there was no
actionable violation of I.C. § 72-911 and never reached the statute of limitation question. As to
the claims arising from alleged violations of I.C. § 42-722, the district court looked to Dietrich v.

Copeland Lumber Co., 28 Idaho 312, 318, 154 P. 626, 628 (1916) which held that in determining
the appropriate statute of limitation a "statutory liability . . . is one that depends for its existence
on the enactment of the statute and not on the contract of the parties." The Hayden Lake district
court indicated that the Dietrich holding should not be controlling in light of the Supreme
Court's finding in Kelso some five years earlier. Nevertheless, the district court opined that the
"gravamen" of the claim asserted in Kelso and Hayden Lake really related to the statute involved,

i.e., I.C. § 42-722, rather than to any contract incorporating that statute. As summarized by the
Supreme Court in Hayden Lake "Thus, since the claims would not exist 'but for' the statutes, the
[district] court applied the three-year statute of limitations to contract claims and determined that
the claims accrued on the effective dates of the leases." at 395.

In discussing the district court's decision on the question of what statute of limitation
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO BIFURCATE - 6
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applied to the alleged violations of I.C. ~ 42-722, the Supreme Court in Hayden Lake upheld the
district court in its finding that the gravamen of the Hayden Lake claims were grounded in
statute. The Supreme Court in Hayden Lake then went on to state that the claims of breach of
contract and implied covenant claims were based on alleged statutory violations and, as such, the
application of the three-year statute was appropriate. "Though the district court recognized that
Dietrich may not be controlling in light of this court's Kelso decision, it stated that "[Dietrich] is

useful in support of the proposition that the true gravamen of the Plaintiffs' claims should control
the question of which statute of limitations is applicable, rather than the manner in which the
claims are actually pied."
Kelso addressed two contract claims.

The first claim argued that the surplus being

retained by the SIF was in excess of what was statutorily required by I.C. § 72-911.
A second contract claim had to do with allegedly selling worker's compensation
insurance at the artificially low premiums established by I.C. § 41-1612(2) and (3). Hayden Lake
discussed yet another claim that the SIF had entered into certain real estate leases which were a
violation ofl.C. §§ 41-701, 72-902 and 72-912. Hayden Lake at 394; Kelso at 140.
These claims were clearly tangential to any direct contractual relationship between the
SIF and its policyholders as we have here.

The Supreme Court in Kelso held that the

policyholders of the SIF did not have a property interest in the assets of the SIF. Here, though, it
has been clearly stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in its amended decision of May 5th that once
the Manager of the SIF decides to declare a dividend and sets money aside for dividend purposes,
then the policyholders do have direct stake in seeing that the distribution requirements of LC. §
72-915 are carried out on a pro rata basis. The existence of a property interest distinguishes this
case from Hayden Lake in that here there is a fundamental contracted duty to the policyholders
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO BIFURCATE - 7
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from the SIF by means of the statute which, once a dividend has been declared, locks in that duty
to recognize a property interest in favor of the policyholders. This is not at all tangential and not
at all abstract. The Hayden Lake and Kelso claims upon which the Court reached a Supreme
Court determination had to do with the operation of the State Insurance Fund.2 The claims
involved here are intimately and directly involved with the operation of a contract. That contract
requires a pro rata distribution of dividend monies to identifiable and eligible policyholders.
This is a distinction with a difference. If we need to find a "gravamen" it is the contractual
property right arising from the contract to receive a pro rata share of the dividend corpus once
that is declared and established by the SIF. Hayden Lake's holding is consistent with Plaintiffs'
position if we must analyze this on an either/or basis between the statute and the contract as
drivers of the appropriate statute of limitation.
Coming back to Hayden Lake, therefore, one must pause as to the necessity of an
identification of a single "gravamen" of this action. As previously stated, by the mere fact that
one is an Idaho employer does not bestow any rights under J.C. § 72-915. Then, too, J.C. § 72915, standing by itself, confers no right to anyone. In truth, both the contract and the statute are
necessary and are inextricably intertwined. One is meaningless without the other. The "true"
gravamen in this case is that well in excess of 30,000 policyholders, more or less, have been
consistently deprived of rate readjustment due them by virtue of their insurance contract with the
State Insurance Fund.

Whether the right to the receipt of these dividends is spelled out

specifically in the contract or whether there is an incorporation ofl.C. § 72-915 into the contract
2

None of the statutes conferred any direct right or benefit on the plaintiffs in Hayden Lake. I.C. § 72-911
was concerned with the amount of surplus the SIF could or should set aside. I.C. § 41-1612(2) and (3)
provided for the charging of premiums which the Plaintiffs argued were too low. The plaintiffs were also
trying to condition or to direct the management or operation of the fund as to the amount of retained
surplus required under I.C. § 72-911 and questioning certain real estate leases entered into by the SIF.
These efforts by the Kelso and Hayden Lake plaintiffs were far different in scope and nature from the
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO BIFURCATE - 8
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would seem to make no difference whatsoever.
Additionally, it is the law in this jurisdiction that where there is a choice between two
statutes of limitation or a rule which impacts directly upon such a statute are possible, courts
should generally prefer the construction which gives the longer period in which to prosecute the
action. James v. Buck, 111 Idaho 708, 710, 727 P.2d 1136 (1986). This holding is consistent
with the holdings of many of our sister states. For example, in Amco Ins. Co. v. Rockwell, 940
P.2d 1096 (Colo.Ct.App. 1997), the Colorado Appellate Court stated "because statutes of
limitation are in derogation of a presumptively valid claim, a longer period of limitation should
prevail if two statutes are arguably applicable." at 1097.
Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court In Matter of Estate of Renwanz, 561 N.W.2d 43
(Iowa, 1997), the Supreme Court of Iowa stated " ... Courts do not favor statutes of limitation.
When two interpretations are possible, the preferred interpretation is one that allows the litigant
seeking relief to have a longer period." at 45. The Supreme Court of Montana is accord. In

Traveler's Indemnity Co. v. Andersen, 983 P.2d 999 (1999), that Court stated at 1002 "[W]here
doubt exists as to the theory of the action - and, therefore which statute of limitation should
apply - the general rule is that the doubt is resolved in favor of the longer statute of limitation."
The Supreme Court of North Dakota is in accord as well. In Global Financial Services, Inc. v.

Duttenhefner, 575 N.W.2d 667 (N.D. 1998), the North Dakota Supreme Court stated ''we have a
general policy of selecting the longer statute of limitation when there is a reasonable dispute over
which statute applies." Citing Burr v. Ca/as, 564, N.W.2d 631 (1997). Similarly, in Zoss v.

Schaefers, 598 N.W.2d 550 (S.D. 1999), the Supreme Court of South Dakota cited to Richards v.
Lenz, 539 N.W.2d 80, 85 (S.D. 1995):
direct contractual property interest being asserted here.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO BIFURCATE- 9

0001-74

. . . when one of two statutes of limitation may be applicable, such application
should always be tested by the nature of the allegations in the complaint and if
there is any doubt as to which statute applies, such doubt should be resolved in
favor of the longer limitation.
Judge Morfitt did not even grapple with any of the issues discussed above. Judge Morfitt
apparently ignored the citation of the Plaintiffs to one case holding that a longer statute of
limitation should be applied where there is a choice between a longer statute and a shorter statute.
To be fair to Judge Morfitt, the Idaho case of James v. Buck, supra, was not cited or discussed by
Plaintiffs in opposing the SIF's proposition that a three-year statute of limitation should apply.
Then, too, the SIF only gave this statute of limitation issue short shrift in its Memorandum of
February 13, 2007 supporting its Motion for Summary Judgment. That Motion covered many
issues and the supporting Memorandum covered some 35 pages with only¾ of one page devoted
to the statute of limitation issue. Thus, this issue was really not fleshed out for Judge Morfitt
who, obviously, did not then have the benefit of the Supreme Court's controlling decision of May

5, 2009.

ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO BIFURCATE

If the Court does not agree that the Plaintiffs and their Class are seeking to enforce their
direct, contractual, rights to funds in which they have a vested interest, then it is respectfully
requested that the Court bifurcate the existing Class into two sub-classes as stated in the present
alternative motion. These two sub-classes would be:
Sub-Class # 1 - This Class would be composed of those employers who purchased a
policy of insurance with the State Insurance Fund on or after July 1, 1999 and before July 1,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO BIFURCATE- 10

000175

2001, who paid an annual premium for such insurance to the SIF which was not more than
$2,500 for one or more policy years beginning on or after July 1, 1999 and before July 1, 2001,
and who did not receive a dividend from the SIF relating to those two years.
Sub-Class #2 - lbis Class would be composed of those employers who purchased a
policy for worker's compensation insurance from the SIF on or after July 1, 2001, paid an annual
premium for such insurance to the SIF which was not more than $2,500 for one or more policy
years beginning on or after July 1, 2001, and did not receive a dividend since July 22, 2003 from
the SIF during any respective subsequent year that dividends were paid to other policyholders.
Such a bifurcation would allow Sub-Class #2 to proceed to a resolution whether by
stipulation or Court decision and permit judgment to be issued as to Sub-Class #1. Sub-Class # 1
can then proceed to appeal without delay while the damages due to Sub-Class #2 are sorted out
and Sub-Class #2 will likely recover its claims before the appeal as to Sub-Class # 1 is resolved.
lbis procedure is within the discretion of the Court and has the advantage of expediting a
resolution of the claims of Sub-Class #2, as the composition of the Class is not in dispute. lbis
results in no further delay in payment to the employers in Sub-Class #1 and a savings to the SIF
since the interest accruing on the claims of Sub-Class #2 will cease as the claims are settled or
decided.

CONCLUSION

As the foregoing demonstrates, there have been additional facts brought to bear in this
case since the two and one-half year old decision of Judge Morfittt.

Upon reflection and

consideratio°' it is clear that the true gravamen in this case is the fact that policyholders have
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been deprived of their contractually-derived property interest in declared dividend corpus. That
fact, in turn, depends for relief on the yoking of the statute (LC. § 72-915) and the contract of
insurance, neither of which can stand alone.
Accordingly, this Court should, upon revisiting the issue, declare that the five-year statute
of limitations should apply in this case which would be measured from the date of the filing of
the Complaint on July 22, 2006.
Alternatively, a bifurcation of the presently-identified Class into two Sub-Classes would
be procedurally appropriate and would be in the interest of the economical administration of
justice.
1i"¢1.l
~
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _'"t_ day of~vembcr, 2009.

LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD.

<llJL·

By
Donald W. Lojek

GORDON LAW OFFICES

ByL S~ (s(JI) ((__
Bruce S. Bistline
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CERTfflCATE OF SERVICE
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LI1\!

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the___=i_ day ofN(P;em\Jer, 2009, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing instrument was served on the following by the method indicated below, and
addressed as follows:

fx:.]

(&and Deliveii)
[_.] U.S. Mail, postage paid
[ ]
Overnight Express Mail
[ ]
Facsimile Copy:

Richard E. Hall
Keely Duke
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton PA
702 West Idaho Street, Ste. 700
Boise, ID 83702
Attorney for State Insurance Fund

Donald W. Lojek
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LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD
623 West Hays Street
PO Box 1712
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone:
208-343-7733
Facsimile:
208-345-0050

DEC O4 2009
CANYON COUNTY CLEAK
K CANNON, DEPUTY

Philip Gordon ISBN 1996
Bruce S. Bistline ISBN 1988
GORDON LAW OFFICES
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83 702
Telephone: 208/345-7100
Facsimile: 208/345-0050
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
RANDOLPH E. FARBER,
SCOTT ALAN BECKER and CRITTER
CLINIC, an Idaho Professional Association.

CASE NO. CV06-7877
AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD W. LOJEK

Plaintiffs,
vs.

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, and
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER,
MARGUARITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE
MARTIN, and MARK SNODGRASS in their
capacity as member of the Board of Directors
of the State Insurance Fund
Defendants.
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)

t'

STATE OF IDAHO

)
: ss

County of Ada

)

COMES NOW, DONALD W. LOJEK, and being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes
and says:

1.

That he is one of the attorneys representing the Plaintiffs and the class in the

above-captioned matter.
2.

Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the

Deposition of Randolph E. Farber.
3.

Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "B" 1s a true and correct copy of the

Deposition of Scott Alan Becker.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT.
DATED this .,2 f"1ay of November, 2009.

Donald W. Lojek

1£
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t~q" d

Notary Public or I a.ho
Residing at:
· {;7JS~ •

My Commission Expires: =7j?;:i:;t-/.;:M7o
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

£

\»--

L1*f)P,
,Q.~
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the_7_day ofvember, 2009, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing instrument was served on the following by the method indicated below, and
addressed as follows:

[ xj
~

[ ]
[ ]

and Delive
U.S. Mai , postage paid
Overnight Express Mail
Facsimile Copy:

Richard E. Hall
Keely Duke
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton PA
702 West Idaho Street, Ste. 700
Boise, ID 83 702
Attorney for State Insurance Fund

Donald W. Lojek
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,.
IN THE DJSTRJCT COURT OF THE TI-ilRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

1

OF TI-IE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COumY OF CANYON

2

MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD

3

GEDDES, MJLFORD TERRELL, JUDI

4

DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE )

5

MARTIN, and MARK SNODGRASS in

6

their capacity as members of the )

TI-CE rDAHO ST ATE INSURANCE FUND,

7

Board of Directors of the State )

JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, and )

8

(nsw-ance Fwid,

RANDOLPH E. FAR.BER, SOOTT Al.AN
BECKER

aoo CRJTIBR. CL.W!C, an

Idaho Profes.s1onal Association, )
Plaintiffs,

)

)

)

) Ca.ie No. CV06-78n

YS.

)

WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER.

Defendants.

9

)

0

1
2
DEPOSmON OF RANDOLPH E. FARBER

NNE29,2007

3

TI-IE DEPOSITION OF RANDOLPH E. FARBER

4

5
REPORTED BY:

MONICA M. ARCHULETA. CSR NO. 471

NOTARY PUBLIC

was taken on behalf of the Defendants at the

6 offices of Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton.,
7

702 West Idaho, Suite 700, Boise, Idaho,

8

commencing at 10:00 a.m. on Jwie 29, 2007, before

9

Monica M. Archuleta, Certified Shorthand Reporter

I

Q0

1

and Notary Public within and for the State of
Idaho, in the above-entitled matter.

3
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1 (Pages 1 to 2)

APPEARANCES:

1

1

INDEX

2 TESTIMONY OF RANDOLPH E. FARBER:

2 For the Plaintiffs:
3

LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD.

3

4

BY: MR. DONALD W. LOJEK

4

5

1199 W. Main Street

5

6

P.O. Box 1712

7

Boise, Idaho 83701-1712

Examination by Ms. Duke

6

7
8

8 And
9

GORDON LAW OFFICES

0

BY: MR. PHILIP GORDON

1

623 West Hays Street

2

Boise, Idaho 83702

5

EXHIBITS

1. Second Amended Notice of Deposition

11

for Jury Ttial

1 3. First Amended Class Action Complaint

2

8

DucesTecwn

9 2. Class Action Complaint and Demand
0

PAGE

11

and Demand for Jury Trial

3

3
4

4

For the Defendants Idaho State Insurance Fund and

5

James M. Alcorn, Manager of the State Insurance

5
6

6

Fund:

7

7

HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.

8

BY: MS. KEELY E. DUKE

9

MR. RlCHARD E. HALL

0

702 West Idaho, Suite 700

1

P.O. Box 1271

8

Boise, Idaho 83701

ALSO PRESENT: George Parham
James M. Alcorn

'j
I

Page 4

Page 3 ]
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(Pages J to 4)

RANDOLPH E. FARBER,

1

1

A. I may have. But I can't remember

offhand.

2 first duly sworn to tell the truth relating to

2

3 said cause, testified as follows:

3

4

4 process given that you are an attorney.

EXAMlNATION

5

5

A. Yes.

6

Q. So I won't go through a lot of the

7

ground rules with you. The big one I will go

6 QUESTIONS BY MS. DUKE:
7

Q. Good morning, Mr. Farber. My name is

8 Keely Duke. We were just introduced off the

Q. Obviously, you're familiar with the

8 over with you is, if you don't understand a

l9

9 record. I'm one of the attorneys who is

question that I ask you, please let me know.

I

}O Okay?

O representing the defendants in an action that you

1

}l

have filed against them.

A. Sure.

l

2
3
4

t2

Q. And if you're answering my questions

i

I'm assuming you are understanding them. Okay?

I

If you could state your name for the

record?

J

I

}4

A. Randolph Earl Farber.

A. Sure.

I

5

MS. DUKE: Counsel, ifwe can stipulate

}5

6

this deposition is being taken pursuant to the

fI 6

7

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

~7

Q. If you could just give us a general

background of your education and what you did to

!

become a lawyer?

I

8

i8

MR. LOJEK: That's true. Before we

A. I graduated from Willamette University

I
I

9

start, Ms. Duke. Even though Mr. Farber is a

19 in 1974 with a B.S. in American studies and

O

distinguished member of the Idaho State Bar he is

2O

political science. I graduated with a J.D. from

1

not an expert in this case. And he won't be

i1

Gonzaga University in 1977. And I became a

2

giving any legal opinions this morning.

22

member of the Idaho State Bar in September of

3
4

5

!

2 3 1978. I then worked, I believe, for six years

MS. DUKE: Thank you.

~4

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Have you ever had your

;

deposition taken before?

with Bruce Robinson until 1983. I spent one

2 5 year, I believe, with Charles Coulter in Boise
Page 5

6
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c.

D

receptionist/secretary. And the other one is a

l from '83 to '84. And then beginning in 1984

l

2 I shared an office space, sort of, with

2 bookkeeper. And, like I say, I have a couple

3 Frank Kibler until he died. And I have been a

3

4 sole practitioner probably technically and

4 an overload .

5 legally since 1984. And my practice is in Nampa,

5

6 Idaho.

6 bar license in 1978?

7

Q. What is the address of your practice?

7

A. Yes.

8

A. 823 12th Avenue South.

8

Q. Since that time have you had any times

9

Q. And what is the name of your firm?

9 when it has been revoked, suspended, anyth.ing

0

A. Just Randolph E. Farber, Attorney at

O like that?

1

Law.

contractual people ifl have a reaJ emergency or

Q. And it sounds like you obtained your

1

A. No.

2

Q. Do you have. any employees?

2

Q. With respect to Exhibit No. 1, wh.ich

3

A. I've got one full time. Two part time.

3

you have in front of you. That is your notice of

4

And a couple of others for overloads and stuff

5

when I'm lucky.

6
7

Q. Has that been about the size of your

ft.rm?

5

A. Right.

6

Q. -- asking that you bring with you

7 certain docwnents.

8

A. No. At one time I had two full-time

9

employees and two part time. Two or three.

O

Depending on who would show up.

1

' 4 deposition -

8

A. Right.

9

Q. Do you have any docwnents that would be

0 responsive to items one, two or three?
!
i

21

Q. And the full-time employee you have, is

[

A. No.

I

2

~2

that a secretary?

I

t

Q. Have you provided any documents to your

3

A. Paralegal; yes.

4

Q. And then the two part times?

1

case or any issue with respect to your policy for

5

A. One part time is basically a

25

Workers' Compensation insurance with the State

3
4

I

attorneys with respect to your claims in this

I

Page 7

I

Page 8
4
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1 Insurance Fund?

1

2

2 And once in a while my secretary may fill out

MR. LOJEK: We would object to that

A. I don't know. I just write the check.

3 question insofar as it attempts to invade the

3 something. But I don't even know where those

4 attorney-client priviJege with respect to

4

5

privileged communicatioos.

documents are.
MS. DUKE: And given your objection,

5

6

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Did you have in your

6

I obviously don 1t want to invade the

7

possession any documents that you feel relate to

7

attorney-client privilege. But we would expect

8

this case?

8

to see a privilege log with any documentation
that has been provided providing a description

9

A. My private possession?

9

0

Q. Yes.

O that is required under the Idaho Rules of Civil

l

A. No.

1

Procedure so we can see at least what documents

2

Q. Prior to hiring attorneys did you have

2

are out there and what you are claiming a
privilege to, if there are any.

3

documents that were in your possession that

3

4

related to this case?

4

~

LOJEK: That's fine.

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) What did you do to

5

A. Not what I would call as a document.

5

6

Q. So nothing in writing?

6

7

A. Other than perhaps the check I write

7

A. Talk to my attorneys.

prepare for your deposition today?-

8

every year to the State Industrial Fund. They

8

Q. And when did you talk to them?

9

send me a couple documents. And I assume that

9

A. I have talked to them several times.

O

the State has those in their possession. I do

0

Q. In preparation for your deposition.

1

not generate any docwnents myself.

1

A. Today and yesterday.

2

Q. But even with respect to documents that

Q. And how long did you meet with them?

3

the State Insurance Fund may have produced, did

A. Approximately an hour each time.

4

you have any of those documents prior to hiring

Q. Did you review any documents in

5

an attorney related to your policies?

preparation for your deposition today?
Page

Page 10
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1

A . Yes.

1 amended complaint. Prior to reading the

2

Q. And what documents did you review in

2 complaint, which is Exhibit 2, and the amended

3
4

preparation?

3

A. 1 reviewed the first and second amended

complaint, which is Exhibit 3, had you read

4 those, prior to that time of reading them, in

5 complaint. I also reviewed -- and by "review" I

5

6 should use the word "skimmed." Mr. Alcom's

6

preparation for your deposition?
A.

r had reviewed the first complaint.

7

affidavit I even took a look at some

7

And, once again, I would qualify that by saying I

8

interrogatory answers. But, once again, Ijust

8

skimmed over it.

9

skimmed over those.

9

0

1

Q. Any other documents that you looked at

Q. And did you review the first complaint

O prior to the time it was filed?

in preparation for your deposition?

1

A. I can't recall.
Q. And so the first time you would have

2

A. Well, this subpoena.

2

3

Q. Any others?

3 read the First Amended Complaint, Exhibit 3,

4

A. Not that I'm aware of

4 would have been yesterday or today in

5

6
7
8

MR. LOJEK: By "subpoena" you meant the
notice of deposition?

I

16

THE WITNESS: Right.

7

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Now, You mentioned the

9

first and second amended complaints. I would

O

assume that you actually mean the Class Action

1

Complaint, which is Exhibit 2. And then the

2

First Amended Complaint, which is Exhibit 3?

3

A. Yes.

4

Q. I just wanted to make sure I was clear

5

5

preparation -A. Yesterday. Among my attorneys.
Q. Have you spoken to anyone other than

8

your attorneys with respect to your claims in

9

this case?
A. No.
Q. And so I would assume with respect to

that answer you have not spoken to any other
pol icy holders?
A. No.

on that. Because I'm not aware of a second

Q . Correct?
Page
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1

A. Correct.

1

A. Right.

2

Q. Do you know who Scott Becker is?

2

Q. And so unless your attorneys is

3

A. No.

J

4

Q. Have you ever met him?

4 to answer --

5

A. No.

5

6

Q. Ever talked to him?

6

not to discuss privjleged communications.

7

A. No.

7

Q. And I'm not looking for privjleged

8

Q. Do you know anyone

8

at the Critter

9 Clinic?

instructing you not to answer or you are refusing

A. I think my attorneys are instructing me

commurucation.

9

A. Well --

0

A. No.

0

Q. If you can let me finish, please. What

1

Q. Never talked to anybody there?

1

I'm looking for is, I would like to know what led

2

A. No.

2 you to bring th.is action prior to being in

3

Q. How did you come about to bring this

3

contact with your attorneys. So there would be

4

no attorney-client privilege.

4

5

case?

A. I would object to that. I believe it

6

involves privileged communications.

7

Q. rm only seeking, prior to you

MR. LOJEK: And I'm going to object at

5

6 this point, because I think what Mr. Farber is
7

saying is the contact with the attorneys are

8

obtaining an attorney, what led you to bring this

8

intertwined with his decision to bring this

9

case or to seek counsel?

9

action. He was aware of the fact that he was not

0

receiving dividends before then. But then when

O

A. I believe, once again, that is

I

1

privileged. I was certainly aware of the fact

¼1

2

that I was no longer getting a dividend.

22
the privileges attaches and you are not required
I

I

he discussed th.is with an attorney at that point

I
I

3

Q. I understand. But you have attorneys

4

here today. And, as I understand it, you already

5

told me you rely on those attorneys.

i3

t:

to invade that privilege.

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) How were you first
contacted with regard to this case?

Page 13 /

Page 14

!
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1

Iv1R. LOJEK: And to the extent that

2 would invade the attorney-client privilege I
3

4

would instruct you not to answer.

attorney for the answer to that question.

6

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) So did ·-

7

2
3

THE WITNESS: And I'll rely upon my

5

1

4

A. Yes.

(Discussion held off the record.)
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Mr. Hall and I have been

counseling here. With respect to the objections

5 made, the fact of an actual contact with an

MR. LOJEK: And, also, it assumes facts

6

attorney is not privileged. Maybe the content of

7

it could be privileged. Depending on whether or

8

not in evidence. And that would be part of my

8

not an attorney-client relationship existed. But

9

objection.

9

obviously this is the position you are taking

0

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Did you make contact

O today. And we'll seek a ruling from the court.

1

with your attorneys first or did they make

1

2

contact with you first with respect to this case?

2

3

MR. LOJEK: I think that is within the

3

And seek our fees and costs related to that.

MR. LOJEK: I would hope you wouJdn't
have to do that, because J still even think it is

4

anomey-client privilege. Which, as I

4 within the scope of Rule 26. And I think it is a

5

understand it, having researched this briefly,

5

6

anticipating this would come up, once there is

6

7

any decision to contact an attorney, and the

7

Workers' Compensation insurance with the State

8

contact is made, then the attorney-client

8

Insurance Fund?

9

privilege attaches to all of those contents and

9

0

all of those conversations, regardless of who

period of '83 to '85. When I first went to work

1

initiated it.

J didn't have any employees. I may have hired --

2

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) So with respect to the

non-issue. But let's move on.

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) How long have you had

A. Probably since - somewhere in the

r remember hiring a pan-time person about that

3

number of times here that your counsel has

period of time. And then I got a full-time

4

instructed you not to answer, you're following

person. And then after Mr. Kibler died I believe

5

your ~llllsel's advice; correct?

J also adopted his secretary. So whatever was
Page
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l
2
3

happening there.
Q. And what led you to obtain your

Workers' Compensation insurance with the State

1

insurance with the State Insurance Fund since

2

that time that you obtained it back in '83 or

3 '85?

4 Insurance Fund?

4

s

5

A. I had to do it. T have to have

6 Workmen's Compensation insurance in order to have

A. Between '83 and '85, to the best of my

knowledge; yes.

6

Q. And, as I understand it, over the

7

employees. If I don't, it is a criminal offense.

7

course of your time with the State Insurance

8

Q. I understand. But you certainly know

8

Fund, you have had difficulty some years paying

9

that there is many companies out there that offer

9

your premiums on time?

O

Workers' Compensation insurance --

0

A. That could be; yes.

1

Q. And you have had difficulties reporting

2

your payroll to the State Insurance Fund a number

3

oftimes?

1

A. I don't know ifl knew it at that time.

2

Q. Okay. Well, what I'm asking for is,

3

was your reason just that you only knew about the

4

State Insurance Fund, so that is why you went to

5

them?

6

A. Probably.

7

Q. Well, was that the case?

8

A. You're asking me about why I did

A. Indirectly, yes. I delegate that to my
5

staff when I have lots of staff members. But,

6

yes, I'm the captain of the srup. So, you bet, -

17:

at times that has occurred.
Q. And as a result there have been times

9
0

t

something over 20 years ago. And I probably just
knew that I had to have the insurance. And I

I

fO

1

certainly don't have any distinct memory of

i
21

2

shopping around. I knew that I had to sign up

I
22

3

for it. And I did it.

4

5

i

I

T3

Q. And have you kept your insurance

that you've received notices of, you know,
potential rescission of your contract for failure
to follow policy requirements?
A. That is certainly possible; yeah.
Q. With respect to the insurance that you

i

24
I

coverage with respect to Workers' Compensation

obtained with the State Insurance Fund. What

i

I

2 5 have your premiums been over the course of -Page 17

i
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1 let's just pick like the last six years? And

1

Or do you feel that is an adequate description of

2 just an estimate. I understand you might not

2

your understanding?

3 have that exact figure.

3

4

A. Oh, probably somewhere $3- to $500.

4 description. But it is my working knowledge of

S Maybe W1der. I don't know.

5

what it is. I'm not an expert on State Insurance
Fund.

6

Q. Do you know what they are this year?

6

7

A. I don't have any distinct recollection.

7

8

A. I'm sure it is not adequate

They base it on my payroll.

Q. Who handles the Workers' Compensation

8 matters at your office? From the standpoint if

MR LOJEK: I think as the

9

you have any paperwork to file with the State

0 representative of the State Insurance Fund she

0

Insw-ance Fund, who does that at your office?

1

has this information already. But she's testing

1

A. Whoever is my lead paralegal at the

2

your memory. So if you don't know,just say you

2 time.

3

don't know.

9

Q. Who is currently doing that for you?

4

THE WITNESS: Well, I don't know.

5

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And with respect to

A. Anna Cardosa.
Q. But I would assume anything you submit

6

dividends. First of all, what do you understand

to the State Insurance Fund you read through and

7

a dividend to be?

have an opportunity to correct, if necessary'?

8

A. l rely upon Anna. But, yes, I do sign

A. Well, from my understanding, as it is

9

used in the context of this action, they t.ake the

O

premiums of a class, compare it to the losses,

1

figure out their administrative figure. And if

2

the specific class takes in more money, then they

3

declare a dividend. That's my understanding.

Q . With respect to dividends. What is

your understanding as to who detennines whether
i
22
I

t

3

or not a dividend will be provided?
A. Well, I believe the State Industrial

I

4

Q. Any other understanding of what the

5

State Insurance Fund dividend is other than that?

t4

Commission. And I suppose their director.

I

2 5 Mr. Alcorn makes recommendations as to that. I
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I

I

iI 1

1 was unaware of the fact until this morning that
2

there is actually a board involved.

j

I
I

13

Q. So even though you read the complaint,

3

2

j

4 Exhibit No. 2, and the board members are listed

4

A. I am aware of the statute. And I have

read the statute.
Q. Have you read the statute independent
from this case? Meaning, not related to this

5

as defendants, you had no idea there was a board

I 5 case.

6

until today?

16

7

8

A.

I didn't know what role the board

7

played.

8

Q. What do you understand the role of the

9

19
i

o board to be?
A. Well, apparently they have meetings and

2

he makes recommendations. And then they agree or

3

disagree on them.

5
6
7

Q. And when you say "the statute," what

statute are you referring to?
A. The one that refers to dividends. And

0 the classes.

1

4

A. No.

1

t
t

2 about the same thing. I would asswne what you

t:

3

Q. And what do you base that understanding

Q. And just to make sure we are talking

on?

are referencing is Idaho Code Section 72-915?

A. Yes.
Q. Have you read any of the other State

i

A. I read some minutes. 1 skimmed over

}6 Insurance Fund statutes contained within Title 72

some minutes.

1 7 of the Workers' Compensation code?
I

8
9

0

Q. And that was in preparation for today's
deposition?

la

A. No.

19

Q. So 72-915 would be the depth of your

iO

knowledge as it pertains to the statutes related

!

A. Yes.

!

1

Q. Do you recall what minutes you read?

2

A. Oh, the last several years. I don't

3
4
5

i
I

~

1 to the State Insurance Fund?
A. No.

know the exact years.

Q. Okay. What else?

Q. Any other basis for your understanding
related to the role of the board?

A. Once again, I think you are getting

?5

into some privileged communication between my

i

Page 21 :

Page 22

11 (Pages 21 to 22)
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. - (208) 345-9611

0001.92

1 reason I stopped getting premiums.

1 attorneys and mysel(

Q. Well, I don't want to do that. I only

2

MR. LOJEK: Dividends?

3 want to get into what you personally know. Not

3

THE WITNESS: Dividends, I should say.

4 through your attorneys or through your own

4 Refunds.

5 reading. So other than Idaho Code Section

5

6 72-915, do you have any other infonnation related

6

your testimony related to Idaho Code Section

7 to Title 72 of the Idaho Code?

7

72-915, and, of course, independent from what

2

8

'MR. LOJEK: And I'll object to the last

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Other than that, and

8 your attorneys may have told you, do you have any

9

question or statement, whichever it was. Because

9

O

once he receives information from his attorneys,

O it relates to the State Insurance Fund?

l

then he does have personal knowledge of iL But

2

that is also an attorney-client communication.

3

So I think what your question respectfully is, do

4

you have any infonnation independent of what your

5

attorneys have told you?

6
7
8

ll
2

t

3

t:

MS. Dl}KE: Right.

MR LOJEK: Outside of what we have

told you about the case, and what we have

O

discussed, she wants to know if you have any

1

additional information?

review some minutes of some meetings. And I
believe there is an affidavit of Mr. Alcorn. And
it may have made a reference to a letter or two.

And so they made references to the Idaho Code.

7

believe is covered by privileged communication

8

between myself and my attorneys.

9

·0

11
,
f2
I

2

A. Well, as I previously said, I did

6 But other than that, anything else would be -- I .

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Do you?

9

other knowledge with respect to the Idaho Code as

1HE WITNESS: The only additional

I

3

information that I have is that at one time I was

4

getting dividends and they were applied as a

5

credit towards my policy. And then for some

Q. Have you ever sustained any losses with
respect to your Workers' Compensation insurance?
A. Not that I'm aware of.
Q. Meaning, a report by an employee being

¥3 harmed and. therefore, needing your Workers'
~4

1s

Compensation insurance to go into effect?

A Not that I'm aware of.
Page 24
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1

Q. What years did you receive dividends?

1 recollection of that.

2

A. Oh, I think probably in the '80s or

2
3

3 '90s.
4
5
6

Q. Do you know when you stopped receiving

I

a dividend?

A. II would probably be around •• since

Q. Do you have any estimate? Whether it
was a couple hundred dollars? Ten dollars?

4

A. You mean my refund?

5

Q. Yes. Dividend.

6

A. I'm sorry. No, it certainly wasn't

7

I've reviewed the minutes of the state board it

7

several hundred dollars. It was probably-- I'm

8

appears to be around 2000, 200 l.

8

guessing. But it was probably ..

9
0

9

Q. And that was from a review that you did

MR. LOJEK: Please don't guess.

O Because the State Insurance Fund has all of this

yesterday; correct?

1

A. No. This morning.

1 information.

2

Q. So prior to this morning did you have

2

THE WITNESS: That's correct.

!viR. LOJEK: And she is just trying to

3

an understanding as to when you stopped receiving

l3

4

dividends?

· 4 test your memory, I think.

5

6
7
8

5

A. Well, I knew it had been the last

[ 6 independent recollection.

several years.

7

Q. But did you have an understanding as to

9

A. I did not have an exact idea. I just

O

knew the last several years that I have not been

1

getting a dividend. And I got a letter saying,

4

5

MR. LOJEK: I'll objecL Because you

I O are asking for speculation. He has told you he
~1
i

doesn't know.

I

I

3

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Do you have any estimate

8 with respect to what your dividends were?

whatyear?

9

2

TIIE WITNESS: I don't haye an

~2

"You don't have a dividend this year."

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) You can go ahead and

I

23
I

Q. What were the approximate value of the

answer.

i

~4

i

dividends you would receive?

A. I would be speculating. I just don't

2' 5 have any independent recollection.

A. I don't have any independent

l
I

I
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1

Q. What is your understanding as to when a

1 Fund, other than your policy; correct?

2 dividend is disoibuted to policyholders?

2

A. To the best of my knowledge; yes.

A. Well, it is my understanding it is

3

Q. That's correct?

4

A. I agree with your statement.

Q. And does your pol icy say anything about

3

4 distributed annually.
5

Q. And when annually?

5

6

A. I don't know. I have a faint memory

6 dividends in it?

that it is usually done in the summer. Or

7

A. I don't know.

8 perhaps that is when it is due.

8

Q. Is it your allegation that the State

9

Q. When what is due?

9

0

A. My premium.

0

7

Insurance Fund has to provide a dividend?
A. From my reading of the statute -- could

1

MR. LOJEK: Your dividend?

1 I look --

2

TIIE WITNESS: No.

2

3

MR. LOJEK: rm sorry. fll be quiet.

3 question. He's not offering this as a legal

4

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Do you have an

4

MR. LOJEK: And .before you answer the

opinion. But only as a lay opinion.

s understanding of what a deviation is?

5

6

A. No.

6 - statute?

7

Q. And so I would assume by that answer

l

THE WJTNESS: May I look at the

7

MS. DUKE: Sure.
THE WJTNESS: It says here, "At the end

8

you have no idea whether your policy receives a

8

9

deviation?

9

0

A. No.

O manager in

1

Q. Correct?

1

readjustment of the rate shall be made for each

2

A. Correct.

2

of the several classes of employment. If at any

23

time there is an aggregate balance remaining to

of every year, and at such other times as the

his discretion may determine, a

i

3

Q. Now, with respect to the insurance that

4

you have with the State Insurance Fund. You

14

the credit of any class of employment or industry

5

don't have a contract with the State Insurance

1s

which the manager deems may be safely and

I

I
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1 assume that that is a surplus of premiums over

1 properly divided, he may in his discretion,
2

credit to each individual member of such class

2 losses and administrative expenses or however

3

who shall have been a subscriber to the State

3 else they do it.

4

Insurance Fund for a period of six months or

4

S more, prior to the time of such readjustment,

5

6 such proportion of such balance as he is properly

6

A. I don't know. I am not an expert.

7

7

Q. Do you understand that one of the

entitled to, having regard to his prior paid

8 premiwns since the last readjustment of rates."

Q. Any other preexisting conditions that
must occur, as you understand it?

8 primary purposes for which the State Insurance

9

So if you are in a class, which I

0

apparently am in, which there is an aggregate

0

1

balance remaining to the credit of that class,

1

A. Yes.

2

then, to my mind, taking in other factors, there

2

Q. And I would asswne you as a

3

should be a distribution. And in the past there

3 policyholder want the State Insurance Fund to

4

was a distribution.

4

remain solvent so that it can be there to pay any

5

claims. Is that --

5

9 Fund was created was to provide Workers'

Q. So my question was whether or not it is

Compensation insurance to Idaho employers?

6

your position in this case that the manager has

6

A. Certainly if Pm a member; yes.

7

to provide a dividend to the policyholders?

7

Q. Do you know what the Idaho Insurance

8

A. He has to if certain preexisting

8

9
0

1
2

9

A. No.

0

Q. And so do you have any idea whether or

·1

oo·t the State Insurance Fund is a member of the

·2

Idaho Guarantee Association?

conditions are met and set out in the statute.

Q. And what are those preexisting
conditions, as you understand them?
A. Well, all I can do is refer to the

Guarantee Association is?

3

3

language of the statute. Which refers, "There is

4

an aggregate balance remaining to the credit of

~4

5

any class of employment or industry." So I

25
I

A. I believe I read somewhere where it is
not. And it may even be prohibited by law from

I

being a member.

I

Page

29

I

1
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Q. Do you have any understanding as to

1

1

aren't being paid out, when in the past they used

2 what the costs to administer any policy is at the

2 to be, then it seems to me that an argument could

3 State Insurance Fund?

3

be made that the 28,000 little guys are paying

4

A. No, not really.

4

for the 4,000 big guys. And in the past we used

s

Q. Do you have any understanding as to how

5

to get a dividend.

6 many policies the State Insurance Fund has that

6

7 are under $2,5007

7

MR. LOJEK: Policies under $2,500? Or

8

8

9 premiwns?

MS. DUKE: Premiwns. Good

0
1

clarification.

somewhere where it is around 28,000-plus.

A. The statute. My reasoning is based on
the statute. We are in a class, apparently.

0

Q. Any other basis?

1

A.

r would say, to my mind, just simple

3

Q. Any other basis?
A. I'll rely upon my attorneys for the

4

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And do you have any

4

5

knowledge with respect to how many policies there

5

6

are out there with premiums over $2,500?

6

A. Well, I believe I read somewhere that

7

entitled to a dividend?

2 fairness.

THE WITNESS: I believe I have read

2
3

9

Q. Any other basis why you believe you're

rest of that.

Q. And when you are saying "the statl:ite,"

7

just so we are clear for the record, you are
talking about 72-915; correct?

8

there is around 32,000 policies. So that would

8

9

be a difference of 4,000. Plus or minus.

9

A. Yes.

0

Q. If you were told that the policies of

Q. Why do you believe that you're entitled

0

1
2

to

a dividend?

11

$2,500 or fewer were operating at a loss, would

i:

you agree that per yow- logic that you would not

I

A. I was getting a dividend in the past.

3

Nobody has told me that my class, which is under

4

$2,500, from the information I have seen, is

14

5

operating at a loss. And so if those dividends

ts

Page 31

be entitled to a dividend?
MR. LOJEK: I'll object for lack of
foundation. Calls for speculation. Also calls
Page 32

j

!
16 (Pages 31 to 32)
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. - (208) 345-9611

0001-97

l

for an expert opinion from a nonexpert. If you

1 with the witness. My objection is that the

2 can possibly answer that question, go ahead.

2

question is argumentative. And it is still

3 Subject to my objection.

3

asking for speculation. And the question lacks

4

4 foundation.

THE WITNESS : I can't even begin to

5 give a cogent answer to that question considering

5

6 all of the incredible policy considerations that

6 the advice of my attorney.

THE WITNESS: And I'm going to follow

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) He's not instructing you

7

are involved here. We could spend days talking

7

8

about that. Days. So I cannot give you a cogent

8

9

answer. And I'm going to follow the advice ofmy

9

0

attorney.

0 previously to the best of my ability. And I'm

1

Q. He is not instructing you not to

1

2

answer. He is saying answer it to the best of

2

3

your ability with his objections noted.

3

4

5
6
7

A. And my ability to put together a cogent

not to answer.
A. Well, I have given you an answer

going to stand by that.

MR. LOJEK: Counsel, I think he said
that he can't answer the question.

4

answer, I cannot do that.

5

6

Q. And you can't put together any kind of
summary of what you feel it would take --

MS. DUKE: I W1derstand. That is what
I'm about to ask.

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) So what you are saying

7

is you are unable to answer the following

8

A. Well --

8

question. And, that is, if you were told that

9

Q. Excuse me. Let me please finish.

9

your class actually operates at a loss, and your

0

Mr. Farber. As I W1derstand it, what you are

0

class is defined as $2,500 and fewer in premiwns,

1

telling me is you can't even come up with a

,1

2

swnmary of apparently these days of

2! 2

3

communications you could provide to us on that

?3

per your definition, that you can't answer that?

i
i

MR LOJEK: And my objection is lack of
foundation. The question is predicated upon

II

4

s

2 4 facts not in evidence. And facts which frankly

answer, is that correct?

f! 5

MR LOJEK: I think you are arguing
l?age 33

we disagree with. And you're asking for

!
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1 speculation on the part of this witness. And he ·

1

2 has told you I think three times now that he

2 his understanding is with respect to what he is

3 can't answer the question.

3

4

THE WITNESS: And I cannot answer the

5

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) So, as I understand it,

7

the way you define a class under 72-915, or the

referring to as a class.

MR. LOJEK: My instruction to him not

4

5 question.
6

right to ask him as a plaintiff in this case what

to answer the question stand.5. I think this is a

6 legal interpretation for the court. Whatever the
7 court decides we will have to abide with. All of
us. And I don't think that this witness being

8 way you understand a class to be defined under

8

9 72-915 is how?

9 produced as a nonexpert can give you an opinion

0

O that is within the scope of Rule 26. So,

MR. LOJEK: I'll object, because you

1

are asking for a legal conclusion. The

1 therefore, it is not discoverable.

2

interpretation of the statute in question is

2

3

really not for Mr. Farber. Nor is it for myself

3

4

or Mr. Gordon. Nor is it for Mr. Hall. It is

4

5

for the court to interpret the statute. And you

5

6

are asking for an interpretation of the statute

6 your counsel's advice?

7

from a nonexpert. An identified nonexpert. And,

7

A. Yes.

8

therefore, his interpretation of the statute is

8

Q. What class do you understand you are

9

totally irrelevant and beyond the scope of Rule

9

t:

O 26 and instruct him not to answer.
1

MS. DUKE: Mr. Lojek, I don't think

:

2

that is appropriate at all. I'm asking what his

22

3

understanding is. You can make your objections.

~3

i

MS. DUKE: So you're instructing him
not to answer?

MR. LOJEK: I am.
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And are you following

in?

A. I believe I'm under -- I know that I'm

in the class where my premium is under $2,500.

Q. Do you know of any other class that you
are in?

1

4

?4

And whether or not they will ultimately be

A. I don't understand the question.

1

5

admissible at trial is one thing. But I have a

~5
I;

Page 35
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i
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1

2
3
4
5

6

receiving a dividend, how did you learn that?

Iv1R.. LOJEK: Would you read back the
question.

1

got a copy of the minutes, which I became aware

2

of today, where they talked about this.

3

MS. DUKE: I can rephrase it.

4

Q. (BY MS . DUKE) How did you first learn

5

that you weren't receiving a dividend?

Q. Did you ever make a request for any
type of thing like that?
A. No. But they are the ones that are

6

taking my money. And then they are telling me

7

A. I didn't get one.

7

that they are going to have less of my money.

8

Q. Did you receive any correspondence or

8

If they would have sent me a copy of the minutes,

9

communication from the State Insurance Fund with

9 as I think, in my opinion, they should have sent

O

respect to that?

0

1

A. I don't have an independent

every other policyholder that got cut off in thls

1 class of under $2,500, then I think I might have

2

recollection of getting any correspondence. I'm

3

sure there was something.

2 made more of an inquiry. But in my business the

3

::::~

;:dh:~p•::~:ve

issues

ilie

4

Q. And did you call the State Insurance

5

Fund after you realized you didn't get a dividend

t

6

the first time?

16

7

A . No.

7

8

Q, And why not?

8

A. No. That is the primary reason.

9

A. Because it wasn't worth my time.

9

Q. And just so we are clear. You say that

0

Q. Why not?

1

A. Because it's been my experience in

54

2O

t

1

Q.

Any other reason you didn't call the

State Insurance Fund when you realized you were

not receiving a dividend?

is the primary reason . Is there any other

reason?

2

dealing with state bureaucracies that unless you

?2

3

confront them directly that -- and I'm talking

T3

4

about a lawsuit or something -- you don't often

2 4 large sum of money.

5

find out what is going on. And certainly I never

25

A. Well, obviously -- I mean, depending on

I

I

the time when the premium is due. It is not a

Q. Any other reason?

I

Page 37 1
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l

A. I would say those are the primary

1

2 reasons.
3

Q. Did you ever have occasion to talk with

2 any other attorneys about what they were paying

Q. But as you sit here today you can't

3

4 think of any other reason?

in Workers' Compensation?

4

A. No.

Q. Or any other companies who provided

5

A. No.

5

6

Q. Correct?

6 Workers' Compensation?

7

A. Correct.

7

A. No.

8

Q. Why did you continue to stay with the

8

Q.

What is your understanding of the

9 State Insurance Fund after you were no longer

9

damages that you are seeking in this case?

O receiving a dividend?

0

A. rm relying upon my attorneys to

1

1 determine those damages.

A. Because I have to have the insurance.

2

And in discussions I have had with a couple other

i2

3

attorneys -- and I don't know when, where, and

!3

4

what attorneys I have talked to -- I became aware

i4

S

that there were private insurers. It just seemed

5 detennine those damages.

6

to me that it would be easier to pay the money

6

7

than to take the time to investigate it. And, in

7 today of what type of injunctive relief you are

8

particular, it was a time versus -- it was

9

primarily a time issue.

Q. Do you have any understanding as to
what those damages are?

I

A. I'm relying upon my attorneys to

i

I

8

Q. Do you have any idea as you sit here

seeking in this lawsuit?

\

0

1

Q. Any other reason why you continued to
stay with the State Insurance Fund after you

9

A. I have a belief that the injunctive

+O
i

relief, if they prevail, is they are going to

:e1

hopefully obtain an order so that whatever class

I
!

!

2

stopped receiving a dividend?

t2

you belonged in, if you fit the criteria of the

~3
i
!

statute, that you will get a dividend/refund.

l

3

A. Habit.

4

Q. Any other reason?

i4
.

Depending on the other criteria of the policy.

5

A. Those are my primary reasons.

'
iS

Q. Any other understanding of what

i

i

Page 39 1
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1 injunctive relief you are seeking in this case?
2

Other than what you just testified to.

A. Not that I can recall.

4

Q. Do you have any understanding of the

2

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And are you following
your counsel's advice?

MR. LOJEK: Just a minute. I am not
S done. Because I want to be reasonable about

in this

6 this. If you have any case law that you can show

6 case?
7

going to instruct him not to answer the question.

3

3

5 declaratory relief that you are seeking

1

MR. LOJEK: Do you want to review the

7

me right now where I'm wrong, I would be happy to

8

complaint before you answer these questions? She

8

reconsider. Otherwise, I'm going to stick with

9

knows the answers to the questions.

9

the instruction to my client not to answer the

0

1

for itself. I'm asking for the kind of relief

2

that is set forth in the complaint. And I'm

3

relying upon my attorneys.

4

MS. DUKE: If we can take about a

5

five-minute break we would appreciate it.

6
7

O question.

THE WITNESS: I know. But it speaks

1

2 your attorney's advice?
3

· 4

f5
7

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) I know we talked about
this before. But I want to make sure the record

9

is clear.

MR. LOJEK: And let the record show I
have been provided with no authority contrary to

Was your first contact involving this

1

case by letter, phone, c>-mail or in person with

2

your attorneys?

MR. HALL: lfI may say something.

' 8

There is absolutely no privilege that attaches to

f9

factual events. Where privilege attaches is to

r

conversations and communications between you and

f1

your client. The fact that somebody may have

O

3

A. Yes.

6 my position.

(Recess.)

8

0

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And are you following

I

22

met, or talked, or done something like that is

j

~ 3 not a confidential communication. And that is

MR LOJEK: And I believe that is part

4

of the attorney-client relationship . The

5

attorney-client privilege attaches. And I'm

!

F4

the authority that we rely on. And that is the

~ S definition of a confidential communication

Page 42
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to answer the question. Because I think it is

1 between attorney and client. And we are not

1

2 asking for confidential communications. We are

2 beyond the scope of Rule 26. And I think it does

3 asking only for events that may have taken place

3

4 outside. We don't want to know anything about

4 that was fonned I think is irrelevant.

5 what was said between the attorney and the

5

get into the attomey,client relationship. How

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And are you following

6

your attorneys' advice with respect to

MR. LOJEK: Well, let me say this. 1

7

instructing you not to answer?

8 have researched this issue. Although, I have

8

9

nothing but the highest regard for your legal

9

MS. DUKE: That's all I have.

O opinion, Rich, I disagree. Let me research it

0

MR. LOJEK: We have no questions at

1

further. And if you're correct and I'm not we'll

1

2

come back and let him answer this question.

2

3

Maybe. Because I'm going to add to my objection

4

that this is beyond the scope of Rule 26. It is

5

not admissible evidence and it does not lead to

6

client.

7

6

was done on a factuaJ basis

7

was made. Whether it

8

or any other basis. So I'm going to stick with

8

9

my objection and instruction.

9

(BY MS. DUKE) And not getting into any

1

confidential information. Did you contact your

2

attorneys first? Or did they contact you first?

3

MR. GORDON: Same objection.

4

N!R. LOJEK: l think so, Keely. And,

5

(Deposition conclude4 at 11 :00 a.m.)

5

7

Q.

this time. We would like to read and sign.

(Signature requested.)

6 -any admissible evidence how the initial contact

O

A. Yes.

O

again, I'm respectfully going to instruct him not
Page 44
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1
2

1

CERTIFICATE OF WITNESS

2

I, RANDOLPH E. FARBER, being first duly

3

Page _Line_ Reason for Change _ _ _ __

5 depasit ion, consisting of pages I through 44;

5

6 that I have read said deposition and know the

contents thereof; that the questions contained

8

therein were propotmded to me; and that the

9

Should Read _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

4

That I am the witness named in the foregoing

7

Page_ Line_ Reason for Change _ _ _ __

Reads _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

3 sworn, depose and say:
4

ERRATA SHEET FOR RANDOLPH E. FARBER

Reads _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Should Read _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
6
7

Page_ Linc_ Reason for Change _ _ _ __
Reads _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

answers contained therein are true and correct,

8

Should Read _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

0

except for any changes that I may bave listed on

9

1

the Change Sheet attached hereto:

2

Page_ Linc_ Reason for Change----,-10

DATED this _ _ day of _ _ __, 2007.

Should Read _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
11

3

12

Page _Linc_ Reason for Change _ _ _ __
R~ds _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

13

Should Read _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

4

5

Reads _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

RANDOLPH E. FARBER

14

6

Page_ Line_ Reason for Change _ _ __ _
7

8

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

15

day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __. 2007.

Should Read _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

16

9

17
0

1

Reads _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Page _

Line _

Reason for Change _ _ _ __

R~ds _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

18

NAME OF NOTARY PUBLIC

Should Read _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

19

2

Page_ Line_ Reason for Change _ _ _ __
3

NOTARY PUBLIC FOR _ _ _ _ _ __

4

RESID.mG AT _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

20

Reads

Should Read _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
1

5

bl

MY CO.MMJSSION EXPrRES _ __ _ __

Page_ Linc_ Reason for Change _ _ _ __

[

Should Read _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

124

You may use another sheet if you need more room.

R~ds _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1

es W1TNESS SIGNATURE _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Page 4 6
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1
2
3

4

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
I, MONICA M. ARCHULETA, CSR No. 471,

Certified Shorthand Reporter, certify:
That the foregoing proceedings were taken

5

before me at the time and place therein set

6

forth, at which time the witness was put W1der

7

oath by me;

8

That the testimony and aJI objections made

9

were recorded stenographically by me and

0

transcribed by me or under my direction;

1

That the foregoing is a true and correct

2

record of all testimony given, to the best of my

3

ability;

4

I further certify that I am not a relative

5

or employee of any attorney or party, nor am I

6

fi.nanciaJly interested in the action.

7
8

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I set my hand an·d seal
this _ _ dayof _ _ _ _ _~2007.

9
0

1

MONICA M. ARCHULETA, CSR NO. 471

2

Notary Public

3

P.O. Box 2636

4

Boise, Idaho 83701-2636

5

My commission expires August 3, 2012
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

1

OF TIIE STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYO~ 2

i

MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD

3

GEDDES, Mll...FORD TERRELL, JUDI

4

DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE

5

MARTIN, and MARK SNODGRASS in

6

their capacity as members of the )

7

Board of Directors of the State

8

Insurance Fund,

)

)

RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT ALAN
BECKER and CRITTER CLINIC, an

Ida.ho Professional Association, )
Plaintiffs,

) Case No. CV06-7877

vs.

)

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,

JAMES M ALCORN, its Manager,

9

and WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER,

Defendants.

)

ho

!11
I

Continui:d.. .

!
~2
!

DEPOSITION OF SCOTT ALAN BECKER
JUNE 28, 2007

113
~4

THE OEPOSITTON OF SCOTT ALAN BECKER was

,i

!1 5

ta.ken on behalf of the Defendants at the offices

i

I

:16

I

of Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton, 702 West

!17 Idaho, Suite 700, Boise, Idaho, commencing at

REPORTED BY:

~8

I 0: IO a,m. on June 28, 2007, before Monica M.

I

MONICA M. ARC HULET A, CSR NO. 471

NOT ARY PUBLIC

l9

Archuleta, Certified Shorthand Reporter and

fO

Notary Public within and for the State of Idaho,

b1

in the above-entitled matt.er.

22
I
i

~3

!

24
j
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EXHIBIT "B"
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';;

i
1

lI 1

APPEARANCES:

2 For the Plaintiff:
3

I2

TESTIMONY OF SCOTT ALAN BECKER:

: 3

Examination by Ms. Duke

I

LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD.

INDEX
PAGE

5

i

! 4

4

BY: MR. DONALD W. LOJEK

5

1199 W. Main Street

!
'

5

I

6

P.O. Box 1712

7

Boise, Idaho 83702-17l2

f

!6
7
8

8

9

~o

9 And
0

GORDON LAW OFFICES

1

BY: MR. BRUCE S. BISTLINE

2

623 West Hays Street

3

Boise, Idaho 83702

~2

8

Duces T ecum
2. Class Action Complaint and Demand

17

for Jury Trial

and Demand for Jury Trial

;i 6

For the Defendants Idaho State Insurance Fund and i17

6 James M. Alcorn, Manager of the State Insurance
7

I. Second Amended Notice of Deposition

I
u 1 3. First Amended Class Action Complaint 25

4

5

EXHIBITS

~8

/19

Fund:

I

8

HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT & BLANTON

9

BY: MS. KEELY E. DUKE

0

MR. RICHARD E. HALL

~o
~l

I
e2
I
~3

1

702 West Idaho, Suite 700

2

P.O. Box 1271

I

3

Boise, Idaho 83701

rs

4

ALSO PRESENT: George Parham

5

James M. Alcorn

b4

l
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.

'~------------SCOTT ALAN BECKER,

1

1 with you and hopefully it will make it go a

2 first duly sworn to tell the truth relating to

2 little smoother. IfI ask you a question that

3 said cause, testified as follows:

3 you don't understand will you let me know that?

4

4

A. Yes.

5

Q. And if you're answering my questions

5

(Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 were marked.)

6 I'm going to assume you are understanding them.

6

7

7

EXAMINATION

8 QUESTIONS BY MS. DUKE:
9

Q. Good morning, Mr. Becker. My name is

Okay?

8

A. Yes.

9

Q.

You can see our court reporter is

0 Keely Duke. And I'm one of the attorneys who

10 taking down everything that I'm saying. And

1 represents the State Insurance Fund and its board

} 1 everything that you are going to say. And

2

and manager with respect to a lawsuit that you

t2

anything that the attorneys here say today. So

3

have filed against them. With me here today is

i3

it is important that you and I not speak over one

i4
i
i5

another. And let one another finish our

4 Rich Hall, who is lead trial counsel in this

I

I

5

case. And then Mr. Parham, who is an attorney

sentences. Okay?

l

6

with the State Insurance Fund. And Mr. Alcorn,

f6

A. All right.

I

7

who is the manager of the State Insurance Fund.

ii 7

Q. If I don't let you firush an answer,

i8

please let me know. It is not my intent to cut

I

8

This deposition is being taken pursuant

ii

9

to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. I asswne

l- 9

you off. So just let me know that you are not

0

that's fine?

TO

finished with your answer ifI start up on

?1

another question. Okay?

1

MR. LOJEK: True.

;

2
3

Q. (BY MS . DUKE) Have you ever had your 22
!

A. All right.

Q. It is important throughout the

deposition taken before?

24

4

A. No.

5

Q. I'll go through a couple ground rules

deposition today that you provide audible
~
~5 responses, saying "yes" or "no," which you are
;

Page s l

Page 6

I
3

M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. - (208) 345-9611

000208

(Pages 5 to 6)

!)
1 doing so far, rather than head shakes or head

1

Q. And what was your ex-wife's name?

I

2 nods, because it is the only way that she can

'
12
l

A. My ex-wife's name was -- maiden name?

3 record what it is you are saying. With that all

13

Q. Maiden name. Sure.

4 said, this is not an endurance contest. If for

I! 4

5 some reason you need a break, please let us know.

!s

6 The only thing I ask from you is that ifl have

16

7 asked you a question that we not take a break

;7
I
lI a

I

I
!

I

A. Marjorie Hamilton.
Q. Did she take your name?
A. She did .

i

8 until you have answered my question. Okay?

Q. And where does she reside?

A. In Boise.

j

9

0

!9

A. All right.

Q. We provided as Exhibit l to the

!

10
I

Q. If you could state your full name for

deposition a notice of deposition duces tecum for

I

i

1 the record?

11
you. If you could take a look at that and let me
i

2

12 know if you have seen that document before?

!

A. Scott Alan Becker.

i

!

3

Q. And what is your date of birth?

tJ

A. I have seen this document.

~4

Q. And in that document we asked for some

I

5
6

i

15 documents. In addition to asking you to be here

Q. And where were you born?

l

I

A. I was born in Kittery, Maine.

f6 today we asked for some documents that you might
i

7

Q. How did you come out here to Idaho?

17

have in your possession.

!

8

18

A. My father retired -- actually, was in

Have you brought any documents with you

1

9

the military and retired out of Mountain Home.

t9

today?

i

0

Q. And so when did you move to Idaho?

20

A. I have supplied my attorneys with the

1

A. It would have been '77.

21
i

documents that I do have. And I believe they
have been given to you.

i

2

Q. Are you married?

£2

3

A. No.

23

4

Q. And have you been married?

5

~4
!i

A. Yes.

i

i

25
I

Q. Okay. What documents did you supply to

your attorneys?
A. Actually, they would have been the

.t

Page 7 '
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1 documents that the State Ins~ance Company had

1 premiwn is under $2,500."

2 supplied me with or had given me as far as

2

3 dealing with not distributing dividends to people

3

4 that don't pay over $2,500 in their premiums

4

5 every year.

5

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) How many letters were

there?
A. Honestly, I don't know. I mean, I have
been dealing with this for quite a few months. I

6

Q. So letters?

6 mean, any that I had in my possession I have

7

A. Exactly.

7

8

Q. Anything other than letters from the

8

given to them.

Q. Did you give them a copy of your

9 State Insurance Fund that you provided to your

!9

0 counsel?

10

A. I believe so.

11

Q. Any other materials other than the

12

letters regarding the dividends and your policy

1

2

;

A. As far as I know, no.
MS. DUKE: And, Counsel, I know we have

policy, too?

i

3

been provided documents through like attachments

i3

4

to affidavits. Obviously, we haven't received

i4

A. Would you repeat that?

5

the answers to our discovery yet. So I'm not

lS

Q. Any other documents that you provided

that you provided to your counsel?

!

!

i

i6

6

quite certain which letters are his and which

7

aren't. I have them copied. So hopefully we'll

8

be able to go through those. As we progress, if

9

we need to, maybe we can get the copies from your

t9

A. As far as I know; no .

0

office. Just to make sure we are talking about

fo

Q. So ifwe look at Exhibit I, I would

1

the same thing.

21

assume that you don't maintain any journals,

2

t7
ia
!
I

to your counsel related to this case other than
what you have just testified to? The letters and
the policy?

I

2i 2 diaries, swnmaries, statements or notes that you

MR. LOJEK: They are the standard

i

!

3

letters that come from the State Insurance Fund

?3

4

saying, "Congratulations, we are not going to

24
i

have related to any of your claims in this case?
A. At this time, no.

i

5

~5

give you a dividend this year because your
Page

Q. And by "at this time, no," did you at

9!

Page 10
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1 some point earlier have such documents?
2

A. Up until th.is time, no .

3

Q. So you haven't had any of those types

i1

A. No.

·2
!

Q. And then if we look to

Item No. 2 on

I3

Exhibit l . Copies of all documents, photographs,

4 of documents that would be responsive. But it

!4

et cetera, in your possession that have not

5 sounds like maybe in the future you could?

IS

previously been provided to us.

6

A. It seems to be going that way.

16

7

Q. And why do you say that?

8

A. Well, obviously, I'm going to have to

As I understand it, all we are dealing

7

with document-wise from you is the policy and

8

some letters you provided to your counsel. So

i

!

I 9 there would be nothing to provide pursuant to

9 keep up on this.
0

Q, Well , do you maintain a journal?

lo No. 2. Is that correct?

1

A. No.

11

!
A. As far as I know.

!

2

I

Q, Do you maintain a diary?

12
I
'
'

3

A. No.

~

4

Q. And as of today's date have you made

i
I

Q. And same for No. 3? You don't know of

3 anything else other than the letters you provided
4

to your counsel and the policy?

I

5

i

is
!

any written statements with respect to your

6 claims in this case?
7

8

MR. LOJEK: Himself? Not through his

A. Correct.

16
I

Q. If you could just provide a general

i7

description of your educational background?

t

attorneys?

A. Graduated from Meridian High School.

8

9

MS. DUKE: Correct.

19 And after that I went to BSU for oh, probably

0

THE WITNESS : No.

1o

1

I

I

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Any notes that you have 21
I

two-and-a-half years. I was working part time
for the business. And at that time I needed to

I

2

taken? Obviously, not related to what you and

22 decide whether I wanted to continue my education

3

your attorneys have discussed. But any notes

23

4

that you have jotted down regarding your claims

5

in this case?

~4
Q. Any other college education or trade
I
?S school ex.perience? Anything like that?

i

or buy the business. And I bought the business.

I

E>age 12
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1

A. No.

1

A. Exactly.

2

Q. With respect to your business. What is

2

Q. And so you own it and have been

3 operating it since 1992?

3 your business?
4

A. I own Marv's Framing and Gallery.

4

A. Yes.

5

Q. And how long have you owned that?

5

Q. Do you have a manager who manages the

6

A. Since 1992.

6 store?

7

Q. Prior to that did you own any

7

A. As far as an official title? No.

8

Q. Somebody that at least satisfies the

8 businesses?
I

9

A. No.

j

0

Q. How did you come to acquire Marv's

iO

9

roles of managing the business, do you have
somebody like that?

;
i

1

il

framing and gallery?

;

!

A. Well, I had worked for Marv since 1981

t2

3 while I was going to school. And it came about

i3

2

A. You are looking at him.

Q. How many employees do you have

i

A. I have one full-time employee. And one

4 that -- I worked for him a few years, anyway.
5

currently?

'
'

And I started going to school. And then it came 15 part time.
i

i

6

about that he wanted to retire and move out of

l6

Q. Have you ever been larger than that?

i

7

town. It was a good deal at the time. And I

i7

A. I have.

8

figured hey, I can acquire this business. I can

'
18

Q. What is the largest that you have been?

19

A. Oh, I believe -- I can't remember ifl

I

9 acquire some property. So I bought it.

;
;

0

*0

Q. And where is it located?

had -- I believe I had two full time and two part

;

1

A. 590 l Overland Road.

ti

2

Q. And do you have any other partners in

22

Q. And when was that?

I

time.

3

the business?

~3

A. Oh, that would have been -- it was

4

A. No.

f4

definitely before 2001. So probably -- oh, it

!

5

2 5 was probably in 2000.

Q. You're the sole owner?

I

Page 13
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1

Q. And what kind of business is it?

1

Q. And when did you meet with them?

2

A. We sell art. Framed pictures.

2

A. I met with them yesterday.

3

Q. And who at your company is responsible

3

Q. Any other times?

4

A. No.

5

Q. And how long did you meet with them?

4 for obtaining Workers' Compensation and insurance
5 for the company?

6

A. That would be me.

7

Q. And I would assume that is the case

I

16
!

A . Maybe half an hour. Hour.

]7

Q. Did you review any documents in

i

1

8 from 1992 to this day?
9

I8

lI

A. Yes.

!I 9

preparation for your deposition today?
A. We did.

i

0

Q. Prior to 1992 when you acquired Marv's,

iO

1 when you were working there, did you have that

i

2 role at that time, too?

T2

Q. And what were the documents that you

1 reviewed in preparation for your deposition

!

3

A. As far as?

4

Q. Being the one responsible for obtaining

today?

A. Well, I was informed that we had just

i4
I

received our request for discovery this morning.

I

5

6

A. When I was working for Marv?

7

Q. Correct.

8

A. No.

9

0

I

Workers' Compensation insurance?

15
I'm not an anomey. And that is why I have
I
I

i! 6

i7

18

Q. What did you do to prepare for your

i9
I

4

deposition today?

±0

you were reviewing, then?
A. They were the figures from the State

!

A. What did I do to prepare for my

~1

Insurance Fund.

'I

t2

Q. And when you say figures from the State

i

prepare for at this time.

23
Insurance Fund. What types of figures?
j

Q. Well, did you meet with your attorneys?

I

24
;

5

Q. Well, describe for me what it was that

i

2 deposition? There is really not a lot I can
3

names of the docwnents.

I

J

1

these attorneys. Actually, I don't know the

A. I did.

A. I guess it would have been premiums in

~5 and what you have all paid out.
Page

isll
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1

Q. What other documents did you review in

MR. LOJEK: I'll object. Because that
2 is not fair to say.

2 preparation for your deposition today?
3

A. You know, there is a box load of them

4 there. It is going to take an army to go through
5

6
7

MS. DUKE: Well, he's the one

3

4 answering. If you would let him answer.

I

fs

that.

Q. And I'm not interested in future arrnies

THE WITNESS: I'm pretty sure I've gone

6 through this. This has been quite a while ago .

going through anything. What I'm interested in

l
1

8 is what you reviewed yesterday and what you
9 recall reviewing.

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) So your testimony then

7

8 today would be you have read it?

MR. LOJEK: It's been asked and

9

+0

0

A. Well, that would be it.

1

Q. I'm going to hand you what has been

answered. He said he is pretty sure that he has

l
j

2 marked as Exhibit No. 2 to your deposition. It's

1 read it. I'll object, because your question is

l2
I

repetitive.

i

3 entitled, "Class Action Complaint and Demand for t3

Q. (BY MS . DUKE) You can go ahead and

I
i

4

~

Jury Trial."

4

answer.

Have you read through this complaint at

5

A. Could you repeat that question, again?
Q. As I understand it, your testimony is

6 any time?

7

I

1 7 that you have read it?

MR. LOJEK: It was filed about a year

I

8

is
i

A. Like I said, I'm pretty sure I have

THE WITNESS: Yeah, I had gone through 1 9

read this. It's been quite a while, though.

ago and --

j

9

I

0

something like this. I couldn't guarantee you

1

this was the exact paper I looked at.

to
11!

Q. So if you have read it do you remember

what the details of the complaint say?

I

2

~

Q. (BY MS . DUKE) So is it fair to say

2

A. The details of the complaint say

i

i

3

then you don't know whether or not you have read 2 3 that just because I don't pay $2,500 a year in

4

the Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury

~

5

Trial?

?5 . to get.

I

4 premiwns I should get a dividend back like r used

I

And somebody in the middle of that

i

Page 18
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1 changed everything.
2

1

Q. Do you have an understanding beyond

2 you can read the complaint. But I would like to

3 that as to what it says?

5

3

MR LOJEK: I'll object to the extent

4

8

9

you are asking for a legal conclusion from a lay

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) You can go ahead and

1

5

pages of the Class Action Complaint and Demand

6

for Jury Trial is truthful? Can you do that?

7

answer.

8

A. Do you want me to answer that?

9

MR. LOJEK: Sure. To the best of your

0

know if you, as you're sitting here today, can

4 verify that everything contained within these 19

6 witness.
7

this now or ifwe need to go off the record so

A. Well, I would have to reread it real

quick.
Q. Okay. We can go off the record.

MR. LOJEK: 1'11 object to the question

0

1 to the extent that I'm not sure what you mean by

ability. Understanding you are not a lawyer.

2

THE WITNESS: As far as I know, the

2

"true" is. There are three named plaintiffs.

3

state statute doesn't say that you can draw the

3

The class has not yet been certified. This

4

line at $2,500 and say, "Hey, we are not paying a

4 witness may or may not know anything about the

5

dividend to people that pay less than $2,500 a

5 other plaintiffs in the case. And he may not

6

year."

6

know all of the details that his attorneys have

7

looked into. I'm here as his attorney. And it's

8

our position that the allegations of the

9

complaint are accurate. And I understand that

7

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Other than that. and

8

your prior answer, do you have any other

9

W1derstanding as to what the Class Action

O

Complaint and Demand for Jwy Trial says?

1

l

:MR WJEK: I have the same objection.

2

TIIE WITNESS: Say that again. I mean,

i
¥0

t

the State Insurance Fund disagrees. That is the
nature of the lawsuit.
I think when you are asking this

l

3

'

as far as I'm concerned, that is the suit.

~3
I

witness whether or not each and every allegation

I

4
5

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) What I would like to
do -- and I don't know if you'll be able to do

of the complaint that has been carefully drafted
by his attorneys is true or not, you are asking
Page 20
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1

A. That's all true.

2

Q. Excuse me. The introduction?

3

A. Yes.

4 know, people in Mr. Becker's position are not

4

Q . And then ifwe move to "Part One:

5 really in a position to read statutes and draw

5 Parties," it says, "All of the named plaintiffs

6 conclusions from statutes. That is something

6

are now and during some or all of the years

1 for, in essence, a tegal conclusion. And that
2

3

would be the basis of my objection.
As I think coW1sel and the court would

7

that lawyers and judges are trained to do. It

7

comprising the class period have been conducting

8

would be beyond his education and experience.

8

business in the State ofldaho.''

O tmfair. And

O you?

I would add that to my objection.

,1

1

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And given those

2

objections. Mr. Becker, in particular, anything

2

3

related to the introduction. Which is on page

3

4

one and two. Anything related to you in the

5

"Parties" section of the complaint And then any

6

allegation contained within "Part one: Factual

7

Allegations." Which are pages five through

Q. "All of the named plaintiffs have
during some or all of such period had one or more

5

provide with Workers' Compensation insurance

6 coverage."
With respect to you, I assume that is

7

9

verify as to whether you know they are accurate

O

and true.

8

true?
A. Yes.

9

Q. "All of named plaintiffs have during
some or all of the class periods subscribed to

THE WITNESS: Pages two?

2

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Pages one and two.

3

A. Okay.

4

Q . Ending prior to "Part One: Parties."

5

A. Yes.

' 4 employees whom they have been required by law to

8 seven. And really what I would like you to do is

1

I assume that is true as it relates to

9

9 And I think to that extent the question is

the Fund for the purpose of obtaining their
Workers' Compensation insurance coverage."
I would assume that is true with
respect to you?

So we can start there.
Page 21
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1

A. Yes.

1 him by his attorneys. And he will tell you, if

2

Q. Then if you look at Paragraph 2(b).

2 you get around to asking him relevant questions,

3

"Plaintiff Becker is a small business operator

3

that he had continually received dividends or

4

who conducts business as Marv's Framing Gallery

4

many, many years. And then all of a sudden they

5

at 5901 Overland Road in Boise and who lives in

5 stopped.

6

Ada County."

6

7

Is that true and accurate?

MS. DUKE: Mr. Lojek, obviously, we are

7

ta.king his deposition. It would certainly be

8

A. Yes.

8

appropriate if you would stop with the corrunentary

9

Q. Then what I would like you to do is

9

statements.

O

tum to page five starting at paragraph seven and

0

1

going through paragraph 14 and tell me whether

1 that I signed this complaint fully understanding

2

you believe the allegations contained in those

2

that Rule

3

paragraphs are true and accurate as they relate

3

Procedure puts certain requirements on me and the

4

to you.

4

other anomeys who are with me on this lawsuit.

5

I th.ink it is somewhat insulting to ask my client

5

MR. LOJEK: And I'll object again

MR. LOJEK: Let me add to my objections

11

of the Idaho Rules of Civil

6

because what you are essentially asking this

6

whether or not these allegations are true or not.

7

witness to do is to go through a statutory

7

They are true to the best of our knowledge and

8

construction or statutory analysis, which I do

8

belief. This is a good faith lawsuit It is not

9

not think he is qualified to do. I think he has

9 a bullshit lawsuit. And we are here to answer

O

told you from his point of view as a layperson

O your questions to the extent that they are

1

what the thrust of this lawsuit is all about.

1

2

That an arbitrary line has been drawn. And that

2 answer the questions that you are asking him. I

3

people who are paying premium of$2,500 or less

3

think they are very unfair because he is not a

4

are not getting dividends. And he believes that

4

lawyer.

5

relevant. I don't think that the witness can

I

it is unfair and contrary to law as explained to

·5

MS. DUKE: And you have made your
Page 24

Page 23

12 (Pages 23 to 24)

M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. - (208) 345-9611

000217

1

understanding is based on any communications you

2

have had with me, Bruce Bistline, or Phil Gordon,

3 intended. And I don't understand why you would

3

that is not an appropriate question and you

4 take offense to that. I have a right to ask

4

should not include that in your answer.

him -- to see if he feels that based on his

5

1 record and stated that. And if you have taken
2

5

some personal offense to the questions it wasn't

6

6 knowledge he believes it's an accurate

Tiffi WITNESS: So the question would be?

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Do you know why it

7

representation of what he understands his claims

7

hasn't been filed? And are you able to answer

8

as a plaintiff in this lawsuit to be. And I

8

that question based on what your attorney just

9

would like him to answer the question. And your

9

stated?

0

objections are noted.

1
2

3
4

TI-IE Wl1NESS: And, yes, I do believe

' 1

THE WITNESS: I guess I would have to

3

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) A truthful and accurate

4

representation; correct?

, 5

A. Yes,

6

Q. And with respect to Exhibit No. 3.

7

This is entitled, 11 First Amended Class Action

8

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial."

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Do you know Randolph
Farber?
A. I do not.

6

Q. Have you ever met him before?

7

A. I have not.
Q. Have you ever spoken to him on the

9

Have you seen th.at document before?

0

A. I believe I have.

1

Q. Do you know why it has not been filed?

2

MR. LOJEK: Same objection.

· 2 say I'm not able to answer that question.

it's a fair representation.

5

9

,o

MR. LOJEK: I'll object on the basis

phone or anything like that?

0

A. I have not.

1

Q. How about anyone who operates the

2

Critter Clinic? Do you know who they are?

I

3

that you are asking him for a legal conclusion.

4

And also attempts to invade the attorney-client

5

privilege. And to the extent that your

r3

A. I do not.

24

Q. Again, no conversations or meeting with

ts

anyone with the Critter Clinic?
Page 26
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1

A. Not with the Critter Clinic.

1 the people --

2

Q. Do you have an understanding as to what

2

3

is meant by a class action lawsuit?

3

A. I talk to so many people every single
day that it is disgust mg.

4

A. 1do.

4

Q. So the answer to the question is you

5

Q. And what is that understanding?

5

cannot provide a single name from anybody you

6

A. My understanding is it will benefit

6

have talked to that has a premium of $2,500 or

7

8
9
0

7 less from the State Insurance Fund?

everyone.
Q. And when you say it will benefit
everyone. Who is the everyone?
A. The everyone would be anybody that pays

8

A. As far as full names; no.

9

Q. Any part of a name?

0

A. As far as full names; no.

1

less than $2,500 a year to the State Insurance

1

Q. Any part of a name?

2

Fund.

2

A. Any part of a name, no. Imean.

3

Q. And have you had any conversations with

4

other policyholders who pay $2,500 or less with

5

the State Insurance FW1d?

6

A. I have.

7

Q. Who?

I

3 offhand; no.

1:

i:

Q. Not the names of companies?
A. Offhand; no.

Q. Do you have any experience in the
insurance industry?

I

8
9

A. 1 couldn't tell you. I mean, honestly,
I could not tell you.

9

0

Q. Not a single name?

1

A. I talk to people aJl of the time.

2

8

0

Small business owners all of the time that don't

f1
f2

A. As far as working for the insurance
industry?
Q. Correct.

A. No.
Q. Do you have any education with respect

I

3

get a dividend anymore. I mean, as far as who,

3

4

naming one out of the bag, I couldn't name one.

4

s

Q. You couldn't name a single name out of

'

to the insurance industry?
A. Excuse me?

Q. Any education that you have received

i

Page 28
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1 with respect to the insurance industry?

1

insurers throughout the years to see who you

2

A. As far as schooling?

2

wanted to obtain insurance from for your company?

3

Q. Schooling. Training. Seminars.

3

A. I wouldn't say throughout the years. I

4

A. No.

4

mean, I picked one years ago and I stuck with it.

5

Q. We have already talked about this. But

5

Q. And we'll talk about that. I assume

6 with respect to who in your office handles

6

the one you picked is the Idaho State Insurance

7

obtaining Workers' Compensation insurance, I

7

Fund?

8

understand that to be you?

8

A. You assume correct.

Q. And with respect to that evaluation

9

A. Correct.

9

0

Q. And that's been you since 1992?

0

1

A. Correct.

1 to? Other than the Idaho State Insurance Fund.

2

Q, And so Twould assume that you're the

2

3

person who looks at various companies that you

3

back then. But, honestly, I can't remember which

4

may be interested in obtaining Workers'

4

one it was.

5

Compensation insurance from; is that correct?

5

6

A. To tell you the hon~st - well, 1992

7

was a long time ago. I think I did look around.

7

A. No.

8

And, you know, what made the State Insurance

8

Q. Did you actually submit an application

9

Fund - what kind of turned me that way is when

9 for insurance with them?

, 6

~:

O the dividends actually made the policy
1

affordable. I'm pretty sure that is why I ended

2

up going that way.

22

I

that you did, what other companies did you talk

A. You know, I did talk to another company

Q. Would you have records as to the

company you talked to?

A. Oh, I believe I probably called
somebody on the phone and got a rate quote. But
as far as any paperwork; no.
MR. LOJEK: Let me advise you, also,

r3

3

Q. And we are going to get there. But my

4

question was, would you have been the individual

5

who was looking at various Workers' Compensation

t:

Ms. Duke is asking for accurate answers, to the
best of your recollection. And if you don't

j

t>age
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1 recall, she's not asking for you to guess or to

1

A. One of the main reasons I selected the

2 give her some supposition. So if you know, tell

2

State Insurance Fund was -- well, I had known -

3 her. If you don't know, don't guess.

3

my prior boss had used the State Insurance Fund.

4

And he had gotten dividends, also. And at the

5 or not you actually went through the process and

5

end of the year it just makes the policy more

6 obtained, you know, a commionent from a company

6

affordable.

7

as to providing Workers' Compensation coverage

7

8

for your company ocher than the State Insurance

8

go with the State Insurance Fund. And, as I

9

Fund?

9

understand it, your prior boss used it. Used the

4

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) So do you recall whether

Q. So the question was why you elected to

0

A. I never did obtain a C-Ommitrnent.

O fund. What were your other reasons?

1

Q. When was this that you were looking

1

A. It was affordable.

2

into the Workers' Compensation insurance and who

2

Q. Any other reasons?

3

was going to be your Workers' Compensation

3

A. What reasons can there be? It's an

4

carrier?

4

5

A. Like I said, I can't remember the exact

6

date I hired my first employee. It possibly

7

would have been in '94 . '93.

8

5

f

I6

I

Q. But, as I understand it, the only

insurance policy.
Q. So I would assume your answer is no,
then?

7

A. Correct.

a

Q. When you say that it was affordable.

9

Workers' Compensation carrier that you have

1

0

worked with, and obtained coverage from since you

~:

Wh:

1

purchased Marv's, has been the State Insurance

fI 1

pay your premiwn. I mean, when you come to look

7

m:e.:,~:~:::~:d::~e is

you wottld

I

2
3

2 2 at it, at the end of every year you would get

Fund?

II

A . Yes.

23
I

some back. You could put that back into your

'
4

Q. And why did you select the State

24
(

premium. So in all reality it was kind of like

I

5

Insurance Fund?

~5

you were lowering your rate.

i
I

Page 31
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1

Q. Do you recall what your premiums have

2 been over the course of the last six years?
3

A. Offhand; no.

I could give you an

1

Q. Do you remember when those were?

2

A. The exact dates, no. I mean, I could

3 give you an approximate. I believe that we had

4

approximate for this year. I mean, they have

4

5

gone up every year.

5 years ago, I believe, in the summer.

Randy cut his hand -- it would have been two

6

Q. What is your approximate for this year?

6

Q. And then you think there was one other?

7

A. I think we are right at $1,600.

7

A. Right. That would have been probably a

8

Q. Have they ever been higher than that?

8 couple years earlier that Kirk had done the same

9

A. I believe so. When I had a few more

9

O

1

employees.

0

Q. Do you recall the lowest your premiums

1

thing. Cut his hand on a piece of glass.
Q. And do you recall what the value of
those losses were? Or the benefits that were

2

ever were? Or just an estimate? Not an exact

2 received by the State Insurance Fund --

3

amount, but an estimate?

3

4

5

6

A.

I would say probably when I first

4

started up I think they were $800 or $900 a year.

MR. LOJEK: Just a second, Scott. I'm
going to object. This is supposed to be

5 discovery, Keely. And the questions you are

6 asking are in the records of the State Insurance

Q. And have you had any losses during any

7

of the years that you have had Workers'

7

Fwid. You have all of this information, And you

8

Compensation insurance with the State Insurance

8

need only to ask your client to give you the

9

Fund?

0

A. I th.ink I have had -- well, I know for

t9

information you are seeking _from this person. I

fo

would think that the records of the State

1

sure we had one where a guy had cut his hand and

!1

Insurance Fund would be more precise as to dates

2

had reqwred a couple stitches. And I was trying

r2

and exact amounts. And I think all you are doing

3

to remember that this morning. I can't remember

?3

here is running up the bill for your client. For
our clients. And we have to pay the deposition

i

I
II

4

if we had another one. But it would have been

?4

5

the same thing.

2 5 transcript by the page. And I think this is an

!
i
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.
l

1

abuse of discovery.

MR. LOJEK: Maybe we should get a

2

MS. DUKE: I very much disagree.

2

ruling from the court on th.is. Unfortunately, we

3

1vfR. LOJEK: Let me finish and make my

3

don't have a judge assigned to this case right

4 record. Jf this is going to be the way you

4 now. So why don't we continue th.is deposition.

5 conduct discovery in this case, then we are going

5 We'll answer your interrogatories as best we can.

6 to have to go to court and ask for some guidance

6

And then we'll come back after we get a ruJ ing

7

from the court. Because you cannot use the

7

from whatever judge is assigned to the case.

8

deposition process to make me, and Mr. Bistline,

8

Would that be satisfactory?

9

and my client sit here hour after hour answering

9

MS. DUKE: I don't know what kind of

0

questions for information you already have and

0

ruling you are saying you want to get. So, no,

1

your client has. It is an abuse of the discoveiy

1

I'm not saying .that is satisfactory. You can do

2

process. So I would ask you to try to find out

2

whatever you want to do and bring whatever issue

3

from this witness infonnation that you do not

3 you want to bring to the court. Whether I think

4

have. And let's move along, please.

4

it is valid or not we can address in our

5

briefings.

s

MS . DUKE: Mr. Lojek, first of all, we

7v1R. LOJEK: Let me talk to my client

6

have been going about 50 minutes. So I'm not

6

7

quite sure what you mean by hour after hour.

7 and Mr. Bistline as to whether we will continue

8

Second, I have eveiy right to question this

le

with the deposition. For the record, we will sit

9

witness with respect to what his knowledge is.

t9

here as long as your questions are relevant and

0

And there is nothing wrong with doing that. Yes,

to

asking for information that you do not already

1

I'm sure there are records that we can look to.

*l
i

have. I just want to make that veiy clear on the

I

I

i

2

But I have every right to know what he knows as a

f2

3

party in this case. And for you to assert

}3

record.
MS. DUKE: And I don't agree with your

i

4

otherwise I think is a gross misrepresentation of

?4

5

what the discoveiy rules provide.

25
i

characterization.

l

(Recess.)
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1
2

MR. LOJEK: We are going to continue

1

Please also be forewarned that if you decide to

2 tenninate the deposition we will seek all fees

this deposition at this time. We don't wish to

3 Wlduly burden the court. There is a presumptive

3

and costs as a sanction for failing to pennit us
to

do the discovery we are entitled to do because

4

rule in the federal jurisdiction, as far as I'm

4

5

concerned, that a deposition should not take

S this gentleman filed a lawsuit.

6

longer than three hours. We are going to allow

6

7

this deposition to go forward for three hours

7

MR. LOJEK: I appreciate the threat.
Let's continue the deposition.
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) So what were your losses

8 from its commencement. And I would ask you to

8

9 please get to the point and ask your questions

9 with respect to those two claims?

A. The first one, like I said, I am not

O

seeking whatever relevant information that you

0

1

deem necessary or advisable for your client. At

·1

2

the end of three hours we'll make a decision.

2

3

But the probability is that the decision at that

3 not. I don't know. With Randy's I did, because

4

time will be that the deposition will be

5

continued until we get a ruling from whatever

6

judge is assigned to the case.

7

5

around like $300 for three stitches. But, as far

as I know, that was it
Q. And as best you sit here today you

MS. DUKE: Well, first of all, it is
8

not a federal case. Second, the federal rules

9

actually state seven hours. Third, we are

0

obviously premature into the deposition with

I

1

respect to how long it is going to go and what is

fl

3

first one. I'm not sure whether he had a loss or

I think I saw the bill and it was somewhere

8

2

sure whether Kirk -- that would have been the

can't recall any other losses on your policies

· 9 for Workers' Compensation?

going to be done, But certainly with the lengthy
objections, and you taldng ten minutes to discuss

0

I
~2

I

~3
I

!

whether you are going to walk out after 50

s

.
.
. deIaymg
. the proceedmg.
·
mmutes
of questions,
1s

Q. Let's tum, then, to dividends. .

First of all, what is your understanding of what
a dividend

is in the context of this case?

I

Q4

4

A. As far as 1 know, no.

~i 5

A. Well --

.MR. LOJEK: Excuse me. Can I just have

I

!?age 37 j
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..
1 a standing objection to the extent that you are

1 everything through USAA as far as auto and home.

2 asking for a legal conclusion. Because dividends

2

3 in th.is context is a matter oflaw subject to

3 issue dividends?

4 various interpretations of the Idaho statute.

4

A. As far as I know, no.

5

Q. And with respect to the State Insurance

MS. DUKE: Then I'll rephrase the

5

6 question. Because I don't th.ink it ca!ls for a
7

8

6 Fund. Turning back to the State Insurance Fund.

legal conclusion.
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) What is your

7

What is your understanding as to why a dividend

8

is provided to policyholders?

9 understanding of a dividend that you have

9

0 received in the past from the State Insurance

O

1

1

2

Q. Any other companies that you have that

Fund?
A. My understanding is basically all of

2

A. I thought I just answered that
question. Didn't I just answer it?

Q. Well, the question before was what your
understanding of a dividend was.
A. Well, obviously, they have a surplus

3

your premiums are paid. Obviously, they are

3

4

going to pay out on some claims. And they aJso

4

5

need to have a reserve set aside. But anything

5 is divided among their policyholders.

6

above that reserve they give out as dividends.

6-

7

8
9
0

1

Q. And how did you gain that
understanding?
A. I have other insurance companies that

Q. But do you have an understanding as to

7

why they distribute the dividends? That is the

8

question.

9

¼o

give me dividends.

above their reserve. And what that surplus is

A. As to why?
Q. Correct. And if you don't know, that

i

Q. What other insurance companies give you

f1

is fine. I'm just asking if you have an

I

2

2, 2

dividends?

understanding as to why --

J

A. As far as I know, it is a nonprofit.

3

A. One would be USAA.

~3

4

Q. And what type of policy is that?

2 4 But I could be wrong there. But, as far as I

s

A. That would be a -- well, I insure

25

~

i

i

Page

know, it is a nonprofit.
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1

Q, Any other basis for your understanding

1

the case?
A. I can't remember the exact date. But I

2

as to why the State Insw-ance Fund issues

2

3

dividends?

3

know this happened just shortly after they

4

A. Say that again?

4

required Worlanen's Comp for everyone in the state

5

Q. Any other basis, other than believing

5

as far as farm workers and things like that.
Q. And so did you think that had something

6

it's a nonprofi~ that supports yow-

6

7

understanding of why they distribute dividends?

7

to do with the State Insurance Fund not providing
dividends to policyholders under $2,500?

8

A. No.

8

9

Q. And with respect to the dividends.

9

O

What is yow- understanding as to when those

O

1

dividends are paid by the State Insurance Fund to

1

2

policyholders?

,2

3

A. When they are paid?

4

Q. Correct.

5

A. As far as a date? A month?

6

Q.

7

A. Well, it used to

Yeah. A month.

be they would give us

8

ow- dividends the first part of every year. I

9

think it was January or February.

O

Q. And what is your understanding as to

1

who receives dividends from the State Insurance

2

Fund currently?

3
4

5

we quit getting dividends.
Q. Do you know who makes the decisions at

the State Insurance Fund as to who will receive

3

dividends?

4

A.

5

Q. Do you know who at the State Insurance

I do not know.

6

Fund makes a decisiop as to whether anyone will

7

receive a dividend in any given year?

. 8

A. Do I know who?

.9

Q. Correct.

A . My understanding is people that pay

premiums over $2,500 receive a dividend.

A. Well, obviously, it must have. Because

I

0

A. J do not know.

1

Q. Is it your understanding that the

2

State Insurance Fund has to give dividends to its

3

policyholders?

4

A. I would believe they would if they have

2 5 a surplus of money.

Q. And do you know how long that has been

I

l?age 4 2
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1

I

Q. And what is your basis for that

11

2 understanding or opinion?
3

A. I mean, we had always gotten dividends

A. Did I get a dividend in 200 I?

2

Q. I don't know. Did you?

3

A. I can't recall. I know one of them

4 in the past. And then it stopped. But,

4 back then was a pretty good dividend. $400 or

5 obviously, people that pay more still get their

5

6 dividends.

6

7

$500. Something like that.

Q. Let me start with that. As you sit

7 here today, from 1992 through 2007, what years

Q. But my question was related to whether

8 or not you believe that the State Insurance Fund

8 within that time period did you receive a

9 has to or is required to provide dividends to its

9

0

~o

policyholders?

1

A. I believe they do.

2

Q. And my follow-up question to that was,

3

4
5

why do you believe that?

t:
t34

A. I believe that because I believe they

6

money they are required to give it back to their

7

policyholders.

6

I

Q. Other than that being a belief of

9

yours, do you have any other basis for that

O

understanding or belief?

3

paperwork of mine -:MR. LOJEK: We'll be happy to ask the

State Insurance Fund in an interrogatory and
supplement his answer.
THE WI1NESS: You could probably tell

i7

8

2

A. Boy, without going through boxes of

are a nonprofit. And when they have a surplus of
~5

1

dividend?

It98

me. You have that information right in front of
you.
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) the point is I'm asking

you right now as to your memory without looking

20 at any documents whether you -I

'

A. That is why I have attorneys.

21

A. OtThand I couldn't tell you.

22

Q. Let me finish my question, please.

l

Q. So the answer would be "no"?

I

?3

A. Correct.

What I'm asking you is whether or not you know as

i

t4
l

4

Q. Do you recall as you sit here today

5

what your dividend was in the year 2001?

you sit here today what years between the years
1992 and 2006 that you received dividends? Can
44
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1 you answer that?
2

1

A. I couldn't tell you specifically what

2 don't believe it says anything in there about me

3 years I received dividends.
4

3 not getting a dividend if I didn't pay more than

Q. And, therefore, I assume you also

4

5 cannot, as you sit here today, tell us what years
6

A. I don't believe it says anything -- I

5

you did not receive dividends?

$2,500.

Q. My question is different than that.

6

And my question is, does the policy, as you

7

A. I could not answer that today.

7

understand it, say anything at aU regarding

8

Q. Other than the policy that you have

8

dividends?

9

with the State Insurance Fund there is no other

9

A. I do not know.

O

agreement that you and the State Insurance Fund

0

Q. You haven't reviewed that to see if it

1

have entered into; correct?

1

MR LOJEK: Could you read the question

2
3

back?

does?

2

A. That's why I have attorneys.

3

Q. Do you know what a deviation is?

4

(Record read.)

4

A. As far as?

5

MR. LOJEK: I'll object to that

5

Q. The insurance industry.

6

question as calling for a legal conclusion, in ·

6

A. No.

7

part. Go ahead and answer.

7

Q. Do you have any understanding as to

8

TI-IE WITNESS: As far as I know, no.

9

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Does your policy with

8 whether you are receiving a deviation that lowers
9

O

the State Insurance FW1d, as you understand it,

f

1

say anything about dividends?

fI 1

2

A. Say that again?

O

your premium on your policy?
A. ~ far as I know, I am not aware of

one. As a matter of fact, I'm paying a higher

r
I

2 rate right now than I believe I should.

r

Q. Why do you say that?
A. Because I'm classified as basically a

j

3

Q. Does your policy with the State

3

4

Insurance Fund, as you understand it, say

14

5

anything about dividends?

~ 5 furniture making/cabinet making shop. What I do

i
i

!
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1

1 doesn't require a fraction of the tools that a
2
3
4

cabinet maker1s shop would require.

Q. And how long have you been classified

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And, therefore, I would

2

assume that also means you don't know whether or

3

not you're receiving a deviation on your policy

4 premium that lowers your premiums; correct?

that way?

A. Well, if it lowers my premiums -- my

5

A. Since the beginning.

5

6

Q. Since 1992?

6 premiums go up, up, up, and up every year. So if

7

A. Oh, yeah.

7

you are lowering my premiums you are not doing a

8

Q. Have you ever done anything about that?

8

very good job of it.

9

A. I have talked to people at the State

9

Q. So l would assume you have no idea or

0

Insurance Fund about it. And. really, there is

0

understanding as to who, policyholder-wise at the

1

not a lot I can do.

1 State Insurance Fund, receives a deviation; is

2

Q. When was the last time you talked to

2

that correct?

3

somebody about it at the State Insurance Fund

3

A. Correct.

4

about that?

4

Q. Do you have an insurance agent that you

s

A . Oh, probably a couple years ago.

5

6

Q. Do you remember who you talked to?

6

A. As far as for Workmen's Comp?

7

A. No.

7

Q. For Workers' Comp.

8

Q. But going back to a deviation. As I

8

A.

9

understand it, you don't know what a deviation

f

0

is; correct?

~ O that you worked with with respect to Workers'

1

9

work with?

No.

Q. Have you ever had an insurance agent

i

f1
I

MR LOJEK: If it will help you. We

Compensation?

2

are willing to stipulate that this witness is not

~2

3

an expert witness. And he is certainly not

23

friend of mine had gotten into the insurance

4

knowledgeable about the insurance business.

14

business. His name was Steve Lloyd. I can't

s

I
I

A. You know, I take that back. Because a

2 5 remember if I did go through him or not to get my

THE WITNESS: Correct.

j

Page fl
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1 Workmen's Comp. He was with Hanley Insurance.

1 correct?

2 And I can't remember whether or not I went

2

A. Correct.

3 through him or not. So, honestly, I can't

3

Q. And, as I understand it, you don't lmow

4 remember that question. My bills come directly

4

who makes the decisions with respect to

5 from you. Or from the State Insurance Fund. So

5

dividends?

6 I don't know.

6

A. Correct.

7

Q. And as I also understand it you do

7

Q. But if you used him it would have been

8 back in '92, I assume?
9

8 not - well, let me ask it this way. Would you

A. Like I said, ifJ did go with him. I

9 agree that one of the purposes of the State

0 don't know ifl had ever changed anything there
1
2

3

or not. I don't know.

Q.

2 yourself?

Do you know if he is still an insurance

agent in the Boise area?
A. Steve Lloyd? I know the Hartley

5

Insurance firm is still there. He does a lot of

6

things. Bu~ I don't think he is still in the

7

insurance business.

9

Insurance Fund is to provide Workers'

1 Compensation insurance to Idaho employers such as

4

8

0

3

· 4

MR. LOJEK: And rl1 object to the

extent that it calls for a legal conclusion and a

5 statutory interpretation. And it is really one
; 6

of the issues in this case to be d~cided by the
judge. Again, we are not calling this witness,

8 or this client, or this plaintiff as an expert in

Q. And the Hartley Insurance that you are

9 this case. And I think these questions go to his

referencing, where is that located?

0

A. On Overland Road.

1o

expertise in the insurance business or his

1

Q. With respect to your aJlegations in

¥1

interpretation of the statutes as to which he has

!
i

2

this case, there is some general questions I want

22

none. He doesn't have any knowledge of the

3

to ask. And then we'll go through the complaint.

23
I

statutes and how they relate. And, obviously,

4

You are certainly not contending that the State

?' 4 that is a contested issue between the State
i

5

Insurance Fund is somehow not financially sound;

I

.2 5 Insurance Fund and something that the lawyers
!
i
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Q. Do you have any w,derstanding of what

1 have talked about. And I think the judge will

1

2 have to make a conclusion. So that is my

2 the costs are to administer a policy that is

3 objection. I'm sorry to be so wordy. I just

3 under $2,500 versus the cost of a policy that is

4

don't understand how this is within the scope of

4

5

5 Rule 26. I really don't.
6

over $2,500?
MR. LOJEK: I'll object to the question

6 as being vague, ambiguous, and overbroad. You

MS. DUKE: Rule 30 is also applicable.

may answer.

7 But, regardless. If you could read the question

7

8

back. Unless you can remember it.

8

9

THE WITNESS: Go ahead.

9

0

(Record read.)

0

1

THE W11NESS: I believe that is what

1 that you as a policyholder, and we'll just use

2
3

5

your losses, if you have losses; correct?

8
9

that you as a policyholder with a premium of

4

approximately $1,600 this year, have the same

~ 5 rights to coverage as does any other

f6

A. Sure, I want the State Insurance Fund

f7

to be around.

1:

Guarantee Association is?

20

A. No.

1

Q. Do you know what it is?

2

A . No.

3

Q. Do you know if the State Insurance Fund

4

is a member of the Idaho Guarantee Association?

policyholder?
MR. LOJEK: I'll object to the extent
that it asks for a legal conclusion. You may

Q. Do you know what the Idaho Insurance

0

5

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) You certainly understand

3

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And you obviously want

it to be a company that is arow,d and able to pay

7

business. I don't know.

2 your average of $1,600 for premiums this year,

they do. Provide Workers' Comp.

4

6

THE WITNESS: I'm not in the insurance

answer.
THE WITNESS: Yes.

f

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Do you have any

22

understanding as to how many policies the State

f3

Insurance Fund has that are under $2,500?

1

A. I couldn't tell you how many policies

f5

A. I do not know.

Page 51
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1

Q. Or how many that are over $2,500?

1 all.

2

A. I couldn't tell you how many.

2

3

Q. What led you to bring this lawsuit?

3

4

A. You know, I had called the State

4

A. Her name is Donna Bond.

5

Q. And what is her address?

6

A. Home address? Shop address?

like, "What's up with this? I don't get a

7

Q. Home address.

9 dividend because I don't pay over $2,500?"

8

A. 2437 Laughridge.

Basically they told me, "Yeah, that's right."

9

Q. Boise?

0

A. Meridian.

1

Q. And where does she work?

2

A. She owns Bond and Company.

5

Insurance Company, I don't know, a couple years

6 ago when I wasn't getting dividends anymore. I'm
7

9

O That was was kind of it

1

And then my girlfriend, she's a

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) What is your
girlfriend's name?

2

hairstylist, she was cutting -- what's his name?

3

Phil Gordon's hair. And he was kind of telling

Q. Is that a hair salon?

4

her about this case with the State Insurance

A. It is.

5

Fund. And she goes, "My boyfriend wants to talk

Q. And where is it located?

6

to you." And so she called me up real quick.

A. 5819 Overland.

7

And I kind of talked to him and set up an

Q. And so, as I understand it, what

8

appointment with him. And it just kind of went

9 from there. I mean, it is basically pretty
O

1

8

prompted you to bring th.is lawsuit, it sounds

9

like, was a conversation that your girlfriend had

f

simple.

O had with Mr. Gordon?

MR. LOJEK: You have answered the

1

MR. LOJEK: I think that has been asked

2

question. I don't want you to go into any

2

and answered. Could you read the question back,

3

conversations between you and Mr. Gordon.

3

please.

4

THE WITNESS: Okay.

5

MS. DUKE: And I'm not going there at

4

(Record read.)
MR. LOJEK: You can answer that.
Page 54
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THE WITNESS: That's how things got

l

2 started.
3

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And do you rec al I about

1

have any idea who Mr. Gordon was?

2

A. I knew who he was just through her.

3

Q. But I would assume it wasn't that you

4 when this was? I mean, obviously you probably

4

don't recall the exact date. But month and year?

5

A. No.

6 Or season and year?

6

Q. And then Mr. Lojek or Mr. Bistline, did

7

7 you know either of them prior to this lawsuit?

5

A. You know, I couldn't tell you the year.

were like a friend or an acquaintance of his?

8

It had to be at least a year ago. Yeah, it was

8

A. No.

9

probably back in there. 1 couldn't tell you what

9

Q. You indicated that when you first

0

month. It possibly was in the swnmer. But,

0

learned that you were no longer receiving a

1

honestly, I couldn't tell you. It was a while

1

dividend that you made a call to the State

2

ago.

2 Insurance Fund.

3

Q. Has your girlfriend been involved in

3

A. I didn't say when I first learned.

4

any of the meetings and conversations that you

4

Q. Okay. When did you first learn that

S

have had with your attorneys?

5

you were no longer receiving a dividend?

6

A. No.

6

A. I couldn't tell you the exact date . I

7

Q. She hasn't been present at those?

7

mean, obviously, I got a letter in the mail that

8

A. No.

8

said, "Your premiwn --" or it said something

9

Q. Have you discussed with your girlfriend

O

anything that you and your attorneys have

1

discussed regarding this case?

2

like, "Due to your premium not being in excess of
$2,500 you won't be receiving a dividend."

Q. But you don't know the year you
received that letter?

A. As far as a discussion? I mean,

3

general. She basically knows what the case is

A. Without looking it up, no.

4

about and that is about it.

Q. When was the first time that you

5

Q. Prior to calling Mr. Gordon did you

contacted the State Insurance Fund with respect
Page 56
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discussed in that conversation?

1 to the.decision not to provide dividends to

1

2 policyholders with premiwns of $2,500 or less?

2

A. No.

3

Q. Did you ever call the State Insurance

3
4

A. When was the first time I contacted

4 Fund again with respect to a dividend after that

them about that?

one call?

5

Q. Correct.

5

6

A. I already told you I didn't know the

6

A. I believe I did.

7

Q. How many other times?

A. I couldn't tell you. Not more than --

7

exact date.

8

Q. I understand. But I'm just trying to

8

9

get -- was it within a couple months receiving

9

0

the letter indicating that you wouldn't be

1

receiving a dividend?

·o
1

I didn't call more than a couple times.
Q. And for those other conversations, any

idea when those occurred?

2

A. I already told you I don't remember. I

2

A. No.

3

might have called them that day and said, "What

3

Q. Any idea who you spoke to?

4

do you mean I'm not getting a dividend?'' I can't

4

A. No.

5

remember.

5

Q. And with respect to those couple times,

· 6

6

Q. Who did you-talk to?

7

A. I already told you I can't remember.

8

Q. And what was said?

9

A . For me to quote something would be --

7

0

basically it was -- I mean, I couldn't tell you

1

exactly what was said. It was basicaJly what was
written in the letter. "Your premium is not

3

$2,500. You won't be getting a dividend. That's

4

the way it is. 11

8

A. Say that again?

9

Q. What was the general content of the

O conversation, as best you can recall?

fl

A. Obviously, it was about why

rm not

I

I

t:
I

Q. Anything else you recall being

the general content of the conversation?

f 2 gening a dividend.

2

S

other than the one we have talked about, ~at was

?S

Q. But I'm asking for your recollection as

to any details related to that. And what was
said between you and whomever you spoke to at the

I
!
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a-----------,-1 it hasn't happened.

1 State Insurance Fund.
2
3

A. No details. As far as I know, there

2

weren't any details about that.

3

Q. So is the answer "no" to that question,
then?

Q. Was it basically the same type of

4

A. I believe so, yes ..

5 conversation that we have already gone through?

5

Q. Other than talking to it sounds like

4

6
7
8

A. It was, 11 You didn't pay $2,500. You

6 some other policyholders who you can't recall any

are not getting a dividend."
Q. Why did you stay with the State

7

of the names of, and your girlfriend, and

8

obviously excluding what you have talked to your

9

Insurance Fund after you were no longer receiving

9

attorneys about, have you spoken to anyone else

O

adividend?

O

about the State Insurance Fund's dividend policy?

1

A. I'm busy at work. I don't have time to

1

2

play with swindling insurances and all of that

}2

3

other good stuff. I mean, it's required. I have

t3

4

employees. It is just the way it is.

5

A. You are asking me ifl can name a name?

Is that what you are asking me?
Q. No. Jin asking you, first of all, if

t

4 there is anyone, other than conversations you

Q. And so you haven't looked around at any

t

have relayed to us with the State Insurance Fund,

5

6

other options that are out there for your

i6

other than your attorneys, other than your

7

Workers' Compensation insurance needs after

}7

girlfriend, and other than these other

8

finding--

ts

policyholders who you can't remember the names

9

A. Why should I have to?

O

Q. -- after finding out you were not

i:

of-A. That's ridiculous. How many people

I

1
2

~1
;

receiving a dividend?

have you spoken to? You are starting to talk

i

f 2 down to me. I don't like that.

A. Why should I have to?

1

3

Q. So is the answer "no"'?

23

4

A. I figured some day you would probably

2 4 if you have spoken to anyone, other than those

5

come around and start giving dividends back. But

Q. I'm not. I'm just trying to understand

I
l

25

individuals, about your case against the State
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1 Insurance Fund or your position with respect to
2

1
2

the State Insurance Fund's distribution of

3

3 dividends?

4

A. As far as I know, no.

4

5

Q. Do you have a recording of your

5

6

6

conversations with the State Insurance Fund?

right?
A. It's not right. How can you even think
it is right?
Q. I'm asking you what your basis is for

saying it is not right.
A. If one person is getting a dividend,

7

A. No.

7

why shouldn't everyone down the line get a

8

Q. Why do you believe that you are

8

dividend? l mean. I can see ifl had accidents.

9

entitled to a dividend from the State Insurance

9 I mean, sure, they are going to take that off.

0

Fund?

0

1

1

MR. LOJEK: To the extent that asks for

But that is not the case.
Q. And so with respect to that you would

2

a legal conclusion, and a statutory

2

certainly agree that if you have a $1,600 policy,

3

interpretation, I'll object to the question.

3

and you have losses on that policy, that, you

4

You may answer.

4

know, those should certainly be reduced from any

5

dividend you would receive?

5

THE WITNESS: If I paid $2,50 I would I

6

get a dividend back'? According to the letter,

7

yes . If I paid $2,400, would I get one back?

8

According to the letter, no. It's not right. I

9

don't expect to get paid -- if some guy gets

· 6

LOJEK: I object to the question

7

being vague, overbroad, and calling for a legal

8

conclusion. You may answer.
THE WITNESS:

1

$1,000. I don't expect to get as much as him. I

2

expect to get ten times less than him. It is not

3

unreasonable. Who made the $2,500 rule? I

4

didn't make it.

rm sure that has been

done in the past.

O $1,000 - say, my premium is $100 and his is

5

~

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) And as I understand what

you just said that is not something you disagree
with; is that correct?
MR. LOJEK: I'll object, because you

2' 5 are asking for an expert opinion. And he is not

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Why do you say it is not

Page 62
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A. I would have to say we would have to

1

an expert in the insurance business. You are

1

2

asking for a legal conclusion . He is not a

2

3

lawyer. So those are the reasons for my

3

4

objection. And whatever his response is, it

4

5

seems to me as inconsequential. You may answer.

5

6

THE WITNESS: I believe - I mean, I

6

This witness has no foundation to be or not to be
critical.

7

don't have a problem with them taking -- like one

7

8

of my guys had an accident. Your safety rating

8

9

at work. In my opinion, we have a great safety

9

0

rating. I mean, two minor cuts in - well, we

0

1

have been in business for 25, 26 years. Two

2

minor cuts in 26 years? In my opinion, that is a

3

great record.

4

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) But the question was,

5

you certainly are not, from your position here as

6

the one bringing the lawsuit, stating that you

7

have any issue with respect to the State

8

Insurance Fund taking into consideration losses

9

as they relate to dividends; correct?

look at each particular company.
Q. And that is not something that you're

critical of them doing; correct?
lvfR_

LOJEK: I have the same objection.

THE WITNESS: That rm not critical of
them looking at my particular company?
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Looking at any companies

1

with respect to their losses and looking to those

1

2

losses to determine what a potential dividend may

1

3

or may not be?

·4

f

5

·6
, 7

MR LOJEK: I'll have the same
objection, if that is a question.

THE WITNESS: Well, they are obviously
not doing a very good job looking at each

8 particular company if they won't even reduce
9 my -- I don't even know what you call it. Rate
0

IO

MR. LOJEK: I'll have the same

~ 1 anybody to do it. I can't get anybody to have a

1

objections. The statute governing the State

2

Insurance Fund covers the conduct of the State

I

~ 2 new category in there.

3

Insurance Fund. And it isn't up to this witness

4

to say what that conduct should or should not be.

5

per hundred . On my business. I can't get

i

i

~3

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) But what I'm getting to,

¥4 and what I'm asking about is, is not whether you

25

I

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Is that correct?

are satisfied with the category you have been jn

Page 63
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( Pages 63 to 64)

•'~-----------1 for the past several years. But, instead, with

1

2 respect to losses, you are certainly not critical

12

3

of the State Insurance Fund looking at a

6

7
8

MR LOJEK: I'll object to that

3 question. Because, as you know, Ms. Duke, we

4 company's losses to evaluate a potential
5

or less?

dividend; correct?

MR. LOJEK: I'll repeat my objection.

4

have been waiting, and waiting, and waiting for

5

answers to discovery requests. And they are

6 still not complete at this point in time. And

You may answer.
THE WITNESS: I would imagine that is

7

even this morning we just received a big stack of

8

infonnation that I haven't even read . When the

9

how insurance companies work; don't they? They

9 State of Idaho State Insurance Fund has responded

0

look at your losses and figure out your rate.

O

to the discovery requests, at that time my

1

clients will be reviewing the infonnation. But

1
2

3
4

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) So you would agree that

~ 2 there is no point in doing it at this point.

is not something that you are critical of?

MR. LOJEK: I have the same objection.
This witness is not in a position to be or not to

13

You may answer.

l4

MS. DUKE: And, l guess, for the

I

5

be critical of the State ofldaho's statutes

i.s

6

governing the State lnsurance Fund.

16 allotted by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

7

8

9

THE WITNESS: I would agree.
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Have you read the

affidavit of James Alcorn in this case?

f:
r9

r:

record. We answered them within the time frame

There has been other items provided over the last
year.

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Have you reviewed
anything from the State Insurance Fund as to its

0

A. I don't believe I have.

1

Q. And let me ask it this way. Have you

2

read anything that has been created by the State

f 2 not be issued to policyholders of $2,500 or less

3

Insurance Fund related to this lawsuit as to the

23

!

i

explanation for the policy that dividends will

premiums?

I
I

4

reasoning behind why the State Insurance FWld

r4

A. I don't believe I have .

5

does not pay dividends to policyholders of $2,500

25

Q. As you sit here today do you have any

I
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~

I

i
1 understanding as to why the State Insurance ·Fund

l

ac!Journ over the noon hour and come back at l :00?

2

has not issued or provided dividends to

2

MS. DUKE: I don't have that much more.

3

policyholders of $2,500 or less over the last

3

MR. LOJEK: I still have a noon

4

couple of years?

4

5

to the extent it caHs for a legal conclusion.

6

7

And a statutory interpretation.

7

9
0

MS.DUKE: We have had this scheduled

5

MR. LOJEK: I'll object to the question

6

8

meeting.

8

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) I'm just asking for your

for a month. Mr. Bistline is here.
MR. LOJEK: That's true. Why don't you
take five minutes, if you need it.

9

understanding.

0

A. As far as I understand it, the state

(Recess.)
Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Mr. Becker, do you have

1

statute says that they should pay all of the

an understanding as to certain costs that you

2

policyholders. Now, if you are not going to pay

could be responsible for in the event you do not

3

all of the policyholders, then go change the

prevail in this case against the State Insurance

4

statute.

Fund?

5

Q. But my question was, do you have any

6

understanding as to the State Insurance Fund's

7

rationale?

harassing at this point. You are threatening

MR. LOJEK: Same objection.

9

THE WITNESS: I have no understanding

1

2
3

question. Because I think it is an attempt to
intimidate this witness. I think you are

8

0

MR. LOJEK: I'll object to the

that he is going to be in deep financial trouble
if this lawsuit is not successful. And I'm going

of the rationale.

Q. (BY MS. DUKE) Do you mind ifwe take

f 1 to instruct him not to answer the question.

:!

22

about a five-minute break?

I

MR. LOJEK: I don't mind. I've got a

4

noon meeting. I didn't anticipate this wouJd go

5

more than two hours. CouJd I suggest that we

MS. DUKE: Well, we disagree. And, if

2 3 necessary, we can take that issue up with the

l

k4
!

fS

court. But I have nothing further.
MR. LOJEK: And we have no questions at

!
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,,__.......,.
'""

_______
1

1 this tjme. Thank you.

.?
3

· (Deposition concluded at 12:00 p.m.)

: 2

CERTIFICATE OF WITNESS
I, SCOTT ALAN BECKER, being first duly

3 sworn, depose and say:

(Signature requested.)

4

That I am the witness named in the foregoing

4
5 deposition, consisting of pages l through 69;

5

6 that I have read said deposition and know the

6

7

contents thereof; that the questions contained

7

8

therein were propounded to me; and that the

8

9 answers contained therein are true and correct,

9

O

except for any changes that I may have listed on

1

the Change Sheet attached hereto:

0

DATED this _ _ day of _ _ __, 2007.

1
2
3

SCOTT ALAN BECKER

4

5

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
day of _ _ _ _ _ _ ___;,2007.

6
7

8
NAME OF NOTARY PUBLIC

9
0

NOTARY PUBLIC FOR - - - - - - -

1

RESIDING AT _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

2

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES - - - - - -

3

4
5
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___ _______

,,.,.......___._
1

...,......

ERRATA SHEET FOR SCOTT ALAN BECKER

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

2 Page_ Line_ Reason for Change _ _ _ __
Reads _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
3

2

Should Read _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

3

4

4

I, MONICA M. ARCHULETA, CSR No. 4 71,
Certified Shorthand Reporter, certify:
That the foregoing proceedings were taken

Page_ Line_ Reason for Change _ _ _ __
5

5 before me at the time and place therein set

Reads _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Should Read _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

6

forth. at which time the witness was put under

7

oath by me;

6
7

8

Page_ Line_ Reason for Change _ _ __ _
Reads _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

B

Should Read _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

9

Page_ Line_ Reason for Change _ _ _ __

10

were recorded stenographic.ally by me and

0

transcribed by me or under my direction;

1

1

Page_ Line_ Reason for Change _ _ _ __

Reads _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
13

9

Reads _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Should Read _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

12

That the testimony and all objections made

2

record of all testimony gjven, to the best of my

3

ability;

4

Should Read _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

14

That the foregoing is a true and correct

I further certify that I am not a relative

s or employee of any attorney or party, nor am I
Page_ Line_ Reason for Change _ _ _ __

15

6

R~~---------------Should Read _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

7

16

17

18

8

Page_ Line_ Reason for Change _ _ _ __
Reads _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

financially interested in the action.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I set my hand and seal
this _ _ day of _ _ _ _ __, 2007.

9

Should Read _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

0

19

MON1CA M. ARCHULETA, CSR NO. 471

Page_ Line_ Reason for Change _ _ _ __

20

r:

R~~---------------Should Read _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __

21
22

4

25

23
I

P.O. Box 2636

~4

Boise, Idaho 83701-2636

I

Page_ Line_ Reason for Change _ _ _ __

Reads _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

23

Notary Public

I

Should Read _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ __

2 5 My commission expires August 3, 2012

You may use another sheet if you need more room.

I

WlWESS SIONAllJRE _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

I'

1
l

!

Page 72

Page 71 j

36 (Pages 71 to 72)
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. - (208) 345~9611

000241

Richard E. Hall
ISB #1253; reh@hallfarley.com

Keely E. Duke

F I

ISB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585
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JAN O4 2010
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
K CANNON, DEPUTY

W:\3\3-461.2\Reconsideration Opp.doc

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT ALAN
BECKER and CRITTER CLINIC, an Idaho
Professional Association,

Case No. CV06-7877
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDATION OR,
ALTERNATIVELY, FOR
BIFURCATION OF CLASS

Plaintiffs,
VS.

THE IDAHO STA TE INSURANCE
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager,
and WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER,
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN,
GERALD GEDDES, MILFORD
TERRELL, JUDI DANIELSON, JOHN
GOEDDE, ELAINE MARTIN, and MARK
SNODGRASS in their capacity as member
of the Board of Directors of the State
Insurance Fund,
Defendants.

COME NOW the defendants, Idaho State Insurance Fund, James M. Alcorn, Manager of
the State Insurance Fund, and the Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund ("SIF"), by and
through their counsel of record, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., and hereby submit this
opposition to plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration or, Alternatively, for Bifurcation of Class,
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDA TION OR,
ALTERNATIVELY, FOR BIFURCATION OF CLASS- I
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filed December 4, 2009 ("plaintiffs' Motion").

As explained herein, plaintiffs' requested

reconsideration and bifurcation should be denied.
ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs' Motion seeks relief from this Court's prior decision regarding the applicable
statute of limitations in this matter.

In particular, this Court's Order Granting Defendants'

Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Statute of Limitation, filed April 30, 2007
("Order"), provided that "Plaintiffs' claims and causes of action accruing prior to July 21, 2003,
are TIME-BARRED, based upon the applicable statute of limitation for statutory violations." Id.
at 2.
Plaintiffs have now taken the curious position that "this is not a statutory cause of action
but, rather, is grounded in contract[.]" Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration
and Alternative Motion to Bifurcate, filed December 3, 2009 ("plaintiffs' Memo"), at 4.
Plaintiffs obliquely point to the depositions of plaintiffs Farber and Becker, pointing out that
both individuals discussed their SIF policies during their depositions. Plaintiffs also assert that
the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Farber "made clear that the Plaintiffs and the Class have a
direct, contractual property interest in those dividend monies which were improperly distributed
by the SIF." In doing so, plaintiffs ignore that the insurance contract each policyholder has with
SIF does not discuss a dividend or the policyholder's right thereto. In addition, in making their
request, plaintiffs are effectively requesting this Court reject the Idaho Supreme Court's finding
in Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, et al., 141 Idaho 388, 111 P.3d 73 (2005),
wherein the Court held that claims based on statutory violations are subject to a three year statute
of limitation. As discussed below, these contentions should be rejected by the Court.
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A.

The Hayden Lake decision establishes a 3-year statute of limitations for plaintiffs' claims.
Plaintiffs note that the Idaho Supreme Court held in Hayden Lake that: "Thus, since the

claims would not exist 'but for' the statutes, the [district] court applied the three-year statute of
limitations to contract claims and determined that the claims accrued on the effective date of the
leases." Plaintiffs' Memo at 6 (quoting Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 395.) Despite this, plaintiffs
claim that this case is different, asserting that the policyholders' claim to a pro rata portion of the
dividends results in an action wherein the gravamen lies in contract, rather than statute. See
Plaintiffs' Memo at 8 ("The claims involved here are intimately and directly involved with the
operation of a contract."). Tellingly, plaintiffs cite no contract language within the policy in

support of their assertions.
The holding of Hayden Lake is clear on this point. Claims, the gravamen of which are
based on statutory violations, are subject to a three year statute of limitation:
There is no Idaho law directly on point as to whether the 3-year statute of
limitations for statutory violations or the 5-year statute .for breach of contract
applies when a contract incorporates a statute and the allegations stem from
violations of those statutes. The district court's application of the three-year
statute of imitations stemmed from its finding that the gravamen of HLFPD's
claims were grounded in statute.
In Kelso this Court held that Kelso's claims that the SIF "acted beyond its
statutory authority" in real estate investments with the State survived a motion to
dismiss. Id. at 140, 997 P .2d at 60 l. This holding was premised on this Court's
determination that the SIF's governing statutes were incorporated into its contracts
with its policyholders. Id. at 138, 997 P.2d at 599. This Court did not make any
findings as to the statute of limitation that would apply to the claims.
HLFPD's breach of contract and implied covenant claims are based on
alleged statutory violations. The district court looked to Dietrich v. Copeland
Lumber Co., 28 Idaho 312, 154 P. 626 (1916), which held that the statute of
limitation for a statutory liability applied, despite the fact that the case was
brought as an action to collect on promissory notes. This Court reasoned that, "[a]
'statutory liability' is one that depends for its existence on the enactment of the
statute, and not on the contract of the parties." Id. at 318, 154 P. at 628 (quoting 4
Words and Phrases, Second Series, 686). Though the district court recognized that
Dietrich may not be controlling in light of this Court's Kelso decision, it stated
that "[ Dietrich J is useful in support of the proposition that the true gravamen of
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDATION OR,
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the plaintiffs' claims should control the question of which statute of limitations is
applicable, rather than the manner in which the claims are actually pied." This
conclusion is correct.
Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 403-04, 111 P.3d 73, 88-89 (2004). In
doing so, note that the Court specifically remarks that the Kelso court "did not make any
findings as to the statute of limitations that would apply to the claims." Id at 404 (emphasis
added). Thus, plaintiffs can find no refuge in Kelso for their argument that a 5-year statute
applies. 1
In addition to disregarding the holding in Hayden Lake, Plaintiffs' argument ignores two
additional critical points.

First, plaintiffs' change in position is belied both by their own

language in the current governing complaint, and by their position on appeal.

The First

Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial asserts only three causes of action:
Declaratory Relief - Payment of Dividends, Declaratory Relief - Injunction, and Damages.
None assert a separate and distinct claim for breach of contract, and, in fact, plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint expressly intertwines a claimed violation of statute with references to contract: e.g.,
" ... such acts and actions are in derogation of the contractual and statutory provisions ... " (,r26);
" ... acted wrongly, arbitrarily, in violation of an [sicJ law of the State of Idaho and contrary to
the contract ... " (if28.a); " ... acted in violation of Idaho law and the provision of the contract..."
(if33); " ... did not have any lawful or contractual authority ... " (Prayer for Relief, if2). In fact,

1

Interestingly, plaintiffs omit discussion of the other Hayden Lake decision, Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v.
Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 109 P.3d 161 (2005). In that matter, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected SIF's request for
attorney fees, holding that fees were not recoverable under either Idaho Code §41-1839 or Idaho Code §12-120(3),
in light of the nature of the action. Id. at 313 ("Both Idaho case law and legislative history suggest subsection four
does not apply to statutory-based litigation. Consequently, LC. §41-1839(4) does not bar recovery of attorney fees
for the SIF under I.C. §12-120(3).... However, where the gravamen ofa complaint regards a violation ofa statute
rather than a contract or commercial transaction, LC. § 12-120(3) does not apply. The gravamen of HLFPD's
complaint was whether the SIF violated its statutory obligations imposed by its workers' compensation insurance
contracts. Consequently, the SIF is not entitled to a reasonable award of attorney fees under LC. §12-120(3).")
Plaintiffs' attempts to now recast this action as a straight contract action is likely motivated, in no small part, by the
realization that plaintiffs lack a statutory basis for attorneys' fees.
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Paragraph 8 expressly alleges that: "This statute provides the sole and exclusive authority
under and pursuant to which the Fund can lawfully pay dividends to its subscribers." Thus,
plaintiffs' own Amended Complaint contradicts their new contention that "this is not a statutory
cause of action[.]"
Further, plaintiffs asserted in their Idaho Supreme Court briefing, bluntly, that "[t]his
case involves the meaning of LC.§ 72-915," and that "[pJlaintiffs and the some 30,000 members
of the class they represent have protested this conduct in light of LC. §72-915." Appellants'
Brief at p. I. The sea-change in positions advance by plaintiffs now should be precluded as a
matter of judicial estoppel:

If parties in court were permitted to assume inconsistent positions in the trial of
their causes, the usefulness of courts of justice would in most cases be paralyzed;
the coercive process of the law, available only between those who consented to its
exercise, could be set at naught by all. But the rights of all men, honest and
dishonest, are in the keeping of the courts, and consistency of proceeding is
therefore required of all those who come or are brought before them. It may
accordingly be laid down as a broad proposition that one who, without mistake
induced by the opposite party, has taken a particular position deliberately in the
course of litigation, must act consistently with it; one cannot play fast and loose.
McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148,153,937 P.2d 1222, 1227 (1997)(quoting Winmark v. Miles &
Stockbridge, 109 Md. App. 149, 674 A.2d 73 (1996)). Thus, plaintiffs' argument should be
rejected.
Second, despite plaintiffs' attempts to characterize the Farber decision otherwise, the
Supreme Court's holding is overwhelming addressed to interpretation of a statute, more than
amply demonstrating that the gravamen of this action lies in statute, not contract:
Instead, the plain language of I. C. § 72-915 demonstrates that the statute grants
the Manager discretion to distribute a dividend when "there is an aggregate
balance remaining to the credit of any class of employment or industry" and the
Manager deems that the aggregate balance "may be safely and properly divided."
The Manager's discretion is therefore limited to the decision of whether or not to
distribute a dividend in the first place. The remainder of the sentence sets forth the
method by which dividends are to be distributed, requiring the Manager to "credit
to each individual member of such class" who has been a policyholder for at least
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six months "such proportion of such balance as he is properly entitled to, having
regard to his prior paid premiums since the last readjustment of rates." Id The
phrase "any class of employment or industry," when read with other statutes
related to worker's compensation insurance, refers to the class to which each
policyholder belongs for purposes of determining the rate paid for worker's
compensation coverage. The statute contemplates dividing the aggregate balance
proportionately according to the policyholder's prior paid premiums relative to
all paid premiums. To argue that this language could be construed to somehow
grant discretion regarding how to calculate the distribution makes no sense, and
would require this Court to stretch the plain language beyond its obvious
meaning. Finally, in 2002 the Idaho Legislature passed House Bill No. 511, an
appropriations bill, which casts further doubt on the Fund's proposed
interpretation of LC. § 72-915. H.R. 511, 56th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2002).
The bill provided that the Fund would distribute a specified amount to state
agencies as policyholders, and that "[t]he balance of the dividends shall be
credited to each individual agency proportionally in accordance with Section 72915, Idaho Code." Id This language demonstrates that in 2002, the Legislature
viewed section 72-915 as requiring a pro rata distribution of dividends.
Farber v. State Insurance Fund, 147 Idaho 307, _ , 208 P.3d 289, 294 (2009).

Thus, there is

nothing in the Farber decision that indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court has reversed its
holding in Hayden Lake, or otherwise held that the gravamen of plaintiffs' suit lay in contract,
rather than statute.
Plaintiffs attempt to sidestep these concerns by suggesting, in part, that there might be
more than one gravamen to the action. Not only does this ignore the definition of 'gravamen,' 2
but also disregards that no such "multiple gravamen" conclusion was reached in Hayden Lake,
even where claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
breach of fiduciary duty, money had and received, rescission, declaratory relief, injunction,
equitable accounting, and attorney fees were made.

See 141 Idaho at 393.

In any event,

plaintiffs cite no authority for their "multiple gravamen" theory.
In a similar vein, plaintiffs also cite to James v. Buck, 111 Idaho 708 (1986), as well as
decisions from other states, for the proposition that where there are two applicable statutes of

Black's 7th : "The substantial point or essence of a claim, grievance, or complaint."
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limitation, the longer should apply. However, plaintiffs' argument is not predicated on two
alternative readings of a statute oflimitation as contained in a statute, as was the case in James v.
Buck, where the Court was attempting to discern a statute of limitation set forth by Idaho Code
§6-IOI l. l l l Idaho at 710 ("In addition, where two constructions of a statute oflimitations or a
rule which impacts directly upon such a statute are possible, courts generally prefer the
construction which gives the longer period in which to prosecute the action. Our interpretation
of J.C. §6-l 01 l today is consistent with that rule.")(internal citations omitted).

Plaintiffs'

argument is not predicated on discerning the longer of two statute of limitations that might arise
out of a statute, but, rather, plaintiffs' attempts to abandon their statute-based claim and recast it
as a pure breach of contract claim. As such, James v. Buck offers plaintiffs no refuge, and, for
the other reasons as stated above, plaintiffs' Motion should be denied.
Finally, note further, that plaintiffs extensively argued in favor of distinction of Hayden
Lake in their prior opposition. See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed on or about March 12, 2007, at pp. l l-16. Plaintiffs attempt to recast
their second bite at the apple both via nonsensical citations to the affidavits of Farber and
Becker, citation to the Idaho Supreme Court's Farber citation (without quotation), citation to one
additional authority (James v. Buck, discussed above), and via attacks on the prior judge in this
matter, Judge Morfitt. See Plaintiffs' Memo at p. 4 ("Following these two depositions and many
pages of briefing, the Supreme Court on March 5th and May 5th made clear what was, perhaps,
unclear to Judge Morfitt."), and at p. IO ("Judge Morfitt did not even grapple with any of the
issues discussed above. Judge Morfitt apparently ignored the citation of the Plaintiffs to one case
holding that a longer statute of limitation should be applied where there is a choice between a
longer statute and a shorter statute.").

Plaintiffs even go so far as to improperly suggest that

"this issue was not really fleshed out for Judge Morfitt," ignoring that I) it was raised in
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defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; 2) plaintiffs spent several pages responding to it in
their opposition, utilizing many of the same arguments as now made, and 3) plaintiffs' arguments
were responded to in an additional 2 pages of briefing in SIF's reply memorandum. 3 In short,
plaintiffs arguments now are as unavailing as previously made, and plaintiffs' 'new' arguments
on reconsideration do not warrant reversal of the previous decision of the Court.
Accordingly, plaintiffs' Motion should be denied.
B.

Plaintiffs' Alternative Motion for bifurcation should be denied.
In the alternative, plaintiffs request that "the Court bifurcate the existing Class into two

sub-classes," one of which would be for employers who purchased a policy between July I, 1999
and June 30, 200 I, and the second class being those employers who purchased a policy between
July I, 200 I to some unspecified date in the future. Plaintiffs' Memo at I 0-l l.
As an initial matter, plaintiffs' argument wholly disregards the current class actually at
issue in this litigation. In defining the current class, the Court issued its Order defining the class
as follows:
All persons or entities, other than Lojek Law Offices Chtd. and Gordon Law
Offices Chtd., who:
a.
b.

c.

purchased a policy for worker's compensation insurance from the SIF
on or after July I, 2000;
paid an annual premium for such insurance to the SIF which was equal
to or less than $2,500.00 for one or more policy years beginning on or
after July I, 2000; and
did not receive a dividend since July 22, 200 I, from the SIF solely
because he, she, or it paid a premium of $2,500.00 or less during any
respective subsequent year that dividends were paid to other
policyholders.

3

Indeed, plaintiffs' reference to the length of SIF's argument in its opening memorandum - without reference to
plaintiffs' own opposition briefing and SIF's reply briefing - in arguing that the matter was not "fleshed out'' for
Judge Morfitt borders on misrepresentation by omission.
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Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, at 2. Further, as a result of the Idaho State
Legislature's repeal of Idaho Code §72-915, as made by S.B. 1166 as effective May 6, 2009, the
class (looking forward) was expressly 'frozen' to the class in existence at the time of the repeal.:
(6) It is the intent of the Legislature that the provisions of this at shall not apply
to any action filed in a state or federal court of law in the state of Idaho on or
before December 31, 2008, and the provisions of this at shall not apply to the
aforementioned case of Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund as currently
pending with respect to those policy holders paying annual premiums of not more
than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500).
(emphasis added). Thus, the repeal of Idaho Code §72-915 precludes any claims for dividends
declared after May 6, 2009. Thus, plaintiffs' identified class in this motion - policyholders who
purchased policies from July 1, 1999 to some unstated future date - is not an accurate
representation of the actual extant class (thus, SIF does, in fact, dispute plaintiffs' contention that
"the composition of the Class is not in dispute"). In actuality, the dividend periods at issue in
this action are as follows:
Dividend Period

Dividend Declaration

Dividend Paid

7/1/01-6/30/02

Dec. 2003

Jan. 2004

7/1/02-6/30/03

Dec. 2004

Jan. 2005

7/1/03-6/30/04

Dec. 2005

Jan. 2006

7/l /04-6/30/05

Dec. 2006

Dec. 2006

7/l /05-6/30/06

Dec. 2007

Jan.2008

7/1/06-6/30/07

Dec. 2008

Jan.2009

(See, e.g., Affidavit of John Marshall, filed Dec. 4, 2009, Exh. A.)

It is for this same reason that plaintiffs' request for bifurcation ultimately fails. In light of
the Court's ruling on the statute of limitations, plaintiffs' requested "Sub-Class # 1" - employers
who purchased a policy between July 1, 1999 and June 30, 2001 - are not presently a party to
this action. Thus, as these policyholders are not members of the extant class in this action, there
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is nothing to 'bifurcate.' To the extent plaintiffs now seek to challenge the Court's ruling on the
issue of the applicable statute of limitations, the appropriate means for requesting relief would be
either through a request for reconsideration (which should be denied, as above) or via appeal to
the Idaho Supreme Court. Indeed, plaintiffs' Motion appears to suggest that they intend to seek
relatively immediate appeal with respect to "Sub-Class #1," so it is unclear why plaintiffs have
not sought a Rule 54(b) certificate. 4
In any event, plaintiffs' claimed interest in "expediting" a decision on this issue via
bifurcation rings hollow, given that plaintiffs took no action to seek reconsideration or review of
the Court's April 30, 2007 Order for over two and a half years. Indeed, plaintiffs could have
immediately sought reconsideration after such decision to, e.g., cite the James v. Buck decision
(a 1986 decision) they now claim is critical to their Motion; plaintiffs could have sought
reconsideration after the depositions of Farber (June 29, 2007) or Becker (June 28, 2007)5 which
they also now claim are critical to consideration of the Motion; plaintiffs could have sought a
Rule 54(b) certificate after the issuance of the Court's Order on April 30, 2007; plaintiffs could
have sought a Rule 54(b) certificate in conjunction with their previously requested (and granted)
request for interlocutory appeal, filed on January 4, 2008; and plaintiffs could have sought
reconsideration following the May 5, 2009 decision in Farber. As such, this Court should pay
little heed to plaintiffs' references to allowing "Sub-Class #1" to "proceed to appeal without
delay" and "expediting a resolution of the claims of Sub-Class #2," as plaintiffs failed to
previously avail themselves to reconsideration/review of the statute of limitation ruling, and as
resolution of such claims is not impaired by the absence of "Sub-Class# 1" in this action.

4

Of course, in noting this, SIF still reserves all right to dispute and contest any such request for a Rule 54(b)
certificate on the statute of limitations issue, if such request is ultimately made by plaintiffs.
5
Plaintiffs' Motion omits the dates of these depositions.
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Finally, plaintiffs' request should also be denied on the grounds of judicial economy.
Plaintiffs' proposed bifurcation would not simplify this matter, but would instead unnecessarily
complicate the action by effectively creating two separate actions which the parties would have
to address simultaneously. For example, plaintiffs' apparent intent would be seek appeal of the
exclusion of "Sub-Class #1" from this action, which would occur during the pendency of this
action as currently postured, placing this action (as well as the parties' counsel) in two different
courts at the same time on the same case. Such a scenario runs contrary to the goals of judicial
economy.
Accordingly, plaintiffs' request for bifurcation should also be denied.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration or,
Alternatively, for Bifurcation of Class should be denied.
Oral argument is requested.
RESPECTUFLL Y SUBMITTED this

:t._ day of January, 2010.

HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT
& BLANTON, P.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

_t_

day of January, 2010, I caused to be served a
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:
Donald W. Lojek
Lojek Law Offices, CHTD
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83 702
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for Plaintiff

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Philip Gordon
Bruce S. Bistline
Gordon Law Offices
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83 702
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for Plaintiff

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
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__F
__, ~k_E_.QM,
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD

JAN 19 2010

623 West Hays Street
PO Box 1712
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone:
208-343-7733
Facsimile:
208-345-0050

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T EARLS, DEPUTY

Philip Gordon ISBN 1996
Bruce S. Bistline ISBN 1988
GORDON LAW OFFICES
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83 702
Telephone: 208/345-7100
Facsimile: 208/345-0050
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIB THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
RANDOLPH E. FARBER,
SCOTT ALAN BECKER and CRITTER
CLINIC, an Idaho Professional Association.

CASE NO. CV06-7877

Plaintiffs,

vs.
THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, and
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER,
MARGUARITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE
MARTIN, and MARK SNODGRASS in their
capacity as member of the Board of Directors
of the State Insurance Fund
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ALTERNATIVELY, FOR
BIFURCATION OF CLASS
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APPLICATION OF THE APPROPRIATE STATUTE OF LIMITATION

The State Insurance Fund (SIF) in its responsive memorandum to Plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration has not really addressed Plaintiffs' principal argument. That argument, simply
stated, is that Plaintiffs could not proceed in this case based on a statute alone. Even more
simply put, LC. § 72-915 does not give every employer in Idaho any right to anything. It is only
when the employer has a contract with the SIF that LC. § 72-915 becomes operative and of
importance. An employer cannot bring a statutory cause of action alleging a violation of LC. §
72-915 without a contract being formed between that employer and the SIF.
Because the statutory framework of the worker's compensation system in Idaho is
incorporated into the contract of insurance between an Idaho employer and the SIF, the contract
is thus expanded to bring within its four comers that statutory framework including, among other
rights and privileges, the pro rata requirement of I.C. § 72-915 when a dividend corpus is
distributed. to the SIF's policyholders as a "readjustment" of the "rate" on which their premium
was based (effectively a premium refund).
If this were simply a statutory cause of action where a statute - and nothing more allowed a direct cause of action against the SIF, Plaintiffs would then readily agree and indeed
must agree with the Defendants' position on the application of a three-year limitation. But that is
not the case and the matter is not quite as simple or as simplistic as Defendants seem to believe.
These are the same Defendants who have not denied, refuted or even discussed Plaintiffs' central
and most basic point: the statute in question confers no rights and no benefits and no privileges
on any Idaho employer unless and until that employer has a contract of insurance with the SIF.

MEIIORANDUII IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' IIOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR,
ALTERNATIVELY, FOR BIFURCATION OF CLASS - 2

000255

The contract is not then incorporated into the statute. On the contrary, the statute is incorporated
into the contract. It becomes a part of the substance and material provisions of the contract.
This is manifestly clear from Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 138,
997 P.2d 591 (2000). " ... the contract [of insurance] necessarily incorporates the statutory
framework in which both created the SIF and governs the actions that can be taken by the SIF
with regard to the SIF's funds ... consequently, any act taken by the SIF beyond its statutory
authority would also be a breach of the SIF' s contract with Kelso."

In addition to the mere presence of a contract, this case really goes to the heart of the
contracts between the SIF and the policyholders in the Class. That is to say, the pro rata
distribution of the dividend corpus really is an adjustment of the consideration lying at the heart
of the contract. The premium paid by the policyholder is consideration for the SIF's agreement
to underwrite a risk subject, of course, to the statutory framework. When the dividend corpus is

distributed on a pro rata basis, that is a readjustment of the rate charged by the SIF or a
readjustment of the consideration. Clearly this is a contractual process.
The very most that can be said by the Defendants is that the Plaintiffs' cause of action

stands on two legs: one leg is the contract and the other is the statute which is, of course, a part
of the contract We know a contract breach is governed by a five-year statute of limitations (I.C.
§ 5-216) and that a pure statutory violation is under a three-year statute of limitations (I.C. §5219(3)). If there is a choice between the two limitation periods (which is not conceded by
Plaintiffs here) that still brings into play James v. Buck, 111 Idaho 708, 710, 727 P.2d 1136
(1986) holding that where there is a choice between two statutes of limitation courts should
generally prefer the construction which gives the longer period in which to prosecute the action.
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As pointed out in Plaintiffs' opening memorandum, this Idaho holding is consistent with the
holdings of our sister states in Colorado, Iowa, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota to
name a few.
To say that Judge Morfitt did not even grapple with any of these questions is not at all
disrespectful of Judge Morfitt. It is simply a reflection of the fact that Judge Morfitt did not
address these questions. His Order filed very early in this case's life applied a three-year statute
of limitations and is of record. It is attached to this memorandum for the convenience of the
Court. Judge Morfitt did not address James v. Buck which reflects Idaho law that a longer statute
of limitations should be applied when there is a choice. Admittedly, Judge Morfitt did not have
James v. Buck cited to him by Plaintiffs. Rather, case law from Montana, Colorado, Arizona and

the two Dakotas was cited. 1 But this is an additional reason why the Motion for Reconsideration
is properly before this Court based on new authority and new developments since 2007 when
Judge Morfitt made his original decision which is being asked to be reconsidered here.
It is not at all disrespectful of Judge Morfitt either as to his office or his person to point
out that he did not have before him those matters that Plaintiffs have brought before the Court in
this Motion for Reconsideration, among them the controlling decision of the Idaho Supreme
Court in this action. To imply otherwise is both unfair and unnecessary.
Having avoided the heart of Plaintiffs' argument, the SIF offers some irrelevancies (e.g.,
the insurance contract does not discuss a dividend or the policyholder's right thereto), and then
clings to the Hayden Lake decision, 141 Idaho 388, 111 P.3d 73 (2005) as applicable to the

1

Gust, et al. v. Prudenlial Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 898 P.ld 964, 968 (Mont 1995). "Because statutes of limitation are in derogation of a
presumptively valid claim, a longer period of limitations should prevail if two statutes are arguably appllcable. • Aneco Ins. Co. v.
Rockwell, 940 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997). See, e.g., Traveler's Indemnity Co. V. Anderson, 983 P.2d 999,1002 (Ariz.
1999); Global Financial Selvices, Inc. v. Duttenhefuer, 575 N.W.2d 667,670 (N.D. 1998); Zoss v. Schllfers, 598 N.W.2d 550,553

(S.D. 1999).
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instant case. The SIF states that Hayden Lake is really dispositive of the issue and urges this
Court on the strength of Hayden Lake to uphold Judge Morfitt' s decision that a three-year statute
of limitation is absolutely the correct statute of limitation to apply.
The SIF is more than a little inaccurate in stating that the Plaintiffs are "disregarding the
holding in Hayden Lake" (Defendants' Opposition, p. 4). The Plaintiffs addressed Hayden Lake
fully and directly at pps. 6-9 of its opening memorandum in support of their motion for
reconsideration. In truth, the SIF does not really appreciate (or simply will not appreciate) the
melding of the contractual aspects of this case with the statutory aspects. Defendants cite to the
Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial and point out,
accurately but without apparent comprehension, that the statute and the contractual obligations of
the SIF are combined in paragraphs 26, 28 and 33 of the Complaint which, notwithstanding, is
really only subject to notice requirements.
Indeed, the prayer for relief in paragraph 2 of the First Amended Complaint does speak to

both lawful and contractual authority and recognizes correctly that J.C.§ 72-915 does provide the
"sole and exclusive authority under and pursuant to which the Fund can lawfully pay dividends to
its subscribers" which, in context, refers to the contract's statutory incorporation. The key word
in that sentence though is "subscribers" because it is only the "subscribers," i.e., the
policyholders of the SIF, who have contracts of insurance to whom or as to which the statute
applies.
This is why the Plaintiffs have stated that this case has to do with the operation of a
j

contract while Hayden Lake concerns itself with the operation of the State Insurance Fund. That
is a distinction with a difference as reflected in the authorities cited and the analysis offered by
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Plaintiffs in their opening memorandum.
The Defendants' confusion (or apparent confusion) may stem from the merging of the

Kelso and Hayden Lake cases. The reader of this memorandum is reminded that the Plaintiffs'
complaint in Hayden Lake was filed while Kelso was still pending before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court did comment in Hayden Lake that: "Thus, since the claims would not exist
'but for' the statutes, the [district] court applied the three-year statute of limitations to contract
claims and determined that the claims accrued on the effective dates of the leases." at 395.
However, would it not be just as accurate to say that the Plaintiffs claims in this case would not
exist "but for" the contract which incorporated the statutes? The difference between Hayden

Lake and this action is explained below.
As stated in Plaintiffs' opening memorandum, that difference is that the Ke/so/Hayden

Lake claims arise from a dispute about three things bearing on the operation and management
decisions of the SIF. First, a surplus retained by the SIF was alleged to be in excess of what was
statutorily required by LC. § 72-911. Second, the complaint stated that the SIF was selling
worker's compensation insurance at the artificially low premiums established by LC. § 411612(2) and (3). Additionally, Hayden Lake discussed yet another claim that the SIF had entered
into certain real estate leases which were a violation of three statutes, i.e., I.C. §§ 41-701, 72-902,
and 72-912. Hayden Lake at 394; Kelso at 140. All of these claims were really critical of how
the SIF was operating its business. None of the claims were based on a subscriber's right to
receive a readjustment of the rate paid for the coverage which is a direct entitlement to money as
to which the Plaintiffs had a property interest.
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Clearly, these claims did not involve the direct contractual relationship between the SIF
and its policyholders created by LC. § 72-915 or, for that matter, any direct contractual
relationship. Here, the policyholders do have a direct property interest in dividends once they are
declared and begun to be distributed by the SIF's Manager. In contract to this direct relationship
and property interest, the Supreme Court in Hayden Lake and Kelso held that the policyholders of
the SIF did not have a property interest in the assets of the SIF. Again, that is a distinction with a
difference: operation of the State Insurance Fund versus the operation of a

contract or, more properly, the fulfillment of contractual duties to policyholders who have a
property right as to their pro rata distribution of the declared dividend corpus.
The multiple contracts held by the Class members in this case absolutely require a pro

rata distribution of dividend monies to identifiable policyholders. There is a contractual right to
a pro rata share of the dividend corpus and a property right as to monies due. Therefore, an
application of Hayden Lake's holding depends upon an analysis of the connection between the
statute or the contract as drivers of the appropriate statute of limitation. None of the statutes in

Hayden Lake conferred any direct right or benefit on the plaintiffs. Here, because the statute
does not stand alone, is incorporated into the contract of insurance, and that melding or
combination produces a property right as to the Plaintiffs and their Class, Hayden Lake provides
no authority for Defendants' position.
The Defendants reliance upon the fact that the Supreme Court in Farber, et al. v. State

Insurance Fund, et al. focused on the statute is really an attempt to view the Supreme Court's
decision with heavy blinders. If, as Kelso says, the statute is a part of the contract, then looking
at the statute is really only isolating on a part of the contract, isn't it? So we can play in a
semantics sandbox and discuss whether there is one or two or no "gravamen" of the lawsuit but
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that skirts the danger of approaching this case with similar heavy blinders. We must come full
circle to the fact that I.C. § 72-915 confers no rights on Idaho employers until and unless those
employers have a contract with the State Insurance Fund. At that point, the statute is within the
written contract with respect to the requirement for a pro rata distribution of the dividend corpus.
There is a melding of the two and that combination constitutes the gravamen of the cause of
action. Since we have a combination of a substantive statute (three years) and its incorporating
contract (five years) a longer limitation should prevail even if two statutes of limitation are
arguably applicable.

MOTION FOR BIFURCATION

If the Court disagrees with Plaintiffs' argument for the application of a five-year

limitation statute, then the alternate motion for bifurcation is, in fact, something that would
promote a resolution of the Class claims which Plaintiffs have described as "Sub-Class No. 2."
The composition of this Class is not in dispute and the employers in this Class would encounter
no further delay in payment to them. This would result in a savings to the State Insurance Fund
since the interest accruing on the claims of Sub-Class No. 2 would cease as soon as the claims
are paid.
The SIF argues that Plaintiffs dragged their feet in not asking for a reconsideration of
Judge Morfitt's opinion earlier. That is beside the point. The question is whether bifurcation
should occur, not when. The Plaintiffs did not really have a cause of action upon which they
could have gone forward until the Supreme Court's decision in Farber and because of
preliminary rulings which were appealed.

Yes, Plaintiffs could have sought a Rule 54(b)
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certificate earlier but if one wraps themselves in the "economy of justice" mantle, then how
would multiple appeals involving a much larger set of Plaintiffs in this case promote that
concept?
Judicial economy in this context should not mean that both Classes should remain stalled
while an appeal is made to the Supreme Court as to the two-year Class dismissed by Judge
Morfitt. As stated earlier, that outcome is disadvantageous to both the State Insurance Fund and
to the members of the Class already determined as viable. A bifurcation would serve the
interests of justice both as to economy and simplification of issues.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration should be granted
and a five-year statute of limitation applied in this case.
Alternatively, bifurcation would be an easy remedy which would promote payment to the
members of the Class who are presently and unquestionably deserving of the payment of
damages and allowing the questionable Class (if that is the Court's decision) to proceed to an
appellate level for a further examination of which statute of limitation should apply.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

jJ_ day of January, 2010.
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD.

GORDON LAW OFFICES

Byo~ ~~~
Bruce S. Bistline

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the/ 7r/(day of January, 2010, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing instrument was served on the following by the method indicated below, and
addressed as follows:
t><] · Hand Delivery
[ ]
U.S. Mail, postage paid
[ ]
Overnight Express Mail
[ ]
Facsimile Copy:

Richard E. Hall
Keely Duke
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton PA
702 West Idaho Street, Ste. 700
Boise, ID 83702
Attorney for State Insurance Fund

Donald W. Lojek
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIIlRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

RANDOLPH E. FARB ER, SCOTT
ALAN BECKER and CRITTER
CLINIC, an Idaho Professional
Association,
Plaintiffs,
-vsTHE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, its
Manager, and WILLIAM DEAL,
WAYNE MEYER, MARGUERITE
McLAUGHLIN, GERALD GEDDES,
MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE,
ELAINE MARTIN, and MARK
SNODGRASS in their capacity
As member of the Board of Directors
of the State Insurance Fund,

Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

Case No. CV 2006-07877*C

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
THE ISSUE OF STATUTE OF
LIMITATION

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

/o) ~©~DW!~fni
In] MAYO 2 2007

~

GORDON LAW OFFICES
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly before the Court
for hearing on April 6, 2007. Plaintiffs appeared through their attorneys of record, Mr.
Bruce S. Bistline, Mr. Phillip Gordon and Mr. Donald W. Lojek. Defendants appeared
through their attorneys of record, Mr. Richard Hall and Ms. Keely E. Duke.
The Court having fully and carefully considered the file and record in this case
together with the briefing and memoranda submitted in support of and in opposition to
the Defendants' motion, and the Court having orally announced its findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the record, in open court, which findings of fact and conclusions of
law are adopted herein, and
Good Cause Appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does ORDER, that Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment on the three-year statute of limitation issue, be, and is hereby
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, and this does ORDER, that Plaintiffs' claims and
causes of action accruing prior to July 21, 2003, are TIME-BARRED, based upon the
applicable statute of limitation for statutory violations.
DATED:

APR 3 0 2007

JAMES Cfv10RFITT
James C. Morfitt
District Judge

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing Order Denying
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on
s~:rs of Standing and Waiver was
mailed to each of the attorneys listed herein on the
day of April, 2007.

th:3

Donald W. Lojek
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD.
1199 W. Main Street
P. 0. Box 1712
Boise, ID 83701-1712

Phillip Gordon
Bruce S. Bistline
GORDON LAW OFFICES
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702

Richard E. Hall
Keely E. Duke
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT
& BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
P. 0. Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701

William H. Hurst,
Clerk of the District Court

By:

DBUTU:.fi

---------Deputy Clerk
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MAR 25 2010

CANYON COUNTY CLERK

O.BUTLER,DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT
ALAN BECKER and CRITTER
CLINIC, an Idaho Professional
Association.
Plaintiffs,
vs.

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, its
Manager, and WILLIAM DEAL,
WAYNE MEYER, MARGUERITE
McLAUGHLIN, GERALD GEDDES,
MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE,
ELAINE MARTIN, and MARK
SNODGRASS in their capacity
as member of the Board of
Directors of the State
Insurance Fund
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2006-07877*C
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER UPON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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This matter came on for hearing before the Court on February 26, 2010 upon Plaintiffs'
Motion for Reconsideration, or, in the Alternative, Bifurcation of Class.

The motion for

reconsideration and the motion for bifurcation were both briefed, however, only the motion for
reconsideration was argued during the February 26, 2010 hearing. Argument on the motion for
bifurcation was reserved for a future date to be determined following resolution of the motion for
reconsideration. Mr. Donald Lojek and Mr. Phil Gordon were present on behalf of the plaintiffs
and Mr. Richard Hall and Ms. Keely Duke were present on behalf of the defendants. The Court has
considered the oral arguments of counsel and the briefing submitted by the parties. The Court's
memorandum opinion is set forth below.

PROCEDURAL lllSTORY:
On April 30, 2007, this Court entered its Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment on the Issue of Statute of Limitation wherein the Court held that the applicable statute of
limitations is three-years. Further, that the Plaintiffs' claims and causes of action arising prior to
July 21, 2003, were time-barred based upon the applicable statute of limitations for statutory
violations, 3-years. The case was assigned to the Honorable Thomas J. Ryan on July 2, 2007.
Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Reconsideration, or Alternatively, for Bifurcation of Class
on December 4, 2009. Plaintiffs motion is brought pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) and Rule 54(b) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs seek relief from this Court's prior Order, filed April
30, 2007, ("Order"). Plaintiffs argue that during the two and one-half years since Judge Morfitt's
Order "it has become evidence that the parties are proceeding upon a contract cause of action rather
than a statutory action." Plaintiffs' memo at 8. Therefore, Plaintiffs and the class they represent
maintain that a 5-year rather than a 3-year statute of limitations should apply in this case from the
date of the filing of the Complaint.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B) allows a party to seek reconsideration of a decision on an interlocutory
order prior to the entry of a final judgment, or within fourteen (14) days of entry of the final
judgment. An order is deemed interlocutory until entry of a final judgment or entry ofan I.R.C.P.
54(b) certificate. Noreen v. Price Development Co. Ltd Partnership, 135 Idaho 816, 820, 25 P.3d
2
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129, 133 (Ct. App. 2001). See also, Idaho First Nat'[ Bank v. David Steed & Assoc., Inc., 121
Idaho 356, 825 P.2d 79 (1992). In this case, no final judgment has been entered and the Plaintiffs
timely filed the motion for reconsideration. Therefore, I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B) is a proper procedural
avenue for Defendants to pursue their motion for reconsideration.
I.R.C.P. 54(b) permits the court to revise an order or decision "at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of the parties .... "
Therefore, 1.R.C.P. 54(b) provides an alternative basis upon which the Court may revise its prior
Order.
The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is squarely within the court's
discretion. Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 166, 159 P.3d 937,942 (2007). Abuse of discretion
is determined by a three part test which asks whether the district court "(I) correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3)
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 71, 175 P.3d 754,
760 (2007) (citation omitted).
When faced with a motion for reconsideration, the court is directed to consider any new
facts presented by the moving party that provide insight into the correctness of the order to be
reconsidered. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Natl. Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026,
103 7 ( 1990). It is the burden of the moving party seeking reconsideration to place those new
facts before the court for reconsideration. Id. While a party may properly present new evidence
on an I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B) motion for reconsideration, the rule does not require new evidence and
the lack of new evidence alone does not act as an automatic denial of the motion for
reconsideration but a trial court acts within the bounds of its discretion in denying a motion for
reconsideration when a moving party either fails to provide new evidence or fails to direct the
court to evidence already in the record that would raise a genuine issue of material fact. Johnson
v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472-473, 147 P.3d 100, 104-105 (Ct. App. 2006).

Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c)~ see also West
3
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Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 82, 106 P.3d 401, 409 (2005). To withstand a
motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must be anchored in something
more solid than speculation. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue.

Edwards v. Conchemco Inc., 111 Idaho 851,853, 727 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Ct. App. 1986).
In a motion for summary judgment, this Court should liberally construe all facts in favor
of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the
nonmoving party. West Wood Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho at 82, 106 P.3d at 409. Summary
judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw
conflicting inferences from the evidence presented. Id. (citations omitted); see also Willie v. Bd

o/Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 133, 59 P.3d 302, 304 (2002)).
A trial court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, is not to weigh evidence or
resolve controverted factual issues. American Land Title Co. v. Isaak, 105 Idaho 600, 601, 671
P.2d 1063, 1065 (1983) (citations omitted).
The existence of disputed facts will not defeat summary judgment when the plaintiff fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, and on
which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1992)
(citations omitted).

Facts in dispute cease to be ''material" facts when the plaintiff fails to

establish a prima facie case. Id. In such cases, there can be "no genuine issue of material fact,"
since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Id (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-323, 106 S. Ct 2548, 2552, 91 L.3d.2d 265 (1986)).
Summary judgments should be granted with caution. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,
808 P.2d 876 (1991) (citations omitted).

If the record contains conflicting inferences or

reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, a summary judgment must be denied. Id.
ANALYSIS

Tue Court initially notes that the decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is
squarely within the Court's discretion. See Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho at 166, 159 P.3d at 942.
Further, that the burden is on the Plaintiff to either provide new evidence or direct the Court to
evidence already in the record that would raise a genuine issue of material fact. Johnson v.
4
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Lambros, 143 Idaho at 472-473, 147 P.3d at 104-105. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
cannot find that the Plaintiffs have met their burden.
In this case, Plaintiffs' motion asks that the Court reconsider the April 30, 2007 Order
regarding the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiffs maintain that since Judge Morfitt's
Order entered April 30, 2007, that it has become evident that the parties are proceeding on a
contract claim and that therefore a 5-year statute of limitations pursuant to I.C. § 5-216 applies to
Plaintiffs' claims. In support of the motion, Plaintiffs argue, inter a/ia, that the case of Kelso v.

Irwin, P.A. vs. State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 997 P .2d 591 (2000), supports a finding that
the applicable statute of limitations in this case is 5-years; that the facts supporting the Court's
decision in Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, et al., 141 Idaho 388, 111 P.3d 73
(2005), are easily distinguishable from the facts in this case because the claims in Hayden Lake
were related to the operation of the State Insurance Fund (hereinafter "SIF"), whereas the claims
in this case are intimately and directly involved with the operation of a contract; and, that there is
not a single "gravamen" of this action, rather the contract and the statute are inextricably
intertwined.

In addition, Plaintiffs argue that where the court is faced with two applicable

statutes of limitation, the court should prefer the longer of the two. Citing James v. Buck, 111
Idaho 708, 727 P.2d 1136 (1986).
The Defendants respond by arguing that the Court appropriately decided the motion
regarding the applicable statute of limitations. Specifically, that Plaintiffs are advancing the
same arguments previously made; and that Plaintiffs' new arguments on reconsideration do not
warrant reversal of the previous decision of the Court. The Defendants argue, inter a/ia, that

Hayden Lake supports the imposition of a 3-year statute of limitations; that Plaintiffs' reliance on
the Supreme Court's decision in Kelso is misplaced because the decision did not contain any
findings regarding the applicable statute of limitations; that a claim for breach of contract is not
included in the Complaint; that the multiple "gravamen" theory is unsupported by the law; and,
that James v. Buck was predicated on two alternative readings of a statute of limitation as
contained in a single statute and therefore inapplicable to the facts of this case.
The Court entered its initial order on the applicable statute of limitations in April of 2007.
Both Kelso and Hayden Lake had been decided by the Supreme Court and briefed by the parties
5
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prior to this Court's initial ruling on the matter. The Court finds that the reasoning and holding in
Hayden Lake supports the Court's previous and present finding that the applicable statute of
limitations is 3-years. Further, that although Plaintiffs argue that Kelso supports a 5-year statute
of limitations, the Supreme Court in Hayden Lake specifically noted that the "[Supreme] Court
did not make any findings as to the statute of limitation that would apply to the [contract] claims"
in Kelso. Hayden Lake, 131 Idaho at 404, 111 P.3d at 89.
In Kelso, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in dismissing Kelso's causes
of action for breach of contract based on an alleged violation of I.C. § 72-911. Kelso, 134 Idaho
at 140, 997 P.2d at 601. This holding was premised on the Supreme Court's determination that
the SIF's governing statutes were incorporated into its contracts with its policyholders. Id. at 138,
997 P.2d at 599. The decision of the district court was reversed and remanded on the breach of
contract causes of action. Kelso was later consolidated with Hayden Lake and the case was
certified as a class action. Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho 388, 111 P.3d 73.
In Hayden Lake, the Supreme Court initially noted that Hayden Lake Fire Protection
District's (HLFPD) "breach of contract and implied covenant claims are based on alleged
statutory violations." Id. The Supreme Court further noted that "[t]here is no Idaho law directly
on point as to whether a 3-year statute of limitations for statutory violations or the 5-year statute
of limitations for breach of contract applies when a contract incorporates a statute and the
allegations stem from violations of those statutes."

Id. at 403-404, 111 P.3d at 88-89.

Thereafter, the Supreme Court upheld the district court's application of a 3-year statute of
limitations to the breach of contract claims of Kelso and the HLFPD. The Supreme Court cited
with approval the following language from the district court's memorandum opinion:
The district court cited to Dietrich v. Copeland Lumber Co., 28
Idaho 312, 318, 154 P. 626, 628 (1916), for the proposition that,
for the purpose of determining the applicable statute of limitations,
a "statutory liability ... is one that depends for its existence on the
enactment of the statute and not on the contract of the parties."
Though the court recognized that this holding was not controlling
in light of this Court's finding in Kelso that the contracts
incorporated the SIF's statutory framework, the court explained that
Dietrich supported its determination that the gravamen of the
claims, and not the pleadings, should dictate the appropriate
limitations period. Thus, since the claims would not exist "but for"
6
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the statutes, the court applied the 3-year statute of limitations to the
contract claims and determined that the claims accrued on the
effective dates of the leases.
Hayden Lake,, 141 Idaho at 394-395, 111 PJd at 79 - 80. The Court finds that language

to be equally applicable to the facts of this case. In this case, the Plaintiffs allege that SIF
breached its contract with policyholders when it violated I.C. § 72-915.

In Hayden Lake, the

district court was faced with deciding which statute of limitations applied to breach of contract
claims, the allegations of which stem from violations of a statute. The Supreme Court upheld the
district court's application of a 3-year statute of limitations.

Therefore, the analysis and

reasoning of Hayden Lake supports a determination that a 3-year statute of limitations applies to
the Plaintiffs' claims.
The Plaintiffs argument that a 5-year statute of limitations is appropriate because the
contract incorporates the statute and but for the contract, the statute would be inapplicable is not
supported by the Supreme Court's holding in Hayden Lake. Kelso supports Plaintiffs' argument
that the statute is incorporated into the contracts. However, Hayden Lake sets the applicable
statute of limitations for such claims. Plaintiffs have filed a class action lawsuit premised on
SIF's failure to distribute dividends in accordance with I.C. § 72-915.

Count I of the 1st

Amended Complaint seeks declaratory relief - payment of dividends; Count II seeks declaratory
relief - injunction; and Count III seeks damages. 1 To the extent that Plaintiffs' cast this action as
one for breach of contact, the Plaintiffs' contracts with the SIF incorporate the statute. However,
but for the statute, the Plaintiffs would not be entitled to dividends per I.C. § 72-915. Therefore,
the gravamen of Plaintiffs' claims is the violation of I.C. § 72-915 and a 3-year statute of
limitations applies to Plaintiffs' claims.
CONCLUSION

The burden is on the party seeking reconsideration to provide new evidence or direct the
court to evidence already in the record that would raise a genuine issue of material fact. The
Plaintiffs have not met this burden. Therefore,
1

Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for

Jury Trial on December 4, 2009. This motion is currently pending before the Court. The Second

Amended Complaint does not alter the relief sought in Count I, II, or III

a,

currently drafted.
7
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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does ORDER, that Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration be, and is hereby, DENIED.
Dated this 2ff~ay of March, 2010.

or District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum
Decision Upon Plaintiffs' ~ n for Reconsideration was mailed, postage prepaid, to the
·
following persons on this--9.5-- day of March, 2010.
Donald W. Lojek
Lojek Law Offices
P.O. Box 1712
Boise, ID 83701
Philip Gordon
Bruce S. Bistline
Gordon Law Offices
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83 702
Richard E. Hall
Keely Duke
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton
702 W. State St. Ste. 700
Boise, Idaho 83701

William H. Hurst
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Deputy Clerk

B ~ - ,
Deputy Clerk
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MAY 2 4 2010
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
K CANNON, DEPUTY
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
RANDOLPH E. FARBER,
SCOTT ALAN BECKER and CRITTER
CLINIC, an Idaho Professional Association.

Case No. CV06-7877

/(I.
-fPR:OPOSE~ ORDER
PRELIMINARILY APPROVING
SETTLEMENT AND PROVIDING
FOR NOTICE

Plaintiffs,

vs.
THE IDAHO STA TE INSURANCE FUND,
JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, and
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER,
MARGUARITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE
MARTIN, and MARK SNODGRASS in their
capacity as member of the Board of Directors of
the State Insurance Fund
Defendants.

WHEREAS, a the above captioned matter is currently pending before the Court as a no-opt out
class action (herein the "Action");
WHEREAS, the Court has received the Stipulation of Settlement dated May _JQ_,

11--

2010 (the "Stipulation"), that has been entered into by the Class Counsel and SIF Counsel, and
the Court has reviewed the Stipulation and its attached Exhibits (A through I);
,j'1I.

WHEREAS the Court has also received under seal a Supplemental Stipulation dated May~
2010, a Certification of Gilardi & Company in support of their nomination as Settlement
ORDER PRELlMINARIL Y APPROVING SETTLEMENT AND PROVIDING FOR NOTICE
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Administrator, and a Statement of Notice Alternatives and the Court has reviewed these
documents;
WHEREAS, the Plaintiffs having made application, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(e), for an order preliminarily approving the Stipulation of Settlement of this
Action, in accordance with the Stipulation which, together with the Exhibits annexed thereto,
sets forth the terms and conditions for a proposed Settlement of the Action and for dismissal of
the Action with prejudice, except as to the Excluded Dividend Periods, upon the terms and
conditions set forth therein; and the Court having read and considered the Stipulation and the
Exhibits annexed thereto and the other filings identified above; and
WHEREAS, all defined terms contained herein shall have the same meanings as set forth in
the Stipulation;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
I.

The Court does hereby preliminarily approve the Stipulation and the Settlement set forth
therein, subject to further consideration at the Final Approval Hearing described below.

2.

A hearing (the "Fairness Hearing") shall be held before this Court on September 16, 2010
at 1:30 p.m., at the Canyon County Courthouse, Court Room of Judge Thomas J. Ryan
Caldwell Idaho, to hear arguments from any objectors who duly file objections and
presentations in support of the Settlement and to determine:
a.

Whether the proposed Settlement of the Action on the terms and conditions
provided for in the Stipulation is fair, reasonable and adequate to the Settlement
Class and should be approved by the Court;

b.

Whether a Judgment as provided in iJl.18 of the Stipulation should be entered
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herein;
c.

Whether the proposed Plan of Allocation should be approved;

d.

The amount of fees and expenses that should be awarded to Class Counsel and the
amount of class representative compensation that should be awarded to the Class
Plaintiffs.

3.

The Court may adjourn the Final Approval Hearing without further notice to Members of
the Settlement Class.

4.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and consistent with prior
rulings in this matter, this Court preliminarily certifies, for purposes of effectuating this
Settlement, a non-opt out Settlement Class composed of:
All persons or entities, other than Lojek Law Offices Chtd. and Gordon
Law Offices Chtd., who:
a. purchased one or more policies for worker's compensation
insurance from the SIF on or after July 1, 2001, and before June 30, 2007,
and retained one or more of those policies for a period of at least 180 days
following the date of purchase;
b. were billed an annual premium for each such policy(s) by the
SIF which was equal to or less than $2,500.00;
c. did not, as to each policy described by (a) and (b ), receive a
Dividend equal to an amount determined by multiplying the billed annual
premium by the Dividend Readjustment Rate applicable to the Dividend

ORDER PRELlMINARILY APPROVING SETTLEMENT AND PROVIDING FOR NOTICE
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Qualifying Period in which the policy was purchased; and,
d. have not been excluded from the Settlement Class by Order of

.
the Court.

5.

With respect to the Settlement Class, this Court preliminarily finds for purposes of
effectuating this Settlement that (a) the Members of the Settlement Class are so numerous
thatjoinder of all Settlement Class Members in the class action is impracticable; (b) there
are questions of law and fact common to the Settlement Class which predominate over
any individual questions; (c) the claims of the Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the
Settlement Class; (d) the Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have fairly and adequately
represented and protected the interests of all of the Settlement Class Members; (e) a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy, considering: (i) the interests of the Members of the Settlement Class in
individually controlling the prosecution of the separate actions; (ii) the extent and nature

-

-

of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by Members of the
Settlement Class; (iii) the desirability or undesirability of continuing the litigation of
these claims in this particular forum; and (iv) the difficulties likely to be encountered in
the management of the class action and (f) the SIF is alleged to have acted on grounds
generally applicable to the Settlement Class as a whole, which, if found by the Court to
be true, would appear to support declaratory relief with respect to the Settlement Class.
6.

The Court approves, as to form and content, the Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class
Action (the "Notice Booklet"), the Summary Notice for Publication ("Summary Notice"),
the Postcard Notice ("Postcard"), the Application for Inclusion, the Objection form, and
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the Escrow Agreement, attached to the Stipulation as Exhibits C, D, E, F, G, and I, and
the Plaintiffs Statement of Notice Alternatives and finds that the mailing and distribution
of the Postcard along with of the Summary Notice and the availability of a website and a
call center all performed and provided in the substantially in the manner and form set
forth in Paragraph 7 of this Order best satisfy the requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 and due process, and is the best notice practicable under the circumstances
and shall constitute due and sufficient notice to all Persons entitled thereto.
7.

Pursuant to Rule 53 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court appoints Gilardi &
Co. LLC ("Settlement Administrator") to supervise and administer the notice procedure
as well as the processing of claims as more fully set forth below:
a.

Not later than 21 days from the entry of this Order (the "Notice Date"), Class
Counsel shall cause a copy of the Postcard, substantially in the forms annexed to
the Stipulation as Exhibit E, to be mailed by first class mail to all Settlement Class
Members who can based upon information supplied by SIF be identified and to
continue for up to 45 days thereafter with other reasonable follow-up procedures
(return address request, internet search, analysis of business entity records at the
Idaho Secretary of States website) for the purpose of identifying and obtaining
delivery by mail of notice upon Settlement Class Members who did not appear to
have received the initial notification;

b.

Not later than the Notice Date Class Counsel shall cause the Summary Notice to
be published once in the following papers of general circulation in the state of
Idaho;
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Yes

No

,11.

Coeur d'Alene Press - Coeur d'Alene, ID

.{t

Idaho Press Tribune -Nampa, ID

4

The Idaho State Journal - Pocatello, ID

~I..

The Lewiston Tribune - Lewiston, ID

/it

The Idaho Statesman - Boise, ID

.{t

Post Register - Idaho Falls, ID

,{i..

Spokane Spokesman-Review - Spokane, ID

,(l

The Times-News - Twin Falls, ID

.

/it
c.

Paper

USA Today (regionalized for Denver/Seattle regions which
Cover Idaho)

Not later than the Notice Date Class Counsel shall cause the Stipulation and its
Exhibits, this Order, the Objection Form, and the Inclusion Form to be posted on
the following website: http://www.gilardi.com and to cause a call center to be
created by Gilardi & Co to handle calls from any Settlement Class Members or
possible Settlement Class members who want to obtain information or documents;
and,
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d.

On or before September 2, 2010, Class Counsel shall cause to be served on SIF
counsel and filed with the Court proof, by affidavit or declaration, of compliance
with the foregoing notice requirements.

8.

All Members of the Settlement Class shall be bound by all determinations and judgments
in the Action concerning the Settlement, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
Settlement Class.

Persons or entities with objections to the Stipulation, the Settlement,

any applications for award of attorney fees and costs, any Administrative Costs, or the
terms of this Order regarding Notice, Objections and inclusion into the Settlement Class,
must make those objections in a timely manner or they are subject to being deemed to
have been waived.
9.

Settlement Class Members who wish to object to the Settlement shall complete an
Objection in the form attached to the Stipulation as Exhibit F and shall submit that
Objection to Class Counsel at SIF Claim, Post Office Box, 1442, Boise Idaho which must
be received in that box not later than August 26,2010. Class Counsel shall immediately
file with the Court and serve upon SIF all Objections other than those seeking an
exclusion. As to Objections seeking an exclusion, Class Counsel may either file those
Objections with the Court or seek a stipulation of exclusion from the SIF. If the SIF
declines to stipulate to exclusion the Objection should be immediately filed with the
Court. All Objections and any stipulations for exclusion must be filed not later than
September 2, 2010. Class Counsel is responsible for assuring that all Objections and all
stipulations are filed in a timely manner, Class Counsel shall by not later than September
2, 2010, file a certification that the provisions of this paragraph have been fully complied
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7

000282

with.
10.

Persons or entities who believe that they should be members of the Settlement Class but
who do not appear to be included in the information regarding that Settlement Class
initially provided to Class Counsel by SIF, shall have the opportunity to submit a request
for inclusion in the form attached to the Stipulation as Exhibit G and shall be entitled to
the benefit of the procedures set forth in Exhibit G and the Stipulation.

To the extent

that any such person or entity is ultimately denied membership in the Settlement Class,
that person or entity shall be thereafter treated as excluded from the Settlement Class and .
shall not be bound or limited in anyway by any Judgment entered based upon the
Stipulation.
11.

Any member of the Settlement Class may enter an appearance in the Action and shall be
deemed to have done so upon the filing of their Objection.

All persons who appear in

the Action shall do so at their own expense individually or through counsel of their own

-

choice. All entities who appear in the Action shall do so at their own expense and must
do so through counsel of their own choice.

All persons or entities who do not enter an

appearance or file an Objection will be represented by Class Counsel.
12.

The Escrow Agent agreed to by the Settling Parties, is authorized to remove
$

po ~z:z. . ~

from the Common Fund and place it into a Notice and

Administration Costs Account from which the Settlement Administrator is authorized to
pay all Settlement Administration Costs. Class Counsel is responsible to insure that the
funds in the Notice and Administration Costs Account are properly spent and accounted
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for and for filing with the Court a report accounting for any funds withdrawn from that
account.
On this 2-~""-aay of

Ma,

,2010.

Judge Thomas J.

Ry

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the £day o f ~ 2010, I caused to be delivered the
foregoing document, addressed to the following and delivered by the method indicated below:

623 W. Hays StreetPO Box 1712
Boise, ID 83701
Facsimile:
208-343-5200

HAND DELIVERY
Zu.s.MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
- , - FACSIMILE

Philip Gordon ISBN 1996
Bruce S. Bistline ISBN 1988
GORDON LAW OFFICES
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702
Facsimile: 208/345-0050

U.S.MAIL
_i,.L_OVERNIGHTMAIL
FACSIMILE
HAND DELIVERY

Richard E. Hall
Keely Duke
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton
702 W. Idaho St. Ste. 700
Boise, Idaho 83701

U.S. MAIL
---:;7'OVERNIGHT MAIL
FACSI.MILE
HAND DELIVERY"-- -

LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD

Deputy Clerk of Court
ORDER PRELI.MINARIL Y APPROVING SET1LEMENT AND PROVIDING FOR NOTICE
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HEET RE: NOTIF ICATION PRo-=-1ou RES

FIXED

NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES
Malled Notic• (lon,,attio,g aod data prep)

S 10,420.00

Declaratioo and Reporting Cost.!

s

T elephone Syttem

$ 10,338.00

Internet Notiee

S 11,750.00

OPTIONS

TOTALS

/D ./zo -·"
/iov-"-

1,800.00

00

10 J1f - -

.

II 1 >c.l ;;:;-'

Publi!bed Notice (to!al for all options)

-

tz. f 1o--

S 12,830.00

,,.

Coe111 d' Alene, ID

832.00

1}~~

Idaho Press-Tribune, Nampa, ID

503.00

,o; ••
-

Idaho State Journal, Pocatello, ID

654.00

l,<11 ,

The Idaho Statesman, Boise, ID

2,385.00

Lewi.ston Tribune, Lewiston, ID

465.00

W,f~

Post Register, Idaho Falls, ID

626.00

(;2.~

?

...

3,-;--•o

Spokane Spokesman Review, Spokane,
WA

2,758.00

The Times News, Twin f al ls, ID

676.00

USA Today for Denver, Seattle

J,940.00

21f°f.,.

"1.,_:!-I
I

SubTo!al:

Option, for Mailing:
$76,313.00

Mail Full Notice Brochure

OR

OR

$54,485.00

Mail Postcard

TOTAL: Enter Par•graph 12 in Proposed Order

~4 ,jf,;B:-

I IO
I
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wo\lsHEET RE: NOTIFICATION PRQ
NOTIFICATlON PROCEDURES

FIXED

Mailed Noli« (formatting and data prtp)

S 10,420.00

Dedantiou and Reporting Co,11

s

ITelepbon• Syst<m

DURES
OPTIONS TOTALS

1,800.00

SI0..)38.00

lnterad Noli«

S I I,7S0.OO

Publbbfll Notice (tot.al for al.I optioos)

$

12,830.00

Co<ur d' Alene, 10

832.00

Idaho Press-Tribune. Nampa. ID

S0J.00

Idaho SlDte l oumal, Pocatello, 10

654.00

The Idaho Statesman, Boise, ID

2,385.00

Lcv,uton Tnbune. l.ew1J!On. 10

46S.OO

Po>t Retist.., Id.oho Falls. ID

626.00

Spoklll>C: Spokesman Review, Spokane.

2,7S8.00

WA
The runes N'ews, Twin Falls, ID

676.00

USA Today for Denver, S<aule

3,940.00

SubTolAI:

Opllon• for Malling:
Mail Full Notice, Braehure

S76.JIJ.OO

OR

OR
$S4,48S.00

Mail Pos!Wd

TOTAL: Enter Paragraph 12 In Proposed Order
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRIC$fp

DP.M.

f 7 2010

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF E~~~OUNTY CLERK

,

I

RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT ALAN
BECKER and CRITTER CLINIC, an Idaho
Professional Association.

Case No. CV 06-7877

t

en

DEPUTY

FINAL WDGMENT AND ORDER OF
DISMISSAL WITH PREWDICE

Plaintiffs,
vs.

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, and
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER,
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE
MARTIN, MARK SNODGRASS, RODNEY A.
HIGGINS, TERRY GESTRIN, MAX BLACK,
and STEVE LANDON in their capacity as
member of the Board of Directors of the State
Insurance Fund
Defendants.
This matter came before the Court for hearing pursuant to the Court's Order Preliminarily
Approving Settlement and Providing for Notice, dated May 24, 2010. The Settling Parties had
applied for approval of the Settlement set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement dated as of May
5, 2010 (the "Stipulation"). Due and adequate notice having been given of the Settlement as
required in said Order, and the Court having considered all papers filed and proceedings held
herein, and otherwise being fully informed in the premises and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADWDGED AND DECREED that:
1. This Judgment incorporates by reference the definitions in the Stipulation, and all terms
used herein shall have the same meanings as set forth in the Stipulation.
FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
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2. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Action and over all Parties to
the Action including all members of the Settlement Class.
3. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court hereby certifies, for
purposes of effectuating this Settlement, a no-opt out Settlement Class of all persons or
entities, other than Lojek Law Offices, Chtd. and Gordon Law Offices, Chtd., who:
a. purchased one or more policies for worker's compensation insurance from the SIF
on or after July I, 200 I and before June 30, 2007 and retained one or more of
those policies for a period of at least 180 days following the date of purchase;
b. were billed an annual premium for each such policy(s) by the SIF which was
equal to or less than $2,500.00;
c. did not, as to each policy described by (a) and (b), immediately above, receive a
Dividend equal to an amount determined by multiplying the billed annual
premium by the Dividend Readjustment Rate applicable to the Dividend
Qualifying Period in which the policy was purchased; and,
d. have not been excluded from the Settlement Class by Order of the Court.
4. With respect to the Settlement Class, this Court finds for the purposes of effectuating this
Settlement that:
a. the members of the Settlement Class are so numerous that joinder of all
Settlement Class members in the Action is impracticable;
b. there are questions of law and fact common to the Settlement Class which
predominate over any individual questions;
c. the claims of the Class Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Settlement Class;
d. the Class Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have fairly and adequately represented and
FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
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protected the interests of all of the Settlement Class members;
e. a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy, considering:
1. the interests of the Members of the Settlement Class in individually
controlling the prosecution of the separate actions;
11. the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by Members of the Settlement Class;
iii. the desirability or undesirability of continuing the litigation of these claims
in this forum; and,
1v. the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of the class
action.
f.

the SIF is alleged to have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Settlement
Class as a whole, which, if found by the Court to be true, would appear to support
declaratory relief with respect to the Settlement Class.

5. Except as to any individual claim of those persons or entities (identified in Exhibit 1
attached hereto) who have by stipulation of the Parties or by Order of the Court been
excluded from the Action or who sought but not obtained by agreement of the Parties
inclusion into the Settlement Class, the Released Claims, including all Claims stated in
the action relating to the Dividend Qualifying Periods, are dismissed with prejudice as to
the Plaintiffs and the other members of the Settlement Class, and as against SIF. The
parties are to bear their own fees and costs, except as otherwise provided in the
Stipulation.
6. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Idaho Rules of Civi-1 Procedure, this Court hereby approves the
FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
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Settlement set forth in the Stipulation and finds that said Settlement is, in all respects,
fair, reasonable and adequate to, and is in the best interests of, the Class Plaintiffs, the
Settlement Class and each of the members of the Settlement Class. The Court further
finds that the Stipulation is the result of arm's-length negotiations between experienced
counsel representing the interests of the Class Plaintiffs, the members of the Settlement
Class, and the SIF. Accordingly, the Settlement embodied in the Stipulation is hereby
approved in all respects and shall be consummated in accordance with its terms and
provisions. The Settling Parties are hereby directed to perform each and every term of the
Stipulation.
7. Upon the Effective Date, Class Plaintiffs, and each of the members of the Settlement
Class shall be deemed to have, and by operation of this Final Judgment shall have, fully,
finally, and forever released, relinquished and discharged all Released Claims against the
SIF. The Settling Parties have agreed to the release of unknown claims, and the Court
find that this agreement was bargained for and is a material element of the Settlement and
that as a consequence, all unknown claims which are part of the Released Claims shall be
deemed released.
8. Upon the Effective Date, the Class Plaintiffs and all members of the Settlement Class and
anyone claiming through or on behalf of any of them, are forever barred and enjoined
from commencing, instituting, or continuing to prosecute any action or proceeding in any
court of law or equity, arbitration tribunal, administrative forum, or other forum of any
kind, asserting against the SIF any of the Released Claims. Provided, nothing in this
Order shall be deemed to release, dismiss or bar any appeal of the Court's rulings
applying the statute oflimitations to claims for dividends relative to the dividend periods
FINAL WDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREWDICE
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beginning July 1, 1999 to June 30, 2000 and July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001.
9. Upon the Effective Date, SIF shall be deemed to have, and by operation of the Judgment
shall have, fully, finally, and forever released, relinquished and discharged the Class
Plaintiffs, the members of the Settlement Class Members, and Class Counsel from all
claims (including, without limitation, unknown claims) arising out of, relating to, or in
connection with the institution, prosecution, assertion, settlement or resolution of the
Action or the Released Claims except that SIF shall not be deemed to have waived any
claim that it may have against a Class Plaintiff or member of the Settlement Class for
amounts which actually are owed to it by a Class Plaintiff or member of the Settlement
Class for reasons unrelated to the claims made in the Action but only to the extent that
those amounts are not satisfied by any payment made to SIF by the Settlement
Administrator pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation.
10. The Notice Plan established by the Court in the Order Preliminarily Approving
Settlement and Providing for Notice constituted the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all Members of the Settlement Class who
could be identified through reasonable effort. Said notice provided the best notice
practicable under the circumstances of those proceedings and of the matters set forth
therein, including the proposed Settlement set forth in the Stipulation, to all members of
the Settlement Class, and said notice fully satisfied the requirements of Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 23, the requirements of due process, and any other applicable law.
11. The Allocation Plan set forth in the Stipulation is found to be an appropriate formula for
allocating the Common Fund among the Settlement Class members. The Settlement
Administrator is directed to, on the Effective Date, proceed to distribute to each
FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
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Settlement Class member that has been located during the Notice process that members
proportionate share (as determined utilizing the allocation formula set forth in the
Stipulation) of the Common Fund after all fees and costs awarded by the Court and all
Exclusion Reimbursement have been paid or set aside. As to all distributable funds
which, after six (6) months following the Effective Date of the Settlement, have not been
claimed or cannot be distributed due to the inability to locate the Settlement Class
member, Class Counsel and the Settlement Administrator are directed to account to the
Court for these funds and seek direction conforming to the Settlement relative to the
distribution of any Undistributed and Undistributable Funds.
12. Any proposal submitted by Class Counsel for the payment of any balance remaining in
the Notice and Administration Costs Account after completion of the duties of the
Settlement Administrator in accordance with the Stipulation and any orders entered
regarding any distributions from the Common Fund for payment of attorneys' fees the
cost of which may not exceed 331/3 % of the Common Fund, for payment of litigation
expenses including Class Plaintiff compensation the cost of which may not exceed Q/34~
of the Common Fund or Settlement Administrator Expenses actually incurred and not to
exceed ~ of the Common Fund shall in no way disturb or affect this Judgment and
shall be considered separate from this Judgment.
13. Neither the Stipulation nor the Settlement contained therein, nor any act performed or
document executed pursuant to or in furtherance of the Stipulation or the Settlement:
a. is or may be deemed to be or may be used as an admission of, or evidence of, the
validity of any Released Claim, or of any wrongdoing or liability of SIF; or
b. is or may be deemed to be or may be used as an admission of, or evidence of, any
FINAL WDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREWDICE
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fault or omission of any of SIF in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding.

in any court, administrative agency or other tribunal.

14. SIF may file the Stipulation and/or the Final Judgment in any other action that may be
_· · .
.
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17. In the event that the Settlement does not become 'effective in accordance with the terms · .,.
oftbe Stipulation or the Effective Date does not occur, or in'the event that the Common
Fund, or any portion thereof, is returned to the SIF (other than Exclusion Reimbursement
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and/or the return of widistributed/undistributable funds, as addressed in Paragraphs 2.2,9
and 2.2.10 of the Stipulation), then this Judgment shall be rendered null and void to the
extent provided by and in accordance with the.Stipulation and shall be vacated and, in-_
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

J1_day of ~bt,(2010, I caused the furegoing

document to be delivered by the method indicated~\va,;daddressed to the following:
Philip Gordon
Bruce S. Bistline
Gordon Law Offices, CHTD.
623 W. Hays Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

~HAND DELIVERY
4-U.S.MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FACSIMILE 208-345-0050

Donald W. Lojek
Lojek Law Offices, CHTD.
623 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 1712
Boise, Idaho 83702

~HAND DELIVERY
V U.S.MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FACSIMILE 208-345-0050

Attorneys for the Plaintif.fe

I
Richard E. Hall
Keely Duke
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton
702 W. Idaho St. Ste. 700
Boise, Idaho 83701

~HAND DELIVERY
-&L-U.S.MAIL
MAIL
- - OVERNIGHT
FACSIMILE 208-395-8585

--

Attorneys for the Defendants

FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
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SEP 2 2 2010
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CANYO~ CjbUNTY CLEF

';r1) , DEPUl

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT ALAN
BECKER and CRITTER CLINIC, an Idaho
Professional Association,

Case No. CV 06-7877

Plaintiffs,
vs.

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, and
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER,
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELA~E
MARTIN, MARK SNODGRASS, RO!>NEY A.
HIGGINS, TERRY GESTRIN, MAX BLACK,
and STEVE LANDON in their capacity as
member of the Board of Directors of the State
Insurance Fund

ORDER FIXING THE AMOUNT OF
THE COMMON FUND WHICH MAY
BE APPLIED TO THE PAYMENT OF
FEES AND AWARDING SUMS
CERTAIN FOR THE
REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION
EXPENSES, THE PAYMENT OF
CLASS PLAINTIFF INCENTIVE
COMPENSATION AND THE
PAYMENT OF FINAL SETTLEMENT
FUND ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES

Defendants.
This matter came before the Court for hearing on September 16, 2010, pursuant to the

Application ofClass Counsel for an Order Fixing the Amount of the Common Fund which May,
by Further Order ofthe Court, Be Applied to the Payment ofAttorney Fees to Class Counsel,
and/or the Award ofSums Certain/or the Reimbursement ofLitigation Expenses, the Payment
of Class PlaintiffIncentive Compensation and the Payment of Final Settlement Fund
Administration Expenses (the "Application").
The Court notes that, as reflected in the Second Affidavit of Bruce S. Bistline In Support
of Application of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, only one Objection (the Amended Notice of

Objection to Proposed Settlement and Application/or Award ofAttorneys' Fees and Costs out of
ORDER OF PAYMENT OF FEES & LITIGATION EXPENSES AND A WARDING
CLASS PLAINTIFF INCENTIVE COMPENSATION & A ITORNEY FEES
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Settlement Proceeds, herein the "Fouser Objection") was served on Class Counsel (for the sake
of consistency in the records, all capitalized terms used in this Order which are not defined in
this Order shall have the same meanings set forth in the Stipulation for Settlement which was
preliminarily approved by the Court on May 24, 2010) and that Fouser Objection has been duly
filed with the Court. No other objections have been filed with the Court. Class Counsel
appeared at the hearing and Bruce S. Bistline presented argument. No other person or entity
appeared at the hearing. After hearing argument of counsel and reviewing the filings relative to
the Application, the Fouser Objection, the filings relative to the Reply to Amended Notice of
Objection to Proposed Settlement and Application for Attorney Fees and Costs Out ofSettlement
and the Class Counsel's Reports which have been filed on a monthly basis in July, August and
September 20 I 0, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court makes the following
findings:
I. The Fouser Objection, though styled as an objection to the Settlement and to the award of
attorneys' fees and costs is in fact only an objection to the award of fees as requested by
Class Counsel and in this regard only appears to be an objection to the billing rate
claimed for Bruce S. Bistline and Philip Gordon.
2. With the exception of those portions of the Application which seek ratification of
amounts already paid from the Notice and Administration Costs Account for the
execution of the Notice Plan, an Order directing additional payments from the Notice and
Administration Costs Account to pay the balance of the expenses associated with the
execution of the Notice Plan and an Order directing that additional funds be withdrawn
from the Qualified Settlement Fund and deposited in the Notice and Administration Cost

ORDER OF PAYMENT OF FEES & LITIGATION EXPENSES AND AWARDING
CLASS PLAINTIFF INCENTIVE COMPENSATION & ATTORNEY FEES
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Account for the payment of the remaining expenses of Settlement Administration Costs
(including costs of disbursement and account closure), the interests of Class Counsel or
Class Plaintiffs, whom Class Counsel represent, are to some degree adverse to the
interests of the Class. In these circumstances, while the Court has discretion to determine
the matters submitted by the Application, the Court also has a duty to the Class to ensure
that the proposed payments from the Common Fund are fair and reasonable payments.
3. The amounts sought in the Application are all equal to or less than the amounts which
Class Counsel announced that they would be seeking in the Notice of Proposed Class
Action Settlement which has been available since June 14, 2010 to the Settlement Class
members.
4. The Application announcing the specific amounts sought by Class Counsel was filed on
August 16, 2010, and posted on the website on or about the dates of August 16-18, 2010,
and the extensive documentation supporting that Application was filed with the Court on
August 23, 2010, and posted on the website on or about the dates of August 19- 20, 2010.
5. The charges billed by the Settlement Administrator for the purposes of executing the
Court's Notice Plan as set forth in the Order Preliminarily Approving Settlement and
Providing for Notice, May 24, 2010, which total $96,628.10, are fair and reasonable
charges for the services necessarily supplied. Those charges are sufficiently documented
and supported and disclosed to the Settlement Class and they have not been objected to
by members of the Settlement Class.
6. Class Counsel has acted properly in authorizing the Settlement Administrator to pay itself
the sum of $78,835.42 out of the Notice and Administration Costs Account.

ORDER OF PAYMENT OF FEES & LITIGATION EXPENSES AND AW ARD ING
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7. After the distribution of $78,835.42 as authorized by Class Counsel and ratified by this
Court and the payment of $17,792.68, the Notice and Administration Costs Account,
which the Court directed should be opened with an initial withdrawal from the Common
Fund in the amount of $110,522.00, should have a balance, after the payment of all costs
associated with the execution of the Notice Plan, of $13,893.90.
8. The charges, as estimated by the Settlement Administrator for the services necessary to
execute the Court's directives and the provisions of the Stipulation of Settlement relative
to distribution of the Common Fund and the closure of all related accounts, are
$64,245.00. These charges are fair and reasonable charges for the services which will
necessarily be supplied to distribute the Common Fund and close all related accounts.
Those charges are sufficiently documented and supported and disclosed to the Settlement
Class and they have not been objected to by members of the Settlement Class.
9. The Settling Parties' agreement, in paragraph 2.2.5.2 of the Stipulation for Settlement,
that the sum of 105% of the estimated charges for executing distribution of the Common
Fund and closure or all related accounts, is a fair and reasonable means for insuring that
enough funds are withheld from the Common Fund prior to the allocation and
distribution of that fund to ensure that all costs of settlement administration are covered.
This provision of the Settlement Agreement has been sufficiently documented and
supported and disclosed to the Settlement Class and it has not been objected to by
members of the Settlement Class.
10. To ensure that 105% of $64,245.00 ($67,457.00) is in the Settlement Administration Cost
Account prior to any allocation and distribution of the Common Fund, it will be
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necessary to transfer an additional $53,565.10 out of the Qualified Settlement Fund and
into the Notice and Administration Costs Account.
11. The total amount which will be transferred from the Common Fund for the payment of
Settlement Administration Costs will be $164,085.10 which represents 2.378% of the
Common Fund.
12. The litigation costs totaling $8,440.71 which Class Counsel has asked to be reimbursed
from the Common Fund prior to any allocation and distribution of the Common Fund are
fair and reasonable costs which were necessarily incurred in the representation of the
Settlement Class. Those costs are sufficiently documented and supported and disclosed to
the Settlement Class and they have not been objected to by members of the Settlement
Class.
13. Incentive payments to Class Plaintiffs are a reasonable and appropriate way to incentivize
citizens who have suffered, what is for any individual class member a relatively nominal
loss, to take on the burden and responsibility of serving as a plaintiff in a class action so
that the entire class can recover what is due to it from a defendant.
14. In this action, it is apparent that the Class Plaintiffs were called upon to participate in
pleading review, strategy decisions, document assembly, preparation of discovery
responses and preparation for depositions. Two of the Class Plaintiffs were actually
deposed. All Class Plaintiffs provided a valuable service to the Settlement Class.
15. Incentive payments to each of the Class Plaintiffs in the amount of$ 5,000.00 are fair and
reasonable under the entirety of the circumstances of this case. Those payments are
sufficiently documented and supported and disclosed to the Settlement Class and they
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have not been objected to by members of the Settlement Class.
16. Taken together as "litigation expenses" the reimbursement sought by Class Counsel and
the incentive pay authorized by the Court represent 0.34% the Common Fund.
17. Class Counsel has invested a substantial amount of time and resources in this action on
behalf of the Settlement Class. As part of the services they have supplied to the
Settlement Class they have, in addition to investing their own time and efforts,
maintained their offices, retained support staff including paralegals and secretaries and
invested the time and efforts of those employees into pursuit of this litigation on behalf of
the Settlement Class.
18. While it appears that complete time records have not been kept by any of Class Counsel,
the records that do exist demonstrate that Gordon Law Offices has invested in excess of
1,211.20 attorney hours over a period of more than 4 years. The time records of Lojek
Law Offices were destroyed by a flood but based upon the affidavits provided, the Court
finds that Lojek Law Offices invested in excess of 775 attorney hours, also over a period
of more than 4 years. In addition, Class Counsel have spent time since this information
was supplied to the Court and will continue to spend time fulfilling their duties to the
Settlement Class associated with overseeing costs reimbursements to the Settlement
Administrator, processing applications for inclusion, reporting to the Court and
presenting motions to the Court as are necessary to administer to the distribution of the
common fund and to wrap up these proceedings. The concerns raised in the Fouser
Objection with respect to the hours reported by Class Counsel have been adequately
addressed in responsive affidavits of Class Counsel and the Court can find no factual
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basis for concluding that Class Counsel have wasted time or spent fewer hours than
reported.
19. Class Counsel has provided highly competent representation to the Settlement Class and
shown a high degree of technical expertise in the management of this class action
litigation on behalf of the Settlement Class. It is apparent to the Court that to fulfill their
responsibilities to the Settlement Class and the Court, that Class Counsel have to be
highly detail oriented, skillful legal writers, thorough and effective litigators, thorough
and creative negotiators and document drafters, skillful appellate attorneys, and ,in this
case, effective lobbyists. While many attorneys have some of these skills and talents,
those who possess several or all of them are uncommon and it is reasonable that lawyers
who possess and employ these attributes are entitled to charge and receive top market
rates.
20. Class Counsel has taken a significant risk on behalf of the Settlement Class. They took
on a case which was either a case of first impression or one which might well have been
determined adversely to them based upon the application of existing decisional law. They
correctly anticipated that the case was not going to be resolved without at an appeal.
They understood that the case they were taldng on could tum out to be litigation about
whether an agency administrator had abused his discretion and therefore a case which
could be complicated and expensive to litigate.

21. Class Counsel was confronted by an aggressive defense by a highly competent firm that
had evidently been given a good deal of latitude in the formation of strategy and the
investment of time and resources in presenting the case.
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22. Class counsel around the Country who are separately billing for paralegal work are
charging fees higher than what are requested by Class Counsel. Class action litigation
firms in Chicago and Washington D.C. are billing their firm partners at a rate between
$425.00 and $700.00 per hour. Attorneys in Seattle and Portland are billing their firm
partners at a rate between $280.00 and $650.00 per hour with most being billed at over
$355.00 per hour. A firm in Salt Lake City is billing their attorneys at a rate between
$375.00 and $575.00 per hour and had billed these same attorneys at between $295.00
and $450.00 per hour in 2006. In Boise, Idaho, a firm which negotiated an arm's length
agreement to establish relative values of contribution between lawyers in firms in Boise,
Minneapolis and Seattle is billing attorney time at between $450.00 and $500.00 per hour
for partners and $385.00 per hour for associates.
23. For the purposes of a lodestar calculation, the Court finds that given the skill and
experience of Class Counsel, the rates being charged for class action representation in
City of Boise and in around the Country and the claims made in the Fouser Objection, an
hourly fee rate for Class Counsel as set forth below is fair and reasonable and that the
appropriate minimum lodestar based on these rates is as set forth:
Bruce S. Bistline

$ 375

Philip Gordon
Donald W. Lojek

= $404,737.50

X

1,079.30

$ 375

X

131.90

$ 425

X

775.00 =

= $ 49,462.50
$329,375.00
$ 783,575.00

Total

Class Counsel, over the course of nearly four and one half years, have committed
valuable resources to the representation of the Settlement Class. They have to date been
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paid nothing for this effort and they have in the meantime paid overhead and litigation
expenses out of their own resources. They took a very real risk of engaging in a losing
effort and ending up paying opposing parties' costs and potentially opposing parties' fees
on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs. The case involved extensive amounts of briefing and
substantial amounts of document and discovery work. In addition, to achieve a recovery
Class Counsel was required to successfully prosecute an appeal and engage in legislative
lobbying efforts. Moreover, it is clear that they have spent and will spend more time ·
than has been used for the purpose of a lodestar calculation. In the market place in which·
attorneys are hired to take cases upon a contingent fee basis, these are all factors which
bear upon the negotiation of a fee agreement. Considering these factors and the case law
relative to the role of the multiplier in a lodestar calculation, the Court finds that a
multiplier of between 2.5 and 3.5 is fair and reasonable for the purpose of a lodestar cross
check of a percentage fee award.
24. Class Counsel has requested that the Court utilize a percentage fee calculation to
determine the award of fees to be paid to Class Counsel from the Common Fund and in
this regard has requested a fee of 33 1/3 percent of the Common Fund. The Court is
aware that the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has favored the use of percentage fee awards
and has, with respect to percentage fee calculations, adopted a benchmark of25% of the
common fund which should be adjusted up and down based upon the circumstances of
the case.
25. In addition to circumstances as found above, the settlement obtained, while a significant
amount and a high percentage of the maximum amount arguably due to the Settlement
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Class, is by class action standards relatively small and this is a factor which should be
considered by the Court for the purpose of considering a percentage fee award request.
26. Under all of the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that a percentage fee award of
33 1/3 % of the Common Fund is fair and reasonable under the entirety of the
circumstances of this case. The request for this award has been sufficiently documented
and supported and disclosed to the Settlement Class and, with the exception of the Fouser
Objection, the members of the Settlement Class have not been objected to the requested
fee award.
27. The percentage fee award approved by the Court is supported by the use of the lodestar
cross check which involves multiplying the lodestar fee - in this case$ 783,575.00 -- by
the multiplier found reasonable by the Court- in this case between 2.5 and 3.5, or
$2,350,725.
28. Class Counsel have made a request for immediate and future periodic payments of fees.
This request has been disclosed to the Settlement Class in the Notice of Proposed
Settlement of Class Action and no objection has been made to the request. The request is
fair and reasonable. Accordingly, Class Counsel may present to the Court specific
requests for actual fees to be paid from the Qualified Settlement Fund in both immediate
and periodic future payments provided that the cost to the Qualified Settlement Fund of
those payments and all administration expenses do not exceed the percentage fee awarded
by the Court.
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BASED UPON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:

1. The Settlement Administrator, in its capacity as the manager of the Notice and
Administration Costs Account is directed to pay itself, from that account, the sum of
$17,792.68 as the final payment upon all costs incurred by the Settlement Administrator
for services necessarily provided in the course of executing the Court's Notice Plan.
2. The Settlement Administrator, in its capacity as the Escrow Agent for the Common Fund
(held in a Qualified Settlement Fund) is directed, prior to any allocation or distribution to
Settlement Class members, to transfer to the Notice and Administration Costs Account
from the Qualified Settlement Fund the sum of $53,565.10 to be held there subject to
further Orders of this Court authorizing distributions from that account.
3. The Settlement Administrator, in its capacity as the Escrow Agent for the Common Fund
(held in a Qualified Settlement Fund) is directed, prior to any allocation or distribution to
Settlement Class members, to pay to Class Counsel (as Class Counsel may direct) from
the Qualified Settlement Fund the total sum of $8,440.71 as reimbursement to Class
Counsel for litigation costs.
4. The Settlement Administrator, in its capacity as the Escrow Agent for the Common Fund
(held in a Qualified Settlement Fund) is directed, prior to any allocation or distribution to
Settlement Class members, to pay to each Class Plaintiff from the Qualified Settlement
Fund, the sum of$ 5,000.00 as class plaintiff incentive compensation.
5. Class Counsel is entitled to a fee of thirty-three and one-third (33 1/3) percent of the
Common Fund. The Settlement Administrator, in its capacity as the Escrow Agent for
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the Common Fund (held in a Qualified Settlement Fund) is directed, prior to any
allocation or distribution to Settlement Class members to either pay this amount in
accordance with a further Order of the Court or to set this amount aside before the
balance of the Qualified Settlement Fund is allocated among or distributed to Settlement
Class members.
6. Class Counsel may petition the Court for an order making specific provisions for
immediate and periodic future payments of attorneys' fees to Class Counsel from the
Qualified Settlement Fund provided that the cost of those payments and any related
administrative expenses do not exceed the percentage fee as awarded by this Order.
7. Any proposal submitted by Class Counsel for the payment of any balance remaining in
the Notice and Administration Costs Account after completion of the duties of the
Settlement Administrator in accordance with the Stipulation For Settlement and any
orders entered regarding any distributions from the Common Fund for payment of
attorneys= fees the cost of which Fund may not exceed 33 1/3 % of the Common Fund or
to deal with undistributable funds in the Common Fund, shall in no way disturb or affect
any Judgment entered by the Court pursuant to the Stipulation For Settlement and shall
be considered separate from any such Judgment.
DATED this 't.0.fl.,.day of

>cyfc."!\ k

,

2010.

/,~
Thomas J. Ryan
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing ORDER was forwarded to
the following persons on this

J~

Philip Gordon
Bruce S. Bistline
Gordon Law Offices
623 W. Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702-5512
Donald W. Lojek
Lojek Law Offices, Chtd _
P. 0. Box 1712
Boise, ID 83701-1712

day of September, 2010.
~

HANDDELIVERY

--7----U.S.MAIL

- - - -OVERNIGHT MAIL
- - - -FACSIMILE 208-345-0050
~

HANDDELIVERY

-z----u.s. MAIL

- - - -OVERNIGHT MAIL
- - - -FACSIMILE 208-345-0050

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

Richard E. Hall
Keely Duke
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A.
PO Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701

,,.

HAND DELIVERY

-7----u.s.
MAIL
--'----

MAIL
F
ACSIMLIE
208-395-8585
---- - - -OVERNIGHT

Attorneys for the Defendants

Trudy Hanson Fouser
Julianne S. Hall
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701

_ __--'HAND DELIVERY
U.S.MAIL
2 OVERNIGHT
MAIL

--+---

---- - - -FACSIMILE 208-336-9177

Objector

:~:[~
William H. Hurst,

DepuerkoftheCcmrt
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Donald W. Lojek ISBN1395
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD
623 West Hays Street
PO Box 1712
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone:
208-343-7733
Facsimile:
208-345-0050
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Philip Gordon ISBN 1996
Bruce S. Bistline ISBN 1988
GORDON LAW OFFICES
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: 208/345-7100
Facsimile: 208/345-0050
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
RANDOLPH E. FARBER,
SCOTT ALAN BECKER and CRITTER
CLINIC, an Idaho Professional Association,

CASE NO. CV06-7877

APPELLANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
VS.

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, and
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER,
MARGUARITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, mDI
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE
MARTIN, and MARK SNODGRASS in their
capacity as member of the Board of Directors
of the State Insurance Fund,

Filing Fee: $86.00 Idaho Supreme Court
$15.00 Canyon County

Defendants/Respondents.
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TO: THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, et al AND THEIR ATTORNEYS
OF RECORD, HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT AND BLANTON. NOTICE IS HEREBY
GIVEN THAT:

1.

The above-named Appellants, Randolph E. Farber, Scott Alan Becker and Critter
Clinic, acting on behalf of themselves and the Class which they represent, appeal
to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Granting Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment on the Issue of the Statute of Limitations (a partial summary

judgment) which was entered by the Honorable James Morfitt and filed on April
30, 2007 and from Judge Morfitt's subsequent Memorandum Decision and Order
Upon the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration filed on March 25, 2010, which

declined to reconsider the Order granting partial summary judgment. These
Orders became final and appealable when on September 17, 2010, the Final
Judgment and Order ofDismissal with Prejudice was filed.

The claims arising from the Plaintiffs' Complaint pertained to a series of
dividend distributions which were made near the first of every year beginning
January of 2002 and continuing through January of 2009. The partial summary
judgment based on the statute of limitations foreclosed those claims as to the
dividends distributed prior to January of 2004. This partial summary judgment
was not appealable until the rest of the claims presented in the action were
resolved by the District Court. On May 10, 2010 the Parties filed a Stipulation of
Settlement with the Court as to "released claims" which specifically included only
the claims related to the dividends distributed in January 2004 and each year
thereafter through and including the dividend distributed in January of 2009. On
May 24, 2010 the District Court preliminarily approved this Settlement and on
APPELLANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL- 2
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September 16, 20 I 0, the District Court gave final approval to the settlement and,
pursuant to the terms of the settlement, dismissed all unresolved claims in the
action by the Final Judgment filed September 17, 20 I 0.
2.

Appellants have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court pursuant to I.AR.
ll(a)(6).

3.

Appellants intend to assert on appeal that the aforesaid Decisions and Orders
constitute an error of law and should be reversed on appeal with instructions to the
District Court to enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs forthwith nunc pro tune.

4.

No transcript of any oral argument is requested by the Appellants.

5.

Documents to be included in the record in addition to those documents
automatically included pursuant to I.AR. 28 are:
(a)

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed on or about 2/13/2007.

(b)

All memoranda submitted by counsel either supporting or resisting
motions for summary judgment on statutes of limitation including but not
limited to:
(i)

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment filed on or about 2/13/2007;

(ii)

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment filed on or about 3/12/2007;

(iii)

Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment filed on or about 3/28/2007.

(c)

Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration filed on or about 12/04/2009.

(d)

All memoranda submitted by counsel either supporting or resisting
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.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration including but not limited to:
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and

(i)

Alternative Motion to Bifurcate filed on or about 12/04/2009.
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration

(ii)

or Alternatively, for Bifurcation of Class filed on or about
1/04/2010.
(iii)

Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Reconsideration or Alternatively, for Bifurcation of
Class filed on or about 1/19/2010.

(e)
6.

Affidavit of Donald W. Lojek filed on or about 12/04/2009.

The undersigned certifies:
(a)

That the clerk of the court has been paid the estimated fee for the
preparation of the clerk's record pursuant to I.A.R. 27(c), i.e., in the
amount of $ l 00. 00;

(b)

All appellate filing fees have been paid; and

(c)

Service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to
I.A.R. 20.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of October, 2010.

LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD.

<ZlJt

By
Donald W. Lojek, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appell,ants

Bruce S. Bistline, Of the Finn
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ a y ofOctober, 20 I 0, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing instrument was served on the following by the method indicated below, and
addressed as follows:
[ ]

[..-r[ ]
[ ]

Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail, postage paid
Overnight Express Mail
Facsimile Copy:

Richard E. Hall
Keely Duke
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton PA
702 West Idaho Street, Ste. 700
Boise, ID 83 702
Attorney for State Insurance Fund

~LDonald W. Lojek
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

rfuG I

/
RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT ALAN
BECKER and CRITTER CLINIC, an Idaho
professional association,

)
)
)

A.~

E DP.M.

OCT 18 2010
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T RANDALL, DEPUTY

ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL

)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

)

~

)
)
)

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
JAMES M. ALCORN, its manager, and
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER,
MARGUARITE MC LAUGHLIN, GERALD
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE
MARTIN, MARK SNODGRASS, RODNEY
A. HIGGINS, TERRY GESTRIN, MAX
BLANCK and STEVE LANDON in their
capacity as members of the Board of Directors
of the State Insurance Fund,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court Docket No. 38140-2010
Canyon County Docket No. 2006-7877

)

Defendants-Respondents.

)

A Clerk!s Record and Reporter's Transcript was filed May 27, 2008, in appeal No.
35144, Farber v State Insurance Fund; therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the Appeal Record in this case shall be
AUGMENTED to include the Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal
No. 35144.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepar.e and file a
LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD with this Court, which shall contain the documents requested in the
Notice of Appeal, together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any document included
in the Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 35144. The LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD shall be
filed with this Court after settlement. Further, the exhibits submitted in prior appeal No. 35144 are
not covered by this Order and they will not be sent to the Supreme Court unless specifically
requested by the parties. The party requesting any or all of the prior exhibits must specifically
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designate those exhibits being requested.
DATED this/

cc:

L/-tl, day of October 2010.

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Reporter
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Richard E. Hall
ISB #1253; reh@hallfarley.com

Keely E. Duke
ISB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585
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CANYON COUNTY C~ERK

D. BUTLER, OEPUfJY

Attomeys for Defendants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OFT~
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIB COUNTY OF CANYON

RANDOLPH E. FARBE~ SCOTT ALAN
BECKER and CRITTER CLINIC, an Idaho
Professional Association,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Case No. CV06-7877

I

I

I

DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FdR
ADDITIONS TO REPORTER'S
TRANSCRIPT AND CLERK'S
I

RECORD

vs.

I

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager,
and WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER,
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN,
GERALD GEDDES, MILFORD
TERRELL, JUDI DANIELSON, JOHN
GOEDDE, ELAINE MARTIN, and MARK
SNODGRASS in their capacity as member
of the Board of Directors of the State
Insurance Fund,
Defendants/Respondents.

I
I

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS AND THEIR ATIO!UIBYS
I
OF RECORD, AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. ;
I

iI

I

i

II

DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONS TO REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT AND CL~RK'S
RECORD-1

'
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I

I

I

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the defendants/respondents, Idaho $tate
'

I

I

Insurance Fund, James M. Alcorn, Manager of the State Insurance Fund, and the 8ioard
I

of Directors of the State Insurance Fund ("SIF''). hereby request, pursuant to Rule ~ 9 of
i

the Idaho Appellate Rules, the inclusion of the. following material in the Repo~er's
I

I

Transcript and Clerk's Record in addition to that required to be included by the Idaho
I

Appellate Rules, the Notice of Appeal filed October 6. 2010. and Idaho Supreme C~urt's

!

Order Augmenting Appeal filed October 14, 2010:

I
I

1. Requested additions to the Report's Transcript:

a. Motions hearing of April 6. 2007; and
b. Motion hearing ofFebruary 26, 2010.
2. Requested additions to the Clerk's Record:
a

Affidavit of Michael Camilleri, filed February 13, 2007; and

b. Affidavit of James M. Alcorn, filed February 13, 2007.
I

3. I certify that a copy of this request for additional transcripts has been served

!

on each court reporter of whom a transcript is requested, as named below at
the addresses set out below:

Kim Saunders
Court Reporter for Judge Morfitt (April 6, 2007 hearing)
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605
Yvonne Hyde Gier
Court Reporter for Judge Morfitt (February 26, 2010 hearing)
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605
I
I

I
I

i

i
DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ADDmONS TO REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT AND CLERK'S
RECORD-2
I
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-------·

4. I further certify that this request for additional record has been served

1pon
I

the clerk of the district court and upon all parties required to be

served

pursuant to Rule 20.
RESPECTUFLL Y SUBMITTED this 20th day of October, 2010.

HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT
& BLANTON, P.A.

I
I

I
!

DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONS TO REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT AND Cl.F.RK'S
RECORD-3
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bERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

,

I

'1---

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the -Zfj day of October, 2010, I caused to be!I
served a true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below. and !
addressed to each of the following:
Donald W. Lojek
Lojek Law Offices, CHTD
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702
FSJC.NO.: (208) 345-0050
Attorne:ys for Plaintiffs

Philip Gordon
Bruce S. Bistline
Gordon Law Offices
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050

· U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Teleoopy

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Attorneys for Plaintijfo

I
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Donald W. Lojek tBN 1395
Lojek Law OfficeJ, CHID
1199 W. Main Str~et
PO Box 1712
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: 20 -343-7733
Facsimile:
20,-345-0050

_F
__
, A.~_;j_·Sff_P,M,
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NOV O9 2010
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
8 1!1AVN!;, 01!:PUTY

Philip Gordon 1sJN 1996

Bruce S. Bistline isBN 1988
GORDON LA w .PFFICES
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83 702i
Telephone: 208/ 45-7100
Facsimile: 208/ 45"0050
Attorneys for Plal,nti.ffe and the Class
I

IN 1-HE
DISTRICT COURT OF TI-IE TIIIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
I
OF niE STA1E OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

RANDOLPH E. tRBER. SCOTT ALAN
BECKER and CtJ:ITER CLINIC, an Idaho
Professional Ass~ciation.
!

Plaintiffs,

vs.

THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, and
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER.
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, JUDJ
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE
MARTIN, and MARK SNODGRASS in

CASE NO. CV 06-7877
ORDER DIRECTING THE
SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATOR
TO DISTRIBUTE A PORTION OF
THE ATTORNEY'S FEES
AWARDED BY TIIE COURT

their capacity as member of the Board of
Director$ of the State Insurance Fund1
Defendants.

TIDS MATTER HAVINO COME BEFORE THE COURT pursuant to the
ORDER DIRECTING THE SET'T'LEMENT ADMINISTRATOR TO PAV OR SECURE PAYMENT
OF IMMEDIATE AND PERIODIC FUTURE .PAYMENTS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO CLASS
COUNSEL
Page 1
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PAGE

APPLICATION OF CLASS COUNSEL FOR AN ORDER DIRECTING THE SETl'LEMENT
ADMlNISTRATOR TO DISTRtBUTE A PORTION OF THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDED BY THE

COURTi and the Court having reviewed the same, determined that based upon previous Orders of

the Court there is no other party or entity with any interest in the Court's determinations with
respect to the Application and that the requested would be only a partial distribution to one of

the individuals or entities with any apparent claim to share in the attorney fee awarded by the
Court and that the all of the interested parties and entities have signed off on the Application, and
the Court being otherwise fu)Jy advised in the premises:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: That the Settlement Administrator, Oilardi & Co
shall pay and distribute attorney fees to Gordon Law Offices Chtd, 623 W. Hays (or such other
address as it may from time to time specify) in the amount of $342,185.53

IT IS SO ORDERED
On this q,,i..day of November, 2010.

Judge Thomas J. Ryan

ORDER DIRECTING THJ: SE'ITLEM.lt.NT ADMINlSTRATOR TO PAY OR SECURE PAYMENT
OF IMMEDIATE AND PERIO.DJC FUTURE PAYMENTS OF ATIORNEY'S FEES TO CLASS
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Donald W. Lojek ISBN 1395
Lojek Law Offices, CHTD
1199 W. Main Street
PO Box 1712
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone:
208-343-7733
Facsimile:
208-345-0050

A.~

E DP.M.

NOV 2 2 2010
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
ll1t,DEPUTV

Philip Gordon ISBN 1996
Bruce S. Bistline ISBN 1988
GORDON LAW OFFICES
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83 702
Telephone: 208/345-7100
Facsimile: 208/345-0050
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT ALAN
BECKER and CRITTER CLINIC, an Idaho
Professional Association.
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE IDAHO STA TE INSURANCE FUND,
JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, and
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER,
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE
MARTIN,andMARK.SNODGRASSm
their capacity as member of the Board of
Directors of the State Insurance Fund,
Defendants.

CASE NO. CV 06-7877

ORDER DIRECTING THE
SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATOR
TO PAY OR SECURE PAYMENT
OF IMMEDIATE AND PERIODIC
FUTURE PAYMENTS OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO CLASS
COUNSEL.

THIS MATTER HAVING COME BEFORE THE COURT pursuant to the
ORDER DIRECTING THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATOR TO PAY OR SECURE PAYMENT
OF IMMEDIATE AND PERIODIC FUTURE PAYMENTS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO CLASS
COUNSEL
Page I
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ORlCJINAL

APPLICATION OF CLASS COUNSEL FOR AN ORDER DIRECTING THE SETTLEMENT
ADMINISTRATOR TO PAY OR SECURE PAYMENT OF IMMEDIATE AND PERIODIC FUTURE
PAYMENTS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO CLASS COUNSEL, and the Court having reviewed the

same, determined that:
1.

Based upon previous Orders of the Court there is no party or entity other than the firms
and individuals identified as Class Counsel (terms capitalized herein are intended to have
the same meaning as ascribed to them in the Stipulation for Settlement filed herein on
May 10, 2010) with any interest in the Court's determinations with respect to the
Application.

2.

That all individuals (Donald W. Lojek, Esq., Bruce S. Bistline, Esq.m and Philip Gordon,
Esa.) and firms (Lojek Law Office, Chtd, and Gordon Law Office, Chtd.) identified as
Class Counsel have signed the Application

3.

That the requested immediate and periodic future payments can be paid or adequately
secured without the cost to the Settlement Fund exceeding the sum of 33 1/3% of the
initial Settlement Fund ($2,300,000) as Ordered by the Court on the22nd day of
September, 2010.
Considering this findings and with the Court being otherwise fully advised in the

premises:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

That the Settlement Administrator, Gilardi & Co shall:
a.

pay and distribute attorney fees to Lojek Law Offices Chtd., at PO Box 1712
Boise, ID 83701 (or such other address as he may from time to time specify) full

ORDER DIRECTING THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATOR TO PAY OR SECURE PAYMENT
OF IMMEDIATE AND PERIODIC FUTURE PAYMENTS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO CLASS
COUNSEL
Page 2
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payment of its share of fees in this matter as follows;
1.

Immediate Payment in the amount of $106,666.67

11.

Future Periodic Payments as follows:
(1)

Beginning 12/15/2011, Pay $$129,600 Per Year For Five Years
Certain Only. (5 Payments).

b.

Enter into appropriate non-qualified assignments with entities approved by Lojek
Law Offices, Chtd., to assure the payment of all future periodic payments, the
cost of which will not exceed $650,000.

2.

That the Settlement Administrator, Gilardi & Co shall:
a.

pay and distribute attorney fees to Bruce S. Bistline, as an individual Class
Counsel, full payment of his share of fees in this matter as follows;

b.

1.

Immediate Payment in the amount of $197,217.80

11.

Future Periodic Payments as follows:
(1)

Beginning 12/15/2011, Pay $40,000.00 Per Year For 8 Years
Certain Only. (8 Payments).

(2)

On 12/15/2019 one payment of $129,000

(3)

On 12/15/2020 one payment of $129,000

Enter into appropriate non-qualified assignments with entities approved by Bruce
S. Bistline to assure the payment of all future periodic payments, the cost of
which will not exceed $500,000 ..

3.

That the Settlement Administrator is not to disburse any amounts for the payment of
attorney fees or to assure the payment of attorney fees which would cause the total

ORDER DIRECTING THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATOR TO PAY OR SECURE PAYMENT
OF IMMEDIATE AND PERIODIC FUTURE PAYMENTS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO CLASS
COUNSEL
Page 3
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amount distributed to exceed $2,300,000. Once the Settlement Administrator has
disbursed this amount for immediate payments and to enter into non-qualified
assignments as set forth above, the Settlement Administrator and the Qualified Settlement
Fund are forever discharged from any duties relative to the payment of attorney fees to
Donald W. Lojek, Bruce S. Bistline and Lojek Law Offices Chtd., and shall bear no
liability for the failure of any assignee to make the required future periodic payments in a
timely manner.

IT IS SO ORDERED
On this 'l-4'l day of November, 2010.

Judge Thomas J.

Ry

ORDER DIRECTING THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATOR TO PAY OR SECURE PAYMENT
OF IMMEDIATE AND PERIODIC FUTURE PAYMENTS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO CLASS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the •"7::l,,, day of November, 2010, I caused to be delivered the
foregoing document, addressed to the following and delivered by the method indicated below:

Donald W. Lojek
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD
623 W.Hays
PO Box 1712
Boise, ID 83701
Facsimile: 208-345-0050

Philip Gordon ISBN 1996
Bruce S. Bistline ISBN 1988
GORDON LAW OFFICES
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83 702
Facsimile: 208/345-0050

Gilardi & Co., LLC
3301 Kerner Blvd.
San Rafael, CA 94901

HAND DELIVERY
_){_U.S.MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FACSIMILE 208-345-0050

HAND DELIVERY
-.x-u.S.MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FACSIMILE 208-345-7100

HAND DELIVERY
-¼-U.S.MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL

- -FACSIMILE 415-256-9756

c1erkofcf

ORDER DIRECTING THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATOR TO PAY OR SECURE PAYMENT
OF IMMEDIATE AND PERIODIC FUTURE PAYMENTS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO CLASS
COUNSEL
Page 5

000329

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

RANDOLPH E. FARBER, Etal.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
-vsTHE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE
FUND, Etal.,
Defendants-Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-06-07877*C
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT

I, WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following
is being sent as an exhibit as requested in the Notice of Appeal:

NONE
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
't"',

the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this___,~_ day of

~\) 4:- ,.

WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
in an9- }G{ the County of Canyon.
By:
J\ le:
Deputy
!' ·~t --~,-

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

RANDOLPH E. FARBER, Etal.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
-vsTHE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Etal.,
Defendants-Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-06-07877*C
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

I, WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District Comt of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby ce1tify that the above and
foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my
direction as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, including specific documents, except no duplicate
documents were included from prior appeal No. 35144.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Comt at Caldwell, Idaho this _"----'-_day of __,=1':=:·=,,_,.- - - ' - - - - - -

WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District
Comt of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
in andJor the County of Canyon.
~ · ·
Deputy
By:
t~- -~~-.)•,,
-- ,fl ;,

CERTIFICATE OF CLERK
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

RANDOLPH E. FARBER, Etal.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
-vsTHE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Etal.,
Defendants-Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 38140
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the
Clerk's Record and one copy of the Reporter's Transcript to the attorney of record to each
party as follows:
Donald W. Lojek, LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD,
P.O. Box 1712, Boise, Idaho 83701
Richard E. Hall and Keely E. Duke, HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, PA, P.O. Box 1271, Boise, Idaho 83701

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
1

the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ---L.;""--"- day of _ _....1·'~\,<-=''---=C~-_ _ __, .,,.._~~WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
in and fu.r the County of Canyon.
By:
' \
Deputy

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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